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Accounting for Japan’s Lost Score 
 
  Caroline M. Betts* 
Abstract 
This paper develops a quantitative framework to evaluate the sectoral origins of economic growth. First, I 
decompose growth in aggregate growth accounting variables–GDP per working age person, a capital 
factor, an hours’ worked factor, and an implied total factor productivity factor–into sectoral contributions. 
I decompose the TFP factor growth contribution of a sector into 1) sector-share weighted, within-sector 
TFP factor growth, and 2) several residual allocative effects. Second, I interpret structurally the observed 
sectoral contributions by comparing them to those predicted by a multi-sector neoclassical growth model. 
Using the framework to account for Japan’s economic growth slowdown I find that, empirically, two 
factors quantitatively dominated Japan’s slowing GDP per working age person in the 1990s. First, a large 
decline in aggregate TFP growth relative to the 1980s, driven by 1) slower within-industrial sector TFP 
growth, and 2) negative residual effects due to faster value-added reallocation towards services which 
mediated a larger impact of the sector for aggregate capital deepening. Second, a large fall in hours worked 
per working age person, originating mainly in smaller industrial sector contributions. In the 2000s, 
continued GDP per working age person and aggregate TFP growth decay were due largely to slower 
within-service sector TFP growth. In the 2010s, anemic aggregate TFP factor growth equal to just 18 percent 
of its 1980s value was depressed by zero service sector TFP growth; a modest growth rate recovery in 
GDP per working age person originated in rapid increases in hours worked per working age person, via 
roughly equal increases in industrial and service sector contributions. A calibrated three-sector growth 
model absent frictions, featuring sectoral TFP time series as inputs, reproduces closely the time-series from 
1980–2018 of a) hours shares of sectors, b) GDP per working age person, and c) the aggregate TFP factor. 
It captures quite well a) sample-average aggregate TFP growth, b) aggregate TFP growth rate changes 
across decades, c) the decomposition of aggregate TFP factor growth into total “within-sector” TFP and 
total residual contributions of sectors, and d) “within-sector” TFP growth contributions of agriculture, 
industry, and services. The model cannot replicate the sources of, or sectoral contributions to, observed–
albeit small–TFP growth residual effects. More importantly, the model’s predicted hours factor (hours per 
working age person): 1) captures only 46 percent of the decline in industry’s contribution to the fall in 
aggregate hours factor growth in the 1990s; 2) declines in the 2000s, while hours factor growth is positive 
in the data; 3) captures only 47 percent of observed average hours factor growth in the 2010s; and 4) 
allocates too much of the 2010s increase in aggregate hours factor growth to industry. A higher 
intertemporal elasticity of substitution, a higher Frisch elasticity, and an aggregate labor (policy) wedge 
resolve some, but exacerbate other, model failures.  
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Ending the nation’s “economic growth miracle”, Japan suffered two decades–a “lost score”–of much 
slower GDP per working age person growth from 1991 through 2010 relative to her impressive 
growth performance in previous post-war decades. I document here that Japan’s growth slowdown 
was due largely to a slowing of aggregate productivity growth, and that productivity growth slowing 
has persisted into a third decade since the great recession of 2008–2009. Specifically, I show that 
although Japan has witnessed modest improvement in GDP per working age person growth since 
2010 to roughly two percent–a rate commonly associated with long-run “trend growth”–this is 
attributable not to faster productivity growth but to rapid increases in hours worked per working age 
person. Since 2010, Japan’s aggregate TFP growth has marginally improved, but to just 18 percent of 
its 1980s value, while average labor productivity growth declined for a third consecutive decade. In 
addition, capital deepening ceased entirely after 2010, suggesting that Japan may be converging to a 
shallower trend growth path. These facts portend a return to slower growth in living standards in 
Japan in the future; growth theory implies that technology-driven productivity growth alone–not labor 
input growth–drives sustainable increases in output per person. Why has this large and persistent 
productivity and economic growth slowdown in Japan occurred? The goal of this paper is to make a 
modest contribution to an answer by investigating empirically and theoretically the sectoral origins of 
Japan’s GDP per working age person and TFP growth since 1990.   
Several literatures motivate identifying sectoral contributions to the aggregate productivity and 
economic slowdown in Japan. In a contribution to the great depressions methodology pioneered by 
Cole and Ohanian (1999) and Kehoe and Prescott (2002, 2007), Hayashi and Prescott (2002) 
conjecture that Japan’s aggregate TFP slowdown in the 1990s may be attributable to industrial policy 
which effectively subsidized relatively inefficient manufacturing sector firms. In an analysis of the role 
of structural transformation for aggregate productivity, Duarte and Restuccia (2010) argue that all 
examples in their international dataset of countries that exhibit slower, stagnating, and declining 
aggregate productivity growth are accounted for by low levels and growth rates of service sector 
productivity. A large firm-level misallocation literature, originating in the seminal contributions of 
Restuccia and Rogerson (2008) and Hsieh and Klenow (2009), implies that “average” sector-level 
misallocation reduces metrics of aggregate TFP levels. Additionally, several recent empirical analyses 
of Japan’s growth and productivity slowdown have emphasized the importance for policy 
prescriptions and international productivity comparisons of identifying sector-level sources, of which 
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Fukao, Kim, and Kwon (2021), and Jorgenson, Nomura, and Samuels (2016) are just two notable 
examples.  
In this paper, I develop a quantitative framework to, first, measure sectoral contributions to 
GDP per working age person, capital and labor input factors, and aggregate TFP factor growth in the 
data and, second, provide insight into the economic mechanisms driving observed sectoral 
contributions by comparing them to those predicted by a multi-sector neoclassical growth model. The 
empirical sectoral contributions to economic growth and economic growth factors that I characterize 
have analogues in the solutions of the multi-sector growth model. Moreover, model-based estimates 
of sectoral contributions can be “re-constituted”, reversing the decomposition calculations, into 
model-based analogues of aggregate macroeconomic variable growth rates. Model-based estimates of 
sectoral contributions and aggregate growth rates are not only metrics to evaluate the quantitative 
performance of the model; to the extent that they accurately reproduce the data, they provide 
structural interpretations of observed aggregate and sectoral growth accounting results. I apply the 
framework to analyze the sectoral sources of Japan’s economic and productivity growth slowdown.   
The basis for my sectoral decompositions of growth in GDP per working age person and TFP 
is the growth accounting framework adopted by Kehoe and Prescott (2002, 2007). In this framework, 
GDP per working age person is accounted for by three aggregate growth factors: A capital (deepening) 
factor, an hours-worked factor, and a TFP factor. The beauty of this specific growth accounting is its 
interpretation in the context of the balanced growth path of a one-sector neoclassical growth model; 
on a balanced growth path, the capital factor (a function of the capital-output ratio) and hours factor 
(hours per working age person) are constant, and growth in GDP per working age person derives 
solely from TFP factor growth. I calculate an empirical decomposition into sectoral contributions of 
growth in i) GDP per working age person, ii) the aggregate capital factor, and iii) aggregate hours 
factor. The decompositions are exact and based solely on aggregation of sectoral into economy-wide 
metrics of each variable in the data. The difference between a sector’s contribution to GDP per 
working age person growth and its contributions to aggregate capital and hours factor growth rates 
measures that sector’s total contribution to aggregate TFP factor growth. The sum of sectoral total 
contributions to aggregate TFP factor growth exactly equals aggregate TFP factor growth. Assuming 
Cobb-Douglas production functions govern sectoral value-added, the aggregate TFP factor growth 
contribution of a sector can be further decomposed into two sources: i) sector-share weighted, 
“within-sector/own” TFP factor growth, and ii) residual effects due to a) changes in the sector’s 
relative value-added price, b) the sector’s capital income share relative to the economy-wide capital 
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income share, and c) evolution of the sector’s value-added share. I develop a similar sectoral 
accounting for labor productivity, measured by GDP per hour worked. For the sake of brevity, I 
present most of the labor productivity results in appendix A.3. To summarize, sectoral contributions 
to GDP per hour worked can be characterized by i) sector-share weighted, “within-sector/own” value 
added per hour growth, and ii) residual effects due to a) changes in the sector’s relative value-added 
price, and b) evolution of the sector’s share of hours worked.  
My model-based estimates of sectoral contributions to GDP per working age person, capital 
hours, and TFP factor growth are derived from simulation of a calibrated three sector model of 
structural change and growth. The model is closely related to that presented by Herrendorf, Rogerson, 
and Valentinyi (2014). Sectoral value added is produced by perfectly competitive firms in the three 
major sectors of economic activity–agriculture, industry, and services. Firms produce value added 
using sector-specific Cobb-Douglas technologies employing labor and capital services, and value-
added of the three sectors is consumed by households. I modify the model to allow for final 
government consumption of value added produced by the three sectors. I also allow for the final 
investment expenditure of households to fall on the value added produced by all three sectors, rather 
than specifying a separate value-added investment production sector, a specification that is easier to 
reconcile with sectoral final use data. There is no money in the model, nor any real or financial frictions 
in my benchmark calibration of the model in which I assume that aggregate and sectoral allocations 
are the efficient outcomes of perfectly competitive markets absent distortions. Model-predicted 
aggregates and aggregate growth factors are constructed by summing sectoral allocations, using 
sectoral prices as weights wherever the equilibrium price of a variable differs across sectors. The 
aggregate TFP factor is calculated by taking the ratio of model-predicted aggregate GDP per working 
age person to the capital and hours factors. Sectoral contributions to growth in all aggregate growth 
accounting variables, including the TFP factor, are calculated exactly as in the data.  
Empirically, I find a large and persistent decline in aggregate TFP factor growth after 1990 is 
the primary source of slower average growth in GDP per working age person and GDP per hour 
worked from 1991 through 2010 relative to the 1980s. An economically significant decline in hours 
worked per working age person also contributed to slower growth in GDP per working age person in 
the 1990s, while an economically significant increase in hours worked per working age person 
produced modest growth rate recovery in GDP per working age person in the 2010s. Because in the 
2010s TFP factor growth was an anemic 18 percent of its 1980s value and the capital-output ratio 
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declined, growth in GDP per hour worked declined for a third consecutive decade after the great 
recession.  
Sectoral decompositions show that in the 1990s two factors quantitatively dominated the 
aggregate TFP growth slow-down: 1) Slower “within” industrial sector TFP factor growth; and 2) a 
negative service sector residual effect, due to a larger impact of the sector for aggregate capital 
deepening mediated through faster value-added reallocation towards the service sector. By 
substantially reducing TFP factor growth, these sectoral contributions also reduced growth in GDP 
per working age person and GDP per hour worked relative to the 1980s. Additionally, an economically 
significant decline in industrial-sector hours per working age person was the main source of decline in 
aggregate hours factor growth in the 1990s and contributed to slower GDP per working age person 
growth. By contrast, continued aggregate TFP growth decay in the 2000s was due largely to slower 
“within” service sector TFP factor growth. That the decline in GDP per working age person growth 
in the 2000s relative to the 1990s was relatively modest was mainly a manifestation of faster growth 
in industrial and service sector hours per working age person, despite the great recession. Similarly, 
the 2011–2018 period saw modest growth rate recovery in GDP per working age person due to rapid 
growth in aggregate hours worked per working age person accomplished through roughly equal 
increases in the hours factor contributions of industry and services. The continued decline in labor 
productivity growth was due to almost equal declines in the capital-deepening contributions of 
industry and services, while aggregate TFP factor growth after 2010 remained depressed due to zero 
service sector contributions.   
I calibrate the three sector model’s industry-level and aggregate parameters so that the model 
replicates a) Japan’s national account data for 1980, and b) a table based on 1980 input-output data 
which represents final use of sectoral value-added by households, the government, and the 
(exogenous) external sector. I construct value added use by sector using a method developed by 
Herrendorf, Rogerson, and Valentinyi (2013). Elasticity parameters are based on extant empirical 
estimates. Sectoral TFP factors, the working population, sectoral net exports, and the fraction of GDP 
accounted for by total government consumption at each date are exogenous data inputs to the model.   
Despite its simplicity, the model matches quite closely the time series evolution of sectoral shares of 
economic activity, GDP per working age person, GDP per hour worked, and the aggregate TFP 
factor. This success includes the model producing a great recession and recovery of proximately the 
right magnitude and persistence, and a temporary negative GDP per working age person growth effect 
of the 2011 earthquake which is observed in the data.  The model also does a decent job of matching 
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aggregate growth accounting facts–with three notable exceptions which I discuss below–and sectoral 
contributions to aggregate growth factors, including total sectoral contributions to aggregate TFP 
factor growth. It also captures quantitatively the decomposition of aggregate TFP factor growth into 
a total “within-sector” TFP growth and total residual effect. In addition, the model’s predictions for 
share-weighted, “within-sector” TFP factor growth contributions to aggregate TFP factor growth of 
each of the three major sectors of economic activity are close to those observed in the data.  
However, the model fails to replicate the decomposition of residual effects for aggregate TFP 
factor growth into the three sources–relative price, capital-income share, and value-added reallocation 
effects–and especially for agriculture and services. In particular, the model does not reproduce well 
sectoral relative price contributions or sectoral value-added reallocation contributions to aggregate 
TFP factor growth. It is possible that incorporating intermediate inputs in the sectoral production 
functions would improve the model’s performance in matching sectoral shares, relative prices, and–
hence–residual effects. Nonetheless, residual effects together account for only a small portion of total 
sectoral contributions to aggregate TFP growth.  
Perhaps more importantly, the model cannot match quantitatively the decline in the industrial 
sector’s contribution to growth in hours per working age person in the 1990s and, partly as a result, 
underpredicts the 1990s decline in GDP per working age person growth. The model also cannot match 
the observed increase in hours per working age person in the 2000s which occurs despite the great 
recession, and hence overpredicts the decline in GDP per working age person growth in the 2000s 
relative to the 1990s. Nor can the model match the large industrial and service sector contributions 
producing rapid hours and, hence, relatively rapid GDP per working age person growth in the 2010s. 
Specifically, the model captures only 46 percent of the decline in industry’s contribution to the fall in 
aggregate hours factor growth in the 1990s, it predicts a decline rather than the observed increase in 
hours factor growth in the 2000s, it captures only 47 percent of observed average hours factor growth 
in the 2010s, and allocates too much of the 2010s increase in aggregate hours factor growth to industry. 
Each of these decades features significant government intervention in labor markets which the model 
does not reflect; as a result, the efficient, undistorted hours allocations of households predicted by the 
model cannot replicate the allocations observed in the data. Specifically, in the late 1980s and early 
1990s Japan mandated a reduction in the length of the working week, and this is associated with a 
relatively large decline in average hours worked per employed person (Hayashi and Prescott (2002), 
Betts (2021). In the 2000s, it has been argued that Japanese firms insulated employees from job losses 
in the great recession via “labor hoarding” (Steinberg and Nakane (2011)), and it is well known that 
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the 2010s featured systematic policies by prime minister Abe to raise labor force participation by 
women, immigrants, and retiree-age members of the working age population.  
I explore whether the model’s performance in matching aggregate and sectoral hours per 
working age person can be improved without introducing distortions measured by “wedges” which 
represent generic distortions in the labor market. Specifically, I conduct two sensitivity analyses 
allowing for higher elasticities of intertemporal substitution and labor supply, respectively. Higher 
elasticities improve the model’s ability to match the decline in industry’s contribution to hours growth 
in the 1990s, and the average growth rate of hours per working age person in the 2010s. However, the 
high elasticity variants produce an even larger decline of the hours factor in the 2000s than does the 
benchmark model, and overpredict the magnitude of increase in industry and service sector hours 
factor contributions in the 2010s relative to the 2000s. Irrespective of the limited improvements they 
elicit in model performance, the high aggregate elasticity values that I experiment with are generally 
thought to be empirically implausible. Incorporating an aggregate labor wedge which represents a 
distortion in (or tax on) the household’s intra-temporal choice of hours worked relative to leisure also 
does not improve the overall fit of the model relative to the benchmark specification, although it does 
increase predicted hours factor growth marginally in the 2000s and substantively in the 2010s. I show 
that to account for hours factor growth in a model with an aggregate labor wedge, and empirically 
plausible (benchmark) elasticities of intertemporal substitution and labor supply, requires that the 
introduction of a second, intertemporal wedge which taxes savings and stimulates labor supply growth.  
My results imply that investigation of how best to model the labor market policies enacted in 
Japan and the effects of those policies for household decision making would be a productive line of 
research in better accounting for Japan’s hours and GDP per working age person growth experience 
since 1980.   
         The framework developed in this paper for analyzing Japan’s secular growth slowdown is similar 
to that of Jeong (2020), which he uses to analyze Korea’s structural transformation and positive growth 
experience since 1960. Jeong adopts a two-sector (agriculture and non-agriculture) neoclassical growth 
model as the basis for his Korean growth accounting, and includes land as a production factor, 
emphasizing the importance of land reallocation across sectors as a source of structural change and 
growth for an emerging economy. I have assumed that land reallocation across sectors was trivial for 
Japan after 1980, following rapid industrialization with agriculture already accounting for a small 
percentage of economic activity. In addition, Jeong focuses on decomposing output per capita and 
labor productivity rather than output per working age person and TFP. Specifically, Jeong decomposes 
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output per capita growth into a) within-sector employment rate growth, b) reallocation of employment 
across sectors, c) within-sector labor productivity growth, and d) changes in the sectoral allocation of 
hours worked. His aggregate labor productivity decomposition in c) and d) is very similar to my labor 
productivity growth decomposition presented in appendix A.3, however, Jeong does not explicitly 
show any decomposition of aggregate TFP growth (although his framework would generate one). 
Jeong’s modeling exercise focuses on quantifying the “wedges” associated with the first order 
condition at every choice margin, and his calibration choices and strategy are very different from mine. 
Diewert (2015) and Oulton (2016) also lay out empirical decompositions of aggregate labor 
productivity and TFP in both sectoral value-added production frameworks–which are very similar to 
mine–and gross output production frameworks.   
           My paper is close in spirit to Hayashi and Prescott (2002), who use a neoclassical growth 
accounting framework to show that slower TFP growth was the largest source of Japan’s 1990s 
slowdown, with a smaller role for declining average hours due to the mandated reduction in the length 
of the working week. They argue that a one-sector neoclassical growth model does a good job of 
accounting for the aggregate slowdown during the 1990s. They hypothesize that misguided subsidies 
to inefficient firms and declining industries may be responsible for misallocating a higher portion of 
resources in favor of low productivity growth entities and sectors, discouraging investments (in 
efficient firms and industries) that could raise productivity growth.  They cite Japan’s “Temporary 
Measures for the Stabilization of Specific Depressed Industries” from 1978 to 1983 as an example of 
such subsidies, when the rate of annual TFP growth declined from over 2 percent in the preceding 
three to six years to just 0.64 percent. My results imply that, for the most part, the efficient allocations 
generated by a multi-sector competitive equilibrium growth model does a decent job of replicating 
Japan’s aggregate TFP growth experience after 1990. More generally, my framework can be interpreted 
as a multi-sector application of the great depressions methodology followed by Hayashi and Prescott 
(2002) and originating in Cole and Ohanian (1999) and Kehoe and Prescott (2002) and (2007).  
The paper also contributes new evidence to a large empirical literature analyzing the sectoral 
origins and persistence of Japan’s aggregate economic and productivity slowdown since the 1990s.  
Baily, Bosworth, and Doshi (2020), Fukao et al. (2004), Fukao (2013), Fukao et al. (2015), and Fukao 
et al. (2021) are just a few precursors that have shown aggregate labor productivity and TFP growth 
slowdown as the main source of Japan’s economic growth slowdown and examined sectoral origins. 
In these and many related research papers, aggregate TFP is measured using different datasets, and 
alternative aggregate growth and development accounting models are utilized to derive it. Fukao and 
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various coauthors, in a long-term project using their own constructed productivity database–the 
Japanese Industrial Productivity (JIP)–also reach the conclusion that Japan’s slow economic growth 
relative to preceding post-war decades is the result of a long-term slowdown in productivity growth. 
They use different growth accounting frameworks than that adopted here of Cole and Ohanian (1999) 
and Kehoe and Prescott (2002, 2007), however. In addition, they often include a labor “quality” 
measure which yields rather different implications for the evolution of labor productivity. Baily, 
Bosworth and Doshi examine metrics of within-sector productivity growth to infer sectoral 
contributions to aggregate TFP slowing, but do not explicitly decompose aggregate into sectoral 
contributions.  Fukao and various coauthors in multiple papers use sectoral productivity estimates 
based on the JIP dataset. They deploy a variety of explicit sectoral decompositions with alternative 
interpretations of sectoral contributions to aggregate productivity growth, none of which are the same 
as mine. Jorgenson, Namura, and Samuels (2018) construct and study different productivity measures 
than I do, using PPP adjusted data, and focus on measuring the sectoral origins of productivity 
differences between Japan and the United States. None of the resulting papers generate model-based 
estimates of sectoral contributions to aggregate productivity growth for the purposes of interpreting 
their results, however.   
The next two sections describe the data, empirical decompositions of growth accounting 
variables and aggregate TFP, and the empirical results. Section 4 presents the three-sector competitive 
equilibrium growth model, and section 5 details its calibration. Section 6 presents the results of 
simulating the calibrated model and compares model-generated data to the empirical results of 
sections 2 and 3, and sensitivity analysis. Section 7 concludes.   
2. Data Analysis  
I measure all data at the annual frequency, drawing original series from the OECD STAN database, 
the System of National Accounts of Japan (JSNA), and the United Nations Population Dataset. I 
describe data series, sources, and calculations of variables in detail in the data appendix.   
2.1 Output per working age person and output per hour worked 
The two panels of figure 1 show the evolution of real output per working age person and the evolution 
of real output per hour worked by employees in Japan from 1980 through 2018. The two panels of 
figure 2 depict the annual growth rates of the same two variables from 1981 through 2018–output per 
working age person, and output per hour worked. Real output is real GDP measured in chained 1980 
yen. In figure 1a, I divide real GDP by the number of working age people, namely, the population of 
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those aged 16 years to 65 years. In figure 1b, I divide real GDP by the number of hours worked by 
employees.  
Figure 1a shows that, following rapid growth through the 1980s, output per working age 
person grew more slowly on average after 1990, and even after the recovery year, 2010, following the 
great recession of 2008–2009. The level of real output per working age person declined in 1993, 1998, 
and 1999 as well as in the great recession years of 2008 and 2009. Figure 2a shows that the annual 
growth rate of output per working age person began to decline in 1991, after peaking at 5.75 percent 
in 1988. The growth rate fell sharply from 1991 through 1993, and again in 1997 and 1998, and in 
2001. On average the growth rate remained much lower than its 1988 peak from 1992 through the 
great recession when it plummeted in 2008 and 2009. By 2018, growth in output per working age 
person had not once returned to its 1988 peak.  
The first column of numbers in table 1 shows that the average annual growth rate of output 
per working age person fell from 3.64 percent in the 1980s to 1.27 percent in the 1990s, fell further 
to 1.21 percent from 2001 through 2010, and rose modestly from 2011 through 2018 to 2.04 percent. 
Excluding the great recession years 2008-2010 from the decade of the 2000s, the average growth rate 
from 2001 through 2007 was 1.72 percent. The average growth rate of output per working age person 
for the entire pre-great recession period from 1991 through 2007 was 1.46 percent, roughly 40 percent 
of its 1980s average of 3.64 percent. Similarly, from 1991 through 2018, including the great recession 
and recovery years, the average growth rate of output per working age person was 1.47 percent. Even 
omitting the impact of the great recession of 2008–2009, Japan has experienced almost 30 years of 
much slower output per adult growth since 1991, relative to the 1980s. Relative to the commonly 
adopted global “trend” growth rate of 2 percent per year, Japan suffered two decades–a lost score–of 
slower output per working age person growth from 1991 through 2010. 
Figures 1b and 2b show the behavior of labor productivity measured by output per hour 
worked by employees, from 1980 through 2018. Evidently, labor productivity exhibits faster growth 
than output per working age person in the 1990s, but much slower growth on average after 2000 and, 
especially, after the great recession of 2008-2009. The second column of numbers in table 1 
corroborates this; from 1981 through 1990 the average growth rate was 3.05 percent, but fell to 1.64 
percent from 1991 through 2000, to 0.60 percent from 2001 through 2010, and 0.49 percent from 
2011 through 2018. If I exclude the great recession years 2008-2010 from the decade of the 2000s, the 
average growth rate from 2001 through 2007 was just 0.83 percent. The average growth rate of output 
per hour worked for the entire pre-great recession period from 1991 through 2007 was 1.30 percent, 
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roughly 43 percent of its 1980s average of 3.05 percent. Similarly, from 1991 through 2018, including 
the great recession and recovery years, the average growth rate of output per hour was 0.94 percent, 
less than one third of its 1980s value. More strikingly, the average growth rate of output per hour after 
2000 was just 0.55 percent per year, only 18 percent of its 1980s value and 23 percent of its growth 
rate from 1981 through 2000. Japan has experienced almost three entire decades of much slower 
output growth per hour worked since 1991, relative to the 1980s, and an even greater productivity 
growth slowdown since 2000.  
The difference between the behavior of output per working age person and output per hour 
simply reflects the evolution of hours worked per working age person; these data imply that they fell 
in the 1990s and rose in the 2000s and 2010s.  
2.2 Growth accounting for output per working age person and output per hour worked  
Growth accounting exercises can identify the main sources of slower growth in output per working 
age person and output per hour worked in Japan after 1990, and the origins of the post-2010 recovery 
in output per working age person.  
Specifically, I assume the aggregate production function takes the Cobb-Douglas form,                                                       𝑌𝑡 = 𝐴𝑡𝐾𝑡𝛼𝐻𝑡1−𝛼.                                                                                  (1) 
Here, 𝑌𝑡 is aggregate output, 𝐾𝑡 denotes the capital stock, 𝐻𝑡 denotes aggregate hours worked, 𝐴𝑡 ≡Γ𝑡𝛾𝑡(1−𝛼) is TFP, where 𝛾 denotes the “trend” growth rate, and 𝛼 is capital’s income share. I denote 
the number of working age people by 𝑁𝑡. Some algebra yields an expression for output per working 
age person as the product of three growth factors: A TFP factor, a capital factor, and an hours’ worked 
factor, 
                                                      (𝑌𝑡𝑁𝑡) = 𝐴𝑡 11−𝛼 (𝐾𝑡𝑌𝑡) 𝛼1−𝛼 (𝐻𝑡𝑁𝑡).                                                               (2) 
In addition, using (2) it is straightforward to derive output per hour worked as a product of the capital 
and TFP factors,  
                                                   (𝑌𝑡𝐻𝑡) = 𝐴𝑡 11−𝛼 (𝐾𝑡𝑌𝑡) 𝛼1−𝛼  .                                                                         (3) 
Taking logs and time derivatives on both sides of (2) and (3) yields the growth rate equations that I 
use in the growth accounting, where I approximate the instantaneous growth rate of a variable by its 
discrete-time, annual net growth rate.  
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The convenience of the decomposition of output per working age person and output per hour 
represented by (2) and (3) is that, on a balanced growth path of a one-sector neoclassical growth model 
growth in which hours worked are endogenously determined by households, growth in output per 
working age person and in output per hour worked derives solely from growth in the TFP factor. 
Specifically, if TFP grows at a constant rate, 𝐴𝑡 = Γ0𝛾𝑡(1−𝛼), and the working age population grows 
at a constant rate given by 𝑁𝑡 = N0𝑛𝑡, output per working age person and the TFP factor grow at the 
trend growth rate 𝛾. Output and the capital stock both grow at the gross rate 𝛾𝑛, and total hours grow 
at the rate of the working population, 𝑛, so that the capital and hours factors are constant; TFP factor 
growth is the sole source of sustained growth in output per working age person and output per hour 
worked in (2) and (3).  
2.2.1 Data  
To compute the capital-output ratio, I divide the nominal value of the economy’s total stock of fixed 
capital by nominal GDP, a choice limited by data availability as I describe in the data appendix.  Notice 
that the nominal capital-output ratio reflects not only changes in the volume of capital relative to 
output but also in the relative price of capital in terms of output. Hours per working age person is 
simply the ratio of total hours of employees to the working population of adults aged 16 to 65. I 
measure the TFP factor by taking the ratio of real output per working age person to the product of 
the capital factor and hours factor, using Hayashi and Prescott’s (2002) estimate of the capital income 
share in Japan in the 1980s, 0.362.  
2.2.2 Accounting for output per working age person  
Figure 3a plots the normalized (1980=100) level of each growth factor on the right-hand side of 
equation (2) against the normalized (1980=100) level of output per working age person. Table 2 
presents a decennial accounting of the annual average growth rate of output per working age person 
from 1981 through 2018, including a modified decennial analysis for the 2000s in which I omit the 
great recession years 2008–2010.  
The data in figure 3a imply that Japan deviated substantially from its balanced growth from 
about 1991 until the end of the sample. Both the capital factor and labor factor vary significantly 
relative to their balanced growth paths (constant values) over the post-1990 sub-sample. Moreover, 
after 2000 TFP factor growth is mild and appears rather weakly related to output per working age 
person growth, in contrast to the preceding years. Specifically, the observed increase over the sample 
period in output per working age person is attributable to a) increases in the TFP factor, especially 
prior to 2000, b) modest capital deepening from about 1989 until 2009, and c) increasing hours worked 
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per working age person in the mid-2000s and, especially, after 2010. The TFP factor exhibited slower 
growth from 1990 onwards relative to the 1980s, and especially in the 2000s–including a sharp 
downturn during the great recession, through the end of the sample period. Slower TFP factor growth 
depressed growth in output per working age person in the 1990s and 2000s, but in both decades was 
somewhat offset by mild capital deepening. Output per working age person grew systematically more 
quickly than the TFP factor after the great recession solely due to growth in hours per working age; 
the capital factor declined on average. 
In table 2, the first column of numbers shows the average annual growth rate of output per 
working age person for each period. The second through fourth columns of numbers show the 
measured contribution of each growth factor on the right hand-side of equation (2) to the growth rate 
of output per working age person. The table shows that an average annual growth rate of output per 
working age person in the 1980s exceeding 3 percent was mainly accounted for by fast TFP factor 
growth. The capital factor was roughly constant. Of the 2.37 percentage point decline in average 
output per working age person growth in the 1990s relative to the 1980s, most was accounted for by 
a decline in average TFP factor growth by 2.07 percentage points. In addition, there was a 0.94 
percentage point decline in average annual growth of hours per working age person. As Hayashi and 
Prescott (2002) and Betts (2021) observe, the greater deceleration in hours per working age person 
was attributable to much lower average hours worked per employee, likely in part attributable to a 
mandated reduction in the length of the working week over the period 1988 through 1993. Modest 
capital deepening somewhat offset these two sources of declining growth. The further decline of 
average growth in output per working age person in the 2000s relative to the 1990s by 0.06 percentage 
points was driven by continued depressed TFP factor growth, which fell by an additional 0.89 
percentage points in the 2000s relative to the 1990s and a small decline in capital factor growth. 
Despite the great recession, the 2000s witnessed a substantially higher growth rate of hours per working 
age person than the 1990s. When I omit the years 2008–2010 and recalculate average growth rates for 
the period 2001–2007, qualitatively the same behavior of each growth factor obtains; however, faster 
growth of the hours factor dominated quantitatively slower growth in the TFP factor so that output 
per working age person growth rate improved relative to the 1990s.  
Finally, the 2010s witnessed partial recovery of output per working age person growth relative 
to the 2000s, to 2.04 percent per year – the sample average growth rate. This occurred despite a 
significant reduction in capital deepening relative to any prior decade and anemic, if modestly 
improved, TFP factor growth. Faster output per working age person growth was largely attributable 
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to higher hours per working age person growth, which grew at an extraordinary 1.54 percent per year. 
The modest improvement in TFP factor growth relative to the 2000s of 0.46 percentage points meant 
that TFP factor growth remained much lower, even, than its growth rate during the “lost decade” of 
the 1990s. Total factor productivity growth has suffered three lower growth decades.1 
2.2.3 Accounting for output per hour worked  
The data in figure 3b shows that output per hour worked in Japan also deviated significantly from its 
balanced growth path from about 1991 until the great recession, due to capital deepening that offset 
notable decline in the TFP factor growth rate. The modest improvement in TFP factor growth after 
2010 was associated with a decline in the capital factor. Table 3 shows a decennial accounting for the 
growth rate of output per hour worked in terms of the TFP and capital factors on the right-hand side 
of equation (3). Rapid growth in output per hour worked in the 1980s exceeding 3 percent was due 
entirely to TFP factor growth. The capital factor was roughly constant. Output per hour worked 
growth in the 1990s was 1.31 percentage points lower per year on average than in the 1980s. Of this 
decline, all was accounted for by a decline in the TFP factor growth rate by 2.07 percentage points, 
while moderate capital deepening offset the effect of decline in the TFP factor growth rate. The 
average growth rate of output per hour worked in the 2000s relative to the 1990s declined by a further 
1.04 percentage points, driven by continued depressed TFP factor growth, although there was also a 
small decline in capital factor growth. During the 2010s, there was further decline relative to the 2000s, 
not recovery, of average growth in output per hour worked in contrast to average growth in output 
per working age person. This further decline in labor productivity growth was due to recession in the 
capital-output factor, while TFP growth modestly increased.  
To summarize, while Japan has suffered a “lost score” relative to trend in output per working 
age person growth since 1991, she has experienced three decades of lost TFP and labor productivity 
growth. The recovery of output per working age person in the 2010s is attributable to rapid hours 
worked per working age person growth, occurring despite anemic TFP factor growth and a recession 
in the capital factor. The growth accounting results imply that Japan’s aggregate TFP factor is the 
dominant source of slower growth in output per working age person growth since 1991, with a smaller 
role played by a declining hours factor in the 1990s. Slower TFP growth is also the origin of a large 
decline in output per hour worked growth in the 1990s and 2000s to which a reduction in capital 
deepening also contributed in the 2010s.  
 
1 In Appendix A.1, I compare my growth accounting results directly to those of Hayashi and Prescott (2002), with the 
results presented in table A1 and figure A1.  
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3. Sectoral decomposition of Japan’s TFP and labor productivity growth  
In this section, I develop a sectoral decomposition of aggregate TFP growth based on the growth 
accounting for GDP per working age person; an approximation to this decomposition could be 
derived from the growth accounting for GDP per hour. In appendix A.3, I present a companion 
sectoral decomposition of GDP per hour worked, which I omit here for brevity.  I first record the 
evolution of value added and shares of labor inputs over the sample period for the three major sectors 
of economic activity: agriculture, industry (manufacturing, energy, utilities, and construction), and 
services.  
3.1 Sector specific growth and allocations 1980–2018  
3.1.1 Sector growth and structural change 
I measure real value added by sector in chained 1980 yen at producer prices, based on OECD data 
and calculated as I describe in the data appendix.  
Figure 4a shows the evolution of real value added per working age person in each of the three 
sectors, normalizing all sectors’ real value added to equal 100 in 1980. Over the sample period, real 
value added of the service sector more than doubled, that of the industrial sector increased by roughly 
70 percent, and that of agriculture declined by roughly 35 percent. Notably, while services’ value added 
rose systematically until the great recession of 2008-2009, industry’s growth stalled sharply in the 1990s 
and stagnated until about 2002; industrial sector value added exhibited a roughly flat trend from 1990 
until after the great recession. Agricultural value added declined quite steadily from the mid-1980s 
throughout the sample period, except for a period of stabilization in the second half of the 1990s and 
short-lived expansion prior to the great recession. Although Japan was a relatively developed OECD 
country in 1980, the changes in relative outputs of the three major sectors of economic activity 
represent economically significant shifts in the allocation of economic resources and activity, which I 
depict in figure 4b.  
Because the chain-linked quantity indexes for the three sectors reflect different relative prices, 
real sectoral shares do not sum to one. In addition, in the theoretical model I analyze there is no 
money or nominal numeraire so that “nominal” value-added shares in the model are not equivalent 
to those in the data. I therefore focus on the hours worked shares of sectors to measure changes in 
the allocation of economic activity and resources across sectors. In figure 4b, I show the employee 
hours shares of the three major sectors. The figure shows that there is gradual divergence in favor of 
services’ hours share over the sample period, relative to industry and agriculture. The divergence 
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relative to industry is greater after 1990; agriculture’s share of hours is always small but increases 
marginally in the 2000s, before declining again after the great recession.   
The three panels of figure 5 show the growth rate of value added (per working age person) in 
each of the three sectors plotted against the growth rate of GDP (per working age person). Figure 5a 
shows that value added in agriculture exhibits a highly volatile growth rate over the sample period 
relative to GDP and is lower on average. In addition, the growth rates appear to co-move inversely. 
By contrast, figure 5b shows that while industry’s value-added growth is also somewhat more volatile 
than that of GDP, the two variables exhibit highly positive co-movements, and the growth rates 
appear to be similar on average. Finally, figure 5c shows that services’ value-added growth is relatively 
smooth, and exhibits less strong, although positive, co-movement with that of GDP.  
Table 4 quantifies the average growth rates of sectoral value added per working age person by 
decade. It compares them to the growth rate of real GDP per working age person, reproducing the 
decennial growth rates from Table 1 for ease of comparison. The secular decline in agriculture’s share 
of economic activity reflects in average annual sectoral value-added growth that is negative in every 
decade. Agriculture’s value-added per working age person declined more rapidly in the 1990s and 
2000s than in the 1980s and exhibits relatively fast (but negative) growth in the 2010s. The industrial 
sector, like that of the aggregate economy, enjoyed high average growth of value-added per working 
age person in the 1980s, but suffered a dramatic decline in the 1990s. Unlike GDP, industrial value-
added grew on average somewhat faster in the 2000s than in the 1990s and exhibited a stronger 
recovery in the 2010s. While qualitatively all three sectors experienced growth slowdowns in the 1990s, 
quantitatively the slowdown in agriculture and services–although substantial–were both smaller than 
that in industry. In addition, services’ recovery in the 2010s was smaller than that of industry. The 
recovery of Japan’s aggregate growth rate during the 2010s was mirrored in the growth performance 
of all three sectors, but the largest improvements were in agriculture and industry.   
3.2 Sectoral decomposition of aggregate growth sources 
I first decompose GDP per working age person growth into the contributions due to each of the three 
major sectors, and then decompose the growth rate of each of the capital and labor factors on the 
right-hand side of (2) into sectoral contributions. Finally, I calculate the difference between a sector’s 
contribution to aggregate output per working age person growth and the sum of its contributions to 
the capital and hours growth factors; this represents a sector’s contribution to aggregate TFP factor 
growth, and the sum of sectoral TFP factor growth contributions is exactly equal to aggregate TFP 
factor growth. It bears emphasis that this decomposition is data driven, and independent of any 
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assumption on the functional form of sectoral production functions. It relies solely on two features 
of the data: First, aggregate nominal value-added and the aggregate nominal capital stock are the sum 
across sectors of nominal value added and nominal sectoral capital stocks, respectively; and second, 
aggregate hours is the sum of the hours worked across sectors.    
In a second exercise, I decompose each sector’s contribution to aggregate TFP factor growth 
into two portions: i) A sector’s “direct” TFP growth contribution; and ii) a sector’s residual 
contribution to aggregate TFP factor growth. The residual contribution of a sector to aggregate TFP 
factor growth, in turn, reflects a) changes in its relative output price, b) any difference between a 
sectoral and the economy-wide capital income share, and c) changes in a sector’s share of value added. 
While each source of the residual is not independent across sectors, I show below that there is a small, 
non-zero net effect for aggregate TFP factor growth of the total residual contributions of sectors. To 
conduct this decomposition of total sectoral contributions to aggregate TFP factor growth, I assume 
a specific form for the sectoral production functions. This is sufficient to interpret i) as a direct, 
sectoral TFP contribution and establish its relationship to actual sectoral TFP, and hence define the 
residual contribution, ii). For simplicity, I assume that sectoral production functions are value added 
functions, abstracting from intermediate inputs, and specifically that they share the same Cobb-
Douglas form as the aggregate production function, but allow for differing sectoral capital income 
shares and TFP levels:                                     𝑌𝑖,𝑡 = 𝐴𝑖,𝑡𝐾𝑖,𝑡𝛼𝑖𝐻𝑖,𝑡1−𝛼𝑖 ,                                    𝑖 = 𝑎,𝑚, 𝑠.                                         (4) 
Here, 𝐴𝑖,𝑡 ≡ Γ𝑖,𝑡𝛾𝑡(1−𝛼𝑖) is the TFP of sector i. Sector i value added per working age person is  
                                  𝑌𝑖,𝑡𝑁𝑡 = 𝐴𝑖,𝑡11−𝛼𝑖 (𝐾𝑖,𝑡𝑌𝑖,𝑡) 𝛼𝑖1−𝛼𝑖 (𝐻𝑖,𝑡𝑁 𝑡) ,                 𝑖 = 𝑎,𝑚, 𝑠,                                        (5) 
where the interpretation of each growth factor on the right-hand side of (5) follows those in (2).   
In a multi-sector neoclassical growth model, like the one I develop below, this specification of 
sectoral value-added production functions and TFP factors ensures that when sectoral TFP factors 
grow at the common constant rate, 𝛾, (𝐴𝑖,𝑡 11−𝛼𝑖 = Γ𝑖,0 11−𝛼𝑖𝛾𝑡 ∀𝑖), the aggregate working population 
grows at a constant rate given by 𝑁𝑡 = 𝑁0𝑛𝑡 , and all other exogenous sources of variation are 
constant, there exists a balanced growth path for the economy. On this path, each sector’s value added 
per working age person growth equals the common trend growth rate, 𝛾, there is no structural change 
in that the sectoral allocation of capital, labor, and value added, and all sectoral value-added prices are 
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constant.  Sectoral capital stocks grow at the same rate (𝛾𝑛), sectoral hours worked grow at the same 
rate (𝑛), sectoral capital-output ratios and sectoral hours per working age person are all constant. The 
aggregate economy exhibits balanced growth, in the sense that aggregate capital and aggregate value-
added (GDP) grow at the same rates, and the same rates as their sectoral counterparts.    
Using (5), a growth accounting can be conducted separately for each sector, i, as I have for the 
aggregate economy and sectoral TFP factors can be derived. I relegate the sectoral growth accounting 
to appendix A.2, where the production function (5) guides my definition of sectoral TFP factors and 
the distinction between within-sector TFP growth and residual contributions of sector i to aggregate 
TFP growth.   
3.2.1 Sectoral contributions to GDP per working age person  
I first decompose GDP per working age person into sectoral contributions. For this, the sum of 
nominal value added across sectors must exactly equal GDP, a condition satisfied in the 
(proportionally adjusted) data. Then, the growth rate of GDP per working age person, measured in 
chained 1980 yen, has the following interpretation in terms of sectoral contributions, where I define 
a sector’s share of nominal value added as 𝑠𝑦,𝑖,𝑡 ≡ (𝑌𝑖,𝑡𝑃𝑖,𝑡𝑌𝑡𝑃𝑡 ), 
                             (𝑌𝑡+1𝑁𝑡+1) − (𝑌𝑡𝑁𝑡)(𝑌𝑡𝑁𝑡) = ∑ ( 
 (𝑌𝑖,𝑡+1𝑁𝑡+1𝑌𝑖,𝑡𝑁𝑡 )(
𝑃𝑖,𝑡+1𝑃𝑡+1𝑃𝑖,𝑡𝑃𝑡 )− 1) 
 𝑠𝑦,𝑖,𝑡𝑖=𝑎,𝑚,𝑠 .                  (6𝑎) 
Here, 𝑃𝑡 is the implicit (chained) GDP deflator at date t and 𝑃𝑖,𝑡 is sector i’s implicit (chained) value-
added deflator at t, both derived as the ratio of nominal to real value added measured in chained 1980 
yen at producer prices. The relative price-adjusted growth rate of value added per working age person 
of sector i, multiplied by the sector’s date t nominal value-added share, yields the sector’s contribution 
to–and the sum of these contributions is exactly equal to–GDP per working age person growth. The 
contribution of sector i reflects value-added share weighted “within-sector” value added per working 
age person growth, and growth over time in its relative output price. It is straightforward to show that 
the sectoral contributions in (6a) can be approximated by the value-added share weighted sum of net 
growth rates of real value added and relative prices,   
                   (𝑌𝑡+1𝑁𝑡+1) − (𝑌𝑡𝑁𝑡)(𝑌𝑡𝑁𝑡) ≅ ∑ ( 
 (𝑌𝑖,𝑡+1𝑁𝑡+1 − 𝑌𝑖,𝑡𝑁𝑡𝑌𝑖,𝑡𝑁𝑡 ) +(
𝑃𝑖,𝑡+1𝑃𝑡+1 − 𝑃𝑖,𝑡𝑃𝑡𝑃𝑖,𝑡𝑃𝑡 )) 
 𝑠𝑦,𝑖,𝑡.           (6𝑏)𝑖=𝑎,𝑚,𝑠  
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I illustrate the time-series contributions of each of the three major sectors of economic activity 
in (6a) to the growth rate of GDP per working age person in figure 6. The figure shows that agriculture, 
although it experiences large within-sector fluctuations in value-added per working age person seen in 
figure 6, because it represents such a small share of aggregate value added given by 𝑠𝑦,𝑎,𝑡, has a 
quantitatively very small contribution to aggregate output per working age person growth. Almost all 
time-series variation in the aggregate growth rate is accounted for by industry and services. In periods 
of most severe downturn in GDP per working age person growth, the 1990s and during the great 
recession, the industrial sector appears to account for much of the slowing. Sectoral contributions to 
average GDP per working age person growth by decade are quantified in table 5.   
Table 5 shows that service sector growth was the largest contributor to rapid aggregate growth 
in the 1980s, although the industrial sector also contributed substantively. By contrast, the industrial 
sector contributed most to the decline in aggregate output growth in the 1990s relative to the 1980s, 
although the service-sector also contributed substantively. The service sector was solely responsible 
for the much smaller decline in aggregate growth in the 2000s relative to the 1990s, while the industrial 
sector accounted for most of the modest increase in aggregate growth during the 2010s; agriculture 
contributed more than services to the 2010s average growth rate increase.  
3.3.2 Sectoral contributions to growth in the capital factor 
I next decompose into sectoral contributions the growth in the capital factor on the right-hand side 
of (2). I express the growth rate of the measured aggregate capital factor as the sum of sectoral 
contributions as follows.  
Let  𝑠𝑘,𝑖,𝑡 ≡ (𝐾𝑖,𝑡𝑃𝑖𝑘,𝑡𝐾,𝑡𝑃𝑘,𝑡 ) denote sector i’s nominal capital stock share, where 𝑃𝐾,𝑡 is the date t 
implicit price deflator of the aggregate fixed capital stock, and 𝑃𝑖𝑘,𝑡 the date t implicit price deflator of 
the sector i fixed capital stock. Then      
( 𝛼1 − 𝛼)((𝐾𝑡+1𝑃𝑘,𝑡+1𝑌𝑡+1𝑃𝑡+1 ) − (𝐾𝑡𝑃𝑘,𝑡𝑌𝑡𝑃𝑡 )(𝐾𝑡𝑃𝑘,𝑡𝑌𝑡𝑃𝑡 ) )
= ( 𝛼1 − 𝛼) ∑ ((𝐾𝑖,𝑡+1𝑃𝑖𝑘,𝑡+1𝑌𝑖,𝑡+1𝑃𝑖,𝑡+1 ) 𝑠𝑦,𝑖,𝑡+1 − (𝐾𝑖,𝑡𝑃𝑖𝑘,𝑡𝑌𝑖,𝑡𝑃𝑖,𝑡 ) 𝑠𝑦,𝑖,𝑡(𝐾𝑖,𝑡𝑃𝑖𝑘,𝑡𝑌𝑖,𝑡𝑃𝑖,𝑡 ) 𝑠𝑦,𝑖,𝑡 )𝑖=𝑎,𝑚,𝑠 𝑠𝑘,𝑖,𝑡.       (7𝑎) 
Note that each sector’s contribution in (7a) reflects not only its own fixed capital-output growth rate 
between t and t+1, weighted by its current nominal capital stock share, but also the change in the 
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sector’s nominal value-added share between t and t+1. If a sector experiences positive nominal value-
added share growth between t and t+1, this raises (reduces) the impact of that sector’s positive 
(negative) capital-output growth for aggregate capital factor growth between t and t+1. It is easy to 
show that sectoral contributions to aggregate capital deepening can be approximated by the nominal 
capital share weighted sum of within-sector capital deepening and growth in a sector’s value-added 
share, multiplied by the ratio of the economy-wide capital income share to the economy-wide labor 
income share, as shown on the right-hand side of equation (7b),    
( 𝛼1 − 𝛼)((𝐾𝑡+1𝑃𝐾,𝑡+1𝑌𝑡+1𝑃𝑡+1 ) − (𝐾𝑡𝑃𝐾,𝑡𝑌𝑡𝑃𝑡 )(𝐾𝑡𝑃𝑡𝑌𝑡𝑃𝑡 ) )
≅ ( 𝛼1 − 𝛼) ∑ ( 
 (𝐾𝑖,𝑡+1𝑃𝑖𝑘,𝑡+1𝑌𝑖,𝑡+1𝑃𝑖,𝑡+1 − 𝐾𝑖,𝑡𝑃𝑖𝑘,𝑡𝑌𝑖,𝑡𝑃𝑖,𝑡𝐾𝑖,𝑡𝑃𝑖𝑘,𝑡𝑌𝑖,𝑡𝑃𝑖,𝑡 ) + (𝑠𝑦,𝑖,𝑡+1 − 𝑠𝑦,𝑖,𝑡𝑠𝑦,𝑖,𝑡 )) 
 
𝑖=𝑎,𝑚,𝑠 𝑠𝑘,𝑖,𝑡.  (7𝑏) 
Table 6 quantifies the contribution of each sector to the average annual growth rate of the 
capital factor, in a decennial growth accounting using equation (7a). Average growth over ten-year 
periods in the aggregate capital factor is small, as theory suggests should be observed; capital adjusts 
transitorily to exogenous TFP variation to attain a constant capital-output ratio on a balanced growth 
path.  For the period 1981 through 1990, service-sector positive contributions to capital deepening 
accounted fully for the tiny increase in the aggregate capital factor; there were almost perfectly 
offsetting negative contributions of agriculture (the largest) and industry. For the period 1991 through 
2000, the service sector contributed about 5/6 of relatively large 0.65 percent growth in the capital 
factor, with industry contributing the remaining portion and agriculture a tiny negative, offsetting 
contribution. Aggregate capital factor growth declined a little in the 2000s, although there was 
nonetheless significant capital-deepening in this decade which was entirely attributable to the service 
sector, while a marginally increased contribution of industry relative to the 1990s was exactly offset by 
a marginally reduced contribution of agriculture. In the 2010s, growth in the aggregate capital factor 
again declined, and was slightly negative. The decline was largely attributable to a further fall in the 
contribution of services, although industry’s contribution was also significantly smaller. Over the 
entire sample period, average growth in the capital factor was modest, and almost all accounted for 
by the contribution of services. Some of this service sector contribution was accounted for by within 
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service sector capital deepening, as appendix A.2 shows; some was accounted for by the increasing 
value-added share of services after 1990, weighted by its large share of the total nominal capital stock.          
3.3.3 Sectoral contributions to hours per working age person growth  
Since the sum of hours worked by employees across the three major sectors of economic activity 
equals aggregate hours worked by employees, hours per working age person decomposes simply into 
within-sector contributions, comprising hours-share weighted sectoral hours per working age person 
growth rates. I denote the hours share of sector i by 𝑠ℎ,𝑖,𝑡 ≡ (𝐻𝑖,𝑡𝐻𝑡 ). Then,  
                                 ((𝐻𝑡+1𝑁𝑡+1) − (𝐻𝑡𝑁𝑡)(𝐻𝑡𝑁𝑡) ) = ∑ (
(𝐻𝑖,𝑡+1𝑁𝑡+1 ) − (𝐻𝑖,𝑡𝑁𝑡 )(𝐻𝑖,𝑡𝑁𝑡 ) ) 𝑠ℎ,𝑖,𝑡𝑖=𝑎,𝑚,𝑠 .                             (8) 
Like the capital factor, hours per working age person should exhibit a zero trend on the 
balanced growth path of a neoclassical growth model, transitorily adjusting to exogenous TFP 
deviations from trend to attain a constant value. Table 7 shows that variation in the hours factor, like 
that of the capital factor, was generally modest over the sample period although surprisingly high 
during the 2001-2018 period. An increase in hours per working age person during the 1980s was 
largely attributable to service sector contributions. The industrial sector accounted for a larger portion 
of the decline in the hours factor’s growth rate (it was negative) in the 1990s relative to the 1980s, 
while the service sector was more important to the increase in hours factor growth in the 2000s relative 
to the 1990s. Finally, industry and services roughly equally accounted for the large increase in hours 
growth during the 2010s relative to the 2000s.  
3.4 Sectoral contributions to aggregate TFP factor growth  
The difference between sector i’s contribution to output per working age person derived from 
equation (6a) and the sum of sector i’s contributions to capital factor growth and hours per working 
age person growth derived from equations (7a) and (8) respectively is a measure of that sector’s 
contribution to aggregate TFP factor growth. The total contribution of sector i to aggregate TFP factor 
growth, which I denote by 𝐶𝑇𝐹𝑃𝐹𝑖,𝑡, is given by equation (9a),     
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𝐶𝑇𝐹𝑃𝐹𝑖,𝑡 = ((𝑌𝑖,𝑡+1𝑁𝑡+1 )(𝑃𝑖,𝑡+1𝑃𝑡+1 )−(𝑌𝑖,𝑡𝑁𝑡 )(𝑃𝑖,𝑡𝑃𝑡 )(𝑌𝑖,𝑡𝑁𝑡 )(𝑃𝑖,𝑡𝑃𝑡 ) ) 𝑠𝑦,𝑖,𝑡 −                                                         ( 𝛼1−𝛼) ((𝐾𝑖,𝑡+1𝑃𝑖𝑘,𝑡+1𝑌𝑖,𝑡+1𝑃𝑖,𝑡+1 )𝑠𝑦,𝑖,𝑡+1−(𝐾𝑖,𝑡𝑃𝑖𝑘,𝑡𝑌𝑖,𝑡𝑃𝑖,𝑡 )𝑠𝑦,𝑖,𝑡(𝐾𝑖,𝑡𝑃𝑖𝑘,𝑡𝑌𝑖,𝑡𝑃𝑖,𝑡 )𝑠𝑦,𝑖,𝑡 ) 𝑠𝑘,𝑖,𝑡 −                                                                               ((𝐻𝑖,𝑡+1𝑁𝑡+1 )−(𝐻𝑖,𝑡𝑁𝑡 )(𝐻𝑖,𝑡𝑁𝑡 ) ) 𝑠ℎ,𝑖,𝑡.                                                   (9𝑎).  
The total contribution of sector i to aggregate TFP can be approximated by the difference on the 
right-hand side of equation (9b),  
    𝐶𝑇𝐹𝑃𝐹𝑖,𝑡 ≅ ( 
 (𝑌𝑖,𝑡+1𝑁𝑡+1 − 𝑌𝑖,𝑡𝑁𝑡𝑌𝑖,𝑡𝑁𝑡 ) + (
𝑃𝑖,𝑡+1𝑃𝑡+1 − 𝑃𝑖,𝑡𝑃𝑡𝑃𝑖,𝑡𝑃𝑡 )) 
 𝑠𝑦,𝑖,𝑡   
−   ( 𝛼1 − 𝛼)( 
 (𝐾𝑖,𝑡+1𝑃𝑖𝑘,𝑡+1𝑌𝑖,𝑡+1𝑃𝑖,𝑡+1 − 𝐾𝑖,𝑡𝑃𝑖𝑘,𝑡𝑌𝑖,𝑡𝑃𝑖,𝑡𝐾𝑖,𝑡𝑃𝑖𝑘,𝑡𝑌𝑖,𝑡𝑃𝑖,𝑡 ) + (𝑠𝑦,𝑖,𝑡+1 − 𝑠𝑦,𝑖,𝑡𝑠𝑦,𝑖,𝑡 )) 
 𝑠𝑘,𝑖,𝑡     
                                                    −    ((𝐻𝑖,𝑡+1𝑁𝑡+1 )−(𝐻𝑖,𝑡𝑁𝑡 )(𝐻𝑖,𝑡𝑁𝑡 ) ) 𝑠ℎ,𝑖,𝑡.                                                                          (9𝑏).  
A sector’s total contribution to aggregate TFP growth reflects within-sector growth in value 
added per working age person relative to within-sector growth in the capital-output ratio and hours 
per working age person growth, just as a sector’s “own” TFP factor growth rate does. A sector’s own 
TFP factor growth rate implied by equation (5) and calculated for each of the three major sectors of 
economic activity in Japan in appendix A.2, is 
𝑇𝐹𝑃𝐹𝑖,𝑡 = ((𝑌𝑖,𝑡+1𝑁𝑡+1 ) − (𝑌𝑖,𝑡𝑁𝑡 )(𝑌𝑖,𝑡𝑁𝑡 ) ) − ( 𝛼𝑖1 − 𝛼𝑖)(
(𝐾𝑖,𝑡+1𝑃𝑖𝑘,𝑡+1𝑌𝑖,𝑡+1𝑃𝑖,𝑡+1 ) − (𝐾𝑖,𝑡𝑃𝑖𝑘,𝑡𝑌𝑖,𝑡𝑃𝑖,𝑡 )(𝐾𝑖,𝑡𝑃𝑖𝑘,𝑡𝑌𝑖,𝑡𝑃𝑖,𝑡 ) )                     
−  ((𝐻𝑖,𝑡+1𝑁𝑡+1 ) − (𝐻𝑖,𝑡𝑁𝑡 )(𝐻𝑖,𝑡𝑁𝑡 ) ).                                                                                               (10) 
However, the sectoral TFP factor growth contributions in (9a) and (9b) also reflect 1) growth in a 
sector’s relative price of value added, which mediates the impact of its own real value-added growth 
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on aggregate output growth, 2) growth in the sector’s value-added share, which mediates the aggregate 
impact of the sector’s capital deepening, and 3) a sector’s current shares of value added, capital stock, 
and hours. Finally, note that a sector’s contribution to capital factor growth in (9a) and (9b) reflects 
the economy-wide capital income share rather than the sector-specific capital income share which 
appears in its own TFP factor growth rate in (10).  
Figure 7a shows the time series of TFP factors (10) for each sector, and the aggregate TFP 
factor, normalizing the three series to equal 100 in 1980, and figure 7b shows the associated growth 
rates of TFP factors by sector given by equation (10) plotted with that of the aggregate TFP factor. 
Figure 7a shows that, over the entire sample period, the aggregate TFP factor grew by slightly less 
than the TFP factor in industry, slightly more than that in services, and much more than that in 
agriculture. The agricultural TFP factor rose more rapidly than that of both the industrial and service 
sector during the 1980s, although all three sectors experienced relatively rapid TFP growth. However, 
agricultural TFP fell sharply in the 1990s until the mid-2000s, before recovering and outperforming 
the other two sectors after the great recession through the end of the sample period. The industrial 
sector’s TFP factor grew more rapidly in the 1980s than at any time until after the great recession; in 
both periods, industrial sector TFP outperformed service sector TFP, with the latter stagnating and 
even declining slightly from the early 2000s onwards. Table 8 records average annual TFP factor 
growth rates for each sector by decade and reproduces aggregate TFP factor growth rates in the first 
column of numbers. The table shows that the dramatic slow-down in aggregate TFP factor growth in 
the 1990s relative to the 1980s was associated with slower TFP factor growth in all three major sectors, 
however, the slowdown in the service sector was relatively mild. By contrast, the second substantial 
aggregate TFP growth slow-down occurring in the 2000s was associated with a dramatic slowing of 
service sector TFP factor growth, while TFP factor growth in industry was only marginally slower 
than in the 1990s and that in agriculture marginally higher. The modest improvement in aggregate 
TFP factor growth in the 2010s, however, was associated with substantial increases in TFP growth in 
agriculture and industry but a negligible increase in that of services; service sector TFP growth has 
been depressed since 2000. Although almost equal on average over the entire sample period to service 
sector TFP factor growth, as the last row of numbers shows, agricultural TFP factor growth fluctuates 
wildly. As appendix A.2 discusses, this reflects a large capital factor impact for measured TFP growth 
mediated through a very high capital income share.  Agriculture’s TFP factor growth is the highest of 




Figure 8 plots the total sectoral contributions to aggregate TFP growth given by (9a). The 
figure shows that in the 1980s–a decade of fast aggregate TFP factor growth, and during the 1990s 
and 2000s– two decades of slowing aggregate TFP factor growth, both service and industrial sector 
contributions played a significant role in aggregate TFP factor growth changes. Agriculture also 
appears to play a positive role for TFP factor growth in the 1980s, however this is relatively small. The 
TFP contributions of industry and services both generally co-move positively with aggregate TFP 
growth, although the strength of co-movement by sector varies over the sample period. For example, 
service sector contributions appear to play a larger role than those of industry in the aggregate TFP 
decline during the great recession, and a smaller role in the subsequent recovery.  
Table 9 shows the sectoral decomposition of aggregate TFP factor growth by decade. The last 
row of numbers shows that, on average over the entire sample period, industry and services contribute 
roughly equally to aggregate TFP factor growth of 1.20 percentage points annually and agriculture 
contributes a much smaller amount. Looking at the remaining rows of numbers in the table, it is 
striking that services’ contribution to aggregate TFP factor growth is essentially zero after 2000. 
Agriculture’s contribution is generally smaller than that of either sector, but even this is larger than 
the contribution of services in the 2010s. Agriculture’s contribution, although small, is positive in all 
decades except the 2000s, despite exhibiting negative within-sector TFP growth in both the 1990s and 
2000s. Decade by decade, aggregate TFP factor growth is accounted for by different sectors’ 
contributions. Rapid annual aggregate TFP factor growth of more than 3 percent in the 1980s 
represented contributions of roughly 1.5 percentage points from the service sector, 1.35 percentage 
points from industry, and 0.15 percentage points from agriculture. The reduction of average aggregate 
TFP growth in the 1990s relative to the 1980s of more than 2 percentage points is attributable to 
reductions in sectoral contributions of 1.08 percentage points from industry, 0.83 percentage points 
from services, and 0.16 percentage points from agriculture; all three sectors play a role in the aggregate 
TFP slowdown of the 1990s, but industry’s role is largest. An additional 0.89 percentage point 
reduction in aggregate TFP factor growth in the 2000s is largely attributable to a decline in the service 
sector’s contribution, however: There is a 0.69 percentage point reduction in services’ contribution, a 
0.18 percentage point reduction in industry’s contribution, and only a 0.03 percentage point reduction 
in agriculture’s contribution. Finally, the modest increase of roughly 0.46 percentage points in average 
annual TFP factor growth in the 2010s relative to the 2000s is attributable largely to an increased 
contribution of industry by 0.39 percentage points, with a small increase in the contribution of 
agriculture of 0.1 percentage points; services’ contribution declined marginally.  
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3.5 Decomposing sectoral contributions to aggregate TFP factor growth 
I now quantify the extent to which the sectoral contributions to aggregate TFP factor growth in figure 
8 and table 9 reflect the within-sector TFP factor growth rates illustrated in figures 7a and 7b and table 
8, rather than changes in the composition of economic activity and in relative prices which are also 
reflected in each sector’s total contribution in equations (9a) and (9b), 𝐶𝑇𝐹𝑃𝐹𝑖,𝑡.  
To simplify notation, in what follows I let  𝑦𝑡 ≡ 𝑌𝑡𝑁𝑡 , 𝑦𝑖,𝑡 ≡ 𝑌𝑖,𝑡𝑁𝑡 ,  and 𝑘𝑖,𝑡 ≡ 𝐾𝑖,𝑡𝑃𝑖,𝑘,𝑡𝑌𝑖,𝑡𝑃𝑖,𝑦,𝑡. I first 
decompose the total TFP factor growth contribution of sector i, 𝐶𝑇𝐹𝑃𝐹𝑖,𝑡 in equation (9a) into two 
components. The first component is a modified within-sector TFP factor growth rate, in which the 
growth rates of value added per working age person, the capital factor, and hours factor are weighted 
by the date t value of sector i ‘s share of nominal value added, sector i’s share of nominal capital, and 
sector i’s share of employee hours, respectively. I call this the sector i weighted TFP growth 
contribution and denote this by “𝑊𝑇𝐹𝑃𝐹𝑖,𝑡”; I think of this as the “direct” contribution of sector i to 
aggregate TFP factor growth, weighed by its importance in aggregate economic activity and resources. 
A second term constitutes a well-defined residual. Specifically, I express sector i’s total contribution 
to aggregate TFP growth as                            𝐶𝑇𝐹𝑃𝐹𝑖,𝑡 =  𝑊𝑇𝐹𝑃𝐹𝑖,𝑡 + 𝑅𝐸𝑆𝐼𝐷𝑖,𝑡,                                                                           (11𝑎) 
where:  
     𝑊𝑇𝐹𝑃𝐹𝑖,𝑡 ≡ (𝑦𝑖,𝑡+1−𝑦𝑖,𝑡𝑦𝑖,𝑡 ) 𝑠𝑦,𝑖,𝑡 − ( 𝛼𝑖1−𝛼𝑖) (𝑘𝑖,𝑡+1−𝑘𝑖,𝑡𝑘𝑖,𝑡 ) 𝑠𝑘,𝑖,𝑡 − (𝐻𝑖,𝑡+1𝑁𝑡+1 −𝐻𝑖,𝑡𝑁𝑡𝐻𝑖,𝑡𝑁𝑡 ) 𝑠ℎ,𝑖,𝑡,                     (11𝑏)   
    𝑅𝐸𝑆𝐼𝐷𝑖,𝑡    ≡ 𝑦𝑖,𝑡+1𝑦𝑖,𝑡   (𝑃𝑖,𝑡+1𝑃𝑡+1 −𝑃𝑖,𝑡𝑃𝑡𝑃𝑖,𝑡𝑃𝑡 ) 𝑠𝑦,𝑖,𝑡 − (( 𝛼1−𝛼) − ( 𝛼𝑖1−𝛼𝑖)) (𝑘𝑖,𝑡+1−𝑘𝑖,𝑡𝑘𝑖,𝑡 ) 𝑠𝑘,𝑖,𝑡                                                                         − ( 𝛼1 − 𝛼)𝑘𝑖,𝑡+1𝑘𝑖,𝑡 (𝑠𝑦,𝑖,𝑡+1 − 𝑠𝑦,𝑖,𝑡𝑠𝑦,𝑖,𝑡 ) 𝑠𝑘,𝑖,𝑡.                                          (11𝑐) 
The residual contribution of sector i to aggregate TFP factor growth,  𝑅𝐸𝑆𝐼𝐷𝑖,𝑡, constitutes 
three elements. First, a sector’s residual contribution to aggregate TFP growth between t and t+1 is 
higher if there is an increase between t and t+1 in the price of that sector’s value added relative to the 
price of GDP, (𝑃𝑖,𝑡+1𝑃𝑡+1 / 𝑃𝑖,𝑡𝑃𝑡 ) > 1. As equations (6a) and (6b) show, an increase in sector i’s relative 
output price increases the impact for aggregate output per working age person growth–and hence 
aggregate TFP factor growth–of sector i’s own value-added per working age person growth. The 
converse statement applies if a sector’s relative price declines over time. Second, if a sector’s capital 
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income share exceeds the economy-wide capital income share, this depresses its weighted TFP 
contribution to aggregate TFP factor growth relative to its total TFP factor contribution. A larger 
sectoral capital income share than economy-wide capital income share magnifies the impact of capital 
deepening in the sector’s (weighted) TFP factor growth rate relative to the sector’s total (actual) 
contribution to aggregate capital deepening. Its weighted TFP contribution thus excessively depresses 
measured aggregate TFP growth. A positive adjustment to the sector’s residual contribution to 
aggregate TFP factor growth corrects for this. The converse statements apply for a sector with a 
smaller than economy-wide capital income share. Third, an increase in the sector i’s value-added share 
from t to t+1,  (𝑠𝑦,𝑖,𝑡+1−𝑠𝑦,𝑖,𝑡𝑠𝑦,𝑖,𝑡 ) > 0,  increases the sector’s impact for aggregate capital factor growth, 
which decreases the sector’s total contribution to aggregate TFP factor growth. Sector i’s weighted 
TFP contribution thus overstates the sector’s contribution to aggregate TFP factor growth relative to 
the sector’s total contribution, and a negative residual effect adjusts for this by accounting for the 
increase in the sector’s value-added share. The converse statement holds if there is a decline in a 
sector’s value-added share. I examine the magnitudes of these three elements of the residual term for 
each sector, i.  
I refer to the three factors in the residual term of sector i as the relative output price factor, 
denoted  𝑅𝐸𝐿𝑌𝑃𝑖,𝑡,  capital income share adjustment, denoted 𝐶𝐴𝑃𝐼𝑁𝐶𝑖,𝑡 and value-added 
reallocation factor, denoted 𝑉𝑅𝐸𝐴𝐿𝐿𝑖,𝑡. Their sum equals the total residual contribution of sector I, 
where 
                                      𝑅𝐸𝐿𝑌𝑃𝑖,𝑡    ≡  𝑦𝑖,𝑡+1𝑦𝑖,𝑡 (𝑃𝑖,𝑡+1𝑃𝑡+1 −𝑃𝑖,𝑡𝑃𝑡𝑃𝑖,𝑡𝑃𝑡 ) 𝑠𝑦,𝑖,𝑡,                                                    (12𝑎)                                      𝐶𝐴𝑃𝐼𝑁𝐶𝑖,𝑡 ≡ − (( 𝛼1 − 𝛼) − ( 𝛼𝑖1 − 𝛼𝑖))(𝑘𝑖,𝑡+1 − 𝑘𝑖,𝑡𝑘𝑖,𝑡 ) 𝑠𝑘,𝑖,𝑡,          (12𝑏)                                   𝑉𝑅𝐸𝐴𝐿𝐿𝑖,𝑡 ≡ −( 𝛼1 − 𝛼)𝑘𝑖,𝑡+1𝑘𝑖,𝑡 (𝑠𝑦,𝑖,𝑡+1 − 𝑠𝑦,𝑖,𝑡𝑠𝑦,𝑖,𝑡 ) 𝑠𝑘,𝑖,𝑡.                      (12𝑐) 
These are “indirect” or “allocative” influences of a sector on measured aggregate TFP factor growth, 
relative to the direct effect of the sector’s weighted TFP factor contribution; no residual factor is 
independent across sectors. If one sector’s relative price growth rises, at least one other’s must fall; if 
one sector’s capital income share is high relative to the economy-wide capital income share then 
another sector’s must be low; if one sector enjoys a reallocation of value added in its favor, another 
sector must suffer a decline in its value-added share. This does not imply that the net effect summed 
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over sectors of residual factors is exactly zero, however, as the residual effects of a sector are weighted 
by its growth rate of value-added or capital. The total residual effect for aggregate TFP factor growth 
is small relative to the total weighted TFP contribution of sectors, but not negligible.    
3.5.1 Weighted TFP factor and residual contributions of sectors 
The sum over sectors of weighted TFP contributions can be thought of as a measure of the aggregate 
productivity growth effect of within-sector TFP factor growth. In figure 9a, I decompose aggregate 
TFP factor growth into a) the sum over sectors of the weighted sectoral TFP factor growth rates, and 
b) the sum over sectors of residual contributions. Table 10 summarizes the decennial accounting of 
aggregate TFP factor growth into these total weighted TFP factor and residual contributions.  
Both the figure and table indicate that, typically, aggregate TFP factor growth is dominated by 
the total weighted TFP contributions of sectors, with a small role for total residual contributions. 
Figure 9a shows that the annual co-movements of aggregate TFP growth and weighted TFP 
contributions of sectors are strong and positive. Nonetheless, the table shows that in the 1980s residual 
effects accounted for about one-fifth of aggregate TFP growth, while in the 2000s they were more 
important than the total weighted TFP contributions of sectors and responsible for the positive 
aggregate TFP growth observed. In addition, table 10 shows that as much as one-third of the decline in 
aggregate TFP factor growth in the 1990s relative to the 1980s was attributable to residual effects, 
with the remaining two-thirds attributable to decline in the weighted TFP contributions of sectors. By 
contrast, the decline of aggregate TFP factor growth in the 2000s relative to the 1990s and its modest 
improvement in the 2010s, are solely attributable to the weighted TFP contributions of sectors.  
 I decompose the total weighted TFP contribution to aggregate TFP factor growth by sector 
in figure 9b, and the total residual contribution by sector in figure 9c. Notice the different scales of 
vertical axes in the two graphs; residual contributions of sectors are relatively small. Figure 9b shows 
that agriculture’s weighted TFP growth contribution, like the sector’s total TFP contribution, is the 
smallest of the three. Agriculture’s very small share of value added, capital, and hours account for the 
tiny role its TFP factor growth plays in weighted TFP factor growth. The weighted TFP contributions 
of both industry and services are large. Industry’s weighted TFP contribution co-moves most closely 
with the total weighted TFP contribution of sectors throughout the sample period, but especially 
during the great recession and recovery years 2008–2010. Both industry and services have lower 
weighted TFP contributions, on average, after the 1980s than during the 1980s. The weighted TFP 
contribution of industry declines sharply after 1989, and those of agriculture and services decline after 
1990; the total weighted TFP contribution of sectors clearly declines after 1990, as figure 9a showed. 
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Figure 9c shows that the residual contributions of the industrial and services sectors are strongly 
inversely correlated, as one might expect. The residual contribution of agriculture is, like its weighted 
TFP contribution, small and it is roughly zero in last few years of the sample. By contrast, while the 
residual contributions of the industrial and service sectors are typically smaller in magnitude than each 
sector’s weighted TFP contribution to aggregate TFP growth, they are not trivial. While the total 
residual contribution to aggregate TFP factor growth is small, because sectoral residual contributions 
are not independent and offset each other, each sector’s residual contribution is not necessarily small 
as a portion of its total contribution to aggregate TFP factor growth.  
The three panels of figure 10 show the decomposition of each sector’s total contribution to 
aggregate TFP growth into its weighted TFP and residual components, where the sum of the weighted 
TFP factor and residual contribution for sector i,  𝐶𝑇𝐹𝑃𝐹𝑖, is not shown but the weighted TFP and 
residual contributions are instead plotted against aggregate TFP factor growth. Figure 10a shows that 
agriculture’s direct and residual contributions, and hence its total contribution, to aggregate TFP factor 
growth are small.  Agriculture’s residual contribution marginally raises its total contribution to 
aggregate TFP growth, on average, until the last decade of the sample. Figure 10b shows that industry’s 
weighted TFP contribution and its residual contribution frequently co-move inversely, but its residual 
contribution is insufficiently large to offset its weighted TFP contribution; its direct TFP contribution 
is partially offset by residual factors. By contrast, services’ weighted TFP contribution appears to 
positively co-move with its residual contribution in general, so the sector’s residual effects exacerbate 
its direct TFP factor contribution. In contrast to those of the industrial sector, services’ weighted TFP 
factor and residual contributions appear to become less important for aggregate TFP factor growth 
towards the end of the sample.  
In table 11, I show the decennial accounting for aggregate TFP factor growth by sector, and 
by weighted TFP and residual contributions. The first column of the table replicates the total weighted 
TFP growth and residual contributions of sectors presented in table 10.  Comparing the first two rows 
of numbers in the table, the large slowdown in aggregate TFP factor growth in the 1990s, relative to 
the 1980s, is attributable to two main factors. First, by far the most important factor is a large decline 
in the weighted TFP contribution of the industrial sector, as figures 9b and 10b also show.  This largely 
reflects the decline in actual TFP factor growth in the sector, seen in Table 8. The decline in industrial 
sector TFP factor growth has a substantive impact because industry represented a relatively large share 
in economic activity on average during the 1980s and 1990s. There is also a substantive, but much 
smaller, decline in agriculture’s direct TFP contribution; this reflects a large negative sectoral TFP 
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growth rate in the 1990s weighted by agriculture’s small shares of value added and primary production 
factors. The second most important factor for the decline in measured aggregate TFP growth is a 
substantial decline in the service sector residual. This also substantially depressed the total residual 
contribution of sectors to aggregate TFP growth, reducing it by 0.2 percentage points per year in the 
1990s relative to the 1980s. The negative residual effect of services for aggregate TFP growth in the 
1990s is also evident in figures 9c and 10c.   
        By contrast, the substantial decline in aggregate TFP factor growth in the 2000s relative to the 
1990s was mainly attributable to a large fall in the service sector’s weighted TFP contribution, 
reflecting a large fall in services’ TFP factor growth, seen in table 8. This, because services represented 
a large share of economic activity, had a substantial impact on the total weighted TFP factor 
contribution of sectors. The dominance of this factor in driving aggregate TFP growth in the 2000s is 
suggested by figures 9b and 10c, although the industrial sector’s weighted TFP contribution declined 
more sharply than that of services in the great recession years 2008 and 2009.  Notably, had the service 
sector residual not increased significantly, the sector’s own TFP growth slowdown would have had an 
even greater negative impact for aggregate TFP growth. In the 2000s, industry experienced a relatively 
small decline in average TFP factor growth, and in its weighted TFP factor and residual contributions 
to aggregate TFP factor growth. On average, the contributions of industry were quite stable in the 
2000s relative to the 1990s; notably, there was no recovery in industrial TFP factor growth or aggregate 
TFP factor contributions whatsoever. Agriculture’s total contribution declined further, relative to the 
1990s, and the decline is due to contraction in its residual contribution. However, the total residual 
contribution of sectors for aggregate TFP growth increased in the 2000s relative to the 1990s, with 
recovery of the service sector residual contribution.  
In the 2010s, a modest increase in aggregate TFP factor growth was attributable to modestly 
higher weighted TFP contributions of all three sectors, although the largest rise was in the industrial 
sector, which is evident in figures 9b and 10b. A negative service sector residual contribution reduced 
the total contribution of the sector and produced a negative total residual contribution of sectors to 
aggregate TFP factor growth, somewhat offsetting the improvement due to faster sectoral TFP 
growth. Finally, the last rows of data in the table reveal that on average over the full sample period 
services contributed marginally more to aggregate TFP growth than industry only due to services’ larger 
residual effect. Average TFP growth in industry was much higher, as seen in table 8, and contributed 
a larger weighted TFP contribution to aggregate TFP growth.    
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Figure 11a displays the total residual contribution to aggregate TFP factor growth, and its 
decomposition into the three residual factors summed over sectors. The figure shows that by far the 
most important source of annual fluctuations in the residual contribution to aggregate TFP growth is 
relative value-added price effects. In addition, there is a significant depressing effect for aggregate TFP 
growth of value-added reallocation in the 1990s. In figures 11b through 11d, I display each of the 
three residual effects respectively, broken down by sector.            
Figure 11b shows the relative price contributions to the residual by sector. The relative price 
contribution of agriculture is very small, and positively co-moves with that of industry, if weakly. The 
relative price contributions of industry and services are larger and co-move inversely.  For much of 
the sample, the relative price contribution of services is positive and that of industry negative; the 
price of services was typically rising relative to that of industry from the late-1980s until after the great 
recession. On average, the relative price effect of agriculture is zero. More generally, the total effect 
of relative price movements for the residual contribution to aggregate TFP growth is largely positive 
in the 1980s, negative in the 1990s, and roughly zero thereafter. 
 Capital income share adjustments by sector are illustrated in figure 11c and are very small; 
notice the different vertical axis scale relative to the other panels of figure 11. The contributions to 
the capital income share adjustment of industry and services are tiny, since the capital income shares 
of these two sectors are close to the economy-wide capital income share. Agriculture accounts for 
almost all capital income share adjustments in the residual, as agriculture has a much larger capital 
income share than the economy-wide share. The sign of the capital income adjustment, therefore, 
depends on whether the capital-output ratio in agriculture increased or decreased during a given year.  
Value added reallocation effects by sector are in figure 11d. The reallocation effects of industry 
and services exhibit a strong inverse co-movement with opposite signs. The reallocation effect of 
services for the residual was largely negative until the 2010s and quantitatively dominated the largely 
positive reallocation effect of industry over the same period. As value added was reallocated into 
services and out of industry, this increased the impact for aggregate capital-deepening of capital 
deepening in the service sector and diminished that of industry. Consequently, services’ weighted TFP 
contribution is “overstated”, and that of industry “understated”, relative to the two sectors’ respective 
total contributions to aggregate TFP factor growth. Negative service sector and positive industrial 
sector value-added reallocation effects in the residual reflect this. The role of agriculture for the 
reallocation residual is trivial.  
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Table 12 quantifies sectoral contributions to aggregate TFP factor growth via residual sources 
in a decennial sectoral accounting of the aggregate residual contribution. The table clearly shows that 
a declining, but positive, relative price effect, and a more negative value-added reallocation effect, are 
jointly responsible for services’ negative residual in the 1990s, reducing the sector’s total and residual 
contributions to aggregate TFP growth. At the same time, industry exhibited a large negative relative 
price effect in the 1990s and a positive value-added reallocation effect. More generally, the table shows 
that in each decade until the 2010s, services’ negative value-added reallocation effect quantitatively 
dominated industry’s positive effect. In the 1990s and 2000s, the industrial and service sector value-
added reallocation effects for within-sector residual contributions were muted by offsetting relative 
price effects. All residual effects were much smaller in the 2010s. The residual effects of agriculture 
were quantitatively small except for the positive capital-income share effect in the 1990s, which 
resulted in a non-trivial positive total residual contribution to aggregate TFP growth of the sector. 
Agriculture is also the most important source of the negative total residual effect in the 2010s through 
a negative capital income share contribution; all other residual contributions were small.  
4. Model 
In this and the following three sections, I develop a simple three-sector growth model, describe its 
calibration, and evaluate its ability to replicate the facts recorded in sections 2 and 3, respectively. I 
briefly present the model economy in this section and document some analytical properties of its 
equilibrium.   
I consider a three-sector neoclassical growth model, in which time is discrete and indexed by 
t, and the length of t is one year. The three sectors, indexed by j, are agriculture (a), industrial (m), and 
services (s). Perfectly competitive firms produce the value added of each industry using capital and 
labor services, which are mobile across sectors. Factor markets are also perfectly competitive. In 
addition, a representative household derives utility from consuming a composite of the three sectors’ 
value added and leisure, supplies labor and capital services to firms, and saves by investing in new 
physical capital.  
4.1 Production  
Sector j produces value added using the Cobb-Douglas production function                                                    𝑣𝑗,𝑡 = ∆𝑗,𝑣𝐴𝑗,𝑡(𝑘𝑗,𝑡)𝛼𝑗(𝑛𝑗,𝑡)1−𝛼𝑗 , ∀𝑗.                                                (13) 
Here, 𝑘𝑗,𝑡 and 𝑛𝑗,𝑡 are capital and labor services employed in sector j at date t, 𝛼𝑗 is capital’s share of 
value added in sector j, 𝐴𝑗,𝑡 ≡ Γ𝑗,𝑡𝛾𝑡(1−𝛼𝑗) is total factor productivity in industry j, and ∆𝑗,𝑣  is a 
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constant scaling factor to facilitate calibration. Value added has price (and unit cost) 𝑝𝑗,𝑡 . TFP is one 
of three exogenous sources of variation in the model, and evolves according to 𝐴𝑗,𝑡+1 𝐴𝑗,𝑡 = Γ𝑗,𝑡+1Γ𝑗,𝑡 𝛾𝑡(1−𝛼𝑗) = 1 + 𝜎𝐴,𝑗,𝑡 , ∀𝑡, 𝑗. 
As I assumed in the empirical work above, on a balanced growth path, the TFP of sector j grows at 
the constant growth rate 
Γ𝑗0Γ𝑗0 𝛾(1−𝛼𝑗) = 𝛾(1−𝛼𝑗) = 1 + 𝜎𝐴,𝑗 , and its TFP factor, 𝐴𝑗,𝑡 1/(1−𝛼𝑗), at the 
constant, economy wide TFP factor growth rate 𝛾 = (1 + 𝜎𝐴,𝑗 )1/(1−𝛼𝑗). 
The firm’s profit maximization problem is                       max{𝑘𝑗,𝑡 ,𝑛𝑗,𝑡 }(𝑝𝑗,𝑡 𝑣𝑗,𝑡 − 𝑟𝑡 𝑘𝑗,𝑡  − 𝑤𝑡 𝑛𝑗,𝑡 ).                                                                 (14)  
In (14), 𝑟𝑡 and 𝑤𝑡 are the competitively determined rental and wage rates, respectively.  
4.2 Households       
There are four sources of demand for the value added of sectors: Private consumption of households, 
private household investment, government consumption, and exogenous foreign demand–net 
exports. The determination of the net exports of a sector is not modeled explicitly and in the calibrated 
model net exports by sector is a source of exogenous variation.   
4.2.1 Household consumption and investment 
The household has 𝑁𝑡 identical members at every date. Each member is endowed with one unit of 
productive time to be allocated between hours worked and leisure. The number of household 
members, and hence the total productive time endowment, grows exogenously. Specifically, the 
working population (all household members are assumed to allocate time between hours worked and 
leisure) evolves according to 
 
𝑁𝑡+1𝑁𝑡 = (1 + 𝜎𝑁,𝑡), ∀𝑡.   
Working population growth is a third source of exogenous variation in the model. On a balanced 
growth path, the working population grows at the constant rate 
𝑁𝑡+1𝑁𝑡 = (1 + 𝜎𝑁) = 𝑛, ∀𝑡. Total hours 
worked by the household at date t is 𝑛𝑡,  and total household leisure is 𝑙𝑡 = 𝑁𝑡 − 𝑛𝑡 . The household 
is also endowed with the initial physical capital stock, 𝑘0 > 0, at date 0 and supplies this in-elastically 
to date-0 production. Capital accumulates with final investment by households, 𝑋𝑡 ,  according to the 
law of motion  
                                    𝑘𝑡+1 = (1 − 𝛿)𝑘𝑡 + 𝑋𝑡.                                                                        (15)     
Here, 𝛿 is the depreciation rate.  
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The final investment good purchased by households is produced by perfectly competitive 
firms. A representative investment firm aggregates purchases of sector j value added, 𝑥𝑗,𝑡, to produce 
the final investment good that is purchased by households, 
 𝑋𝑡 = ∆𝑥 (∑ 𝜔𝑥,𝑗1/𝜗(𝑥𝑗,𝑡)1−1/𝜗𝑗=𝑎,𝑚,𝑠 )𝜗/(𝜗−1) .                                       (16)                                      
Here, 𝜔𝑥,𝑗 governs the share of industry j output in investment, 𝜗 > 0  is the elasticity of substitution 
between investment purchases from different industries, and ∆𝑥  is a constant scaling factor facilitating 
calibration. The price of the final investment good is the CES index 𝑃𝑥,𝑡. The firm maximizes profits 
subject to the production function (16), and taking as given the price index 𝑃𝑥,𝑡, and input prices 𝑝𝑗,𝑡, 
   𝑚𝑎𝑥 𝑃𝑥,𝑡𝑋𝑡 − ∑ 𝑝𝑗,𝑡𝑥𝑗,𝑡.𝑗                                                                                (17) 
The household maximizes lifetime utility by choice of per working age person consumption of 
a composite good and leisure at each date,   
                        𝑢(𝐶, 𝑙) =  ∑ 𝛽𝑡𝑈((𝐶𝑡𝑁𝑡) , (1 − 𝑛𝑡𝑁𝑡))𝑁𝑡 ,∞𝑡=0                                               (18)     
where 0 < 𝛽 < 1 is the discount factor. I assume that the period utility function,  𝑈((𝐶𝑡𝑁𝑡) , (1 − 𝑛𝑡𝑁𝑡)), 
in (18) takes the nested, constant elasticity of substitution (CES) form, 
                      𝑈 ((𝐶𝑡𝑁𝑡) , (1 − 𝑛𝑡𝑁𝑡)) = ((
𝐶𝑡𝑁𝑡)𝜙 𝜈 (1 − 𝑛𝑡𝑁𝑡)1−𝜙)𝜌 − 1𝜌 ,                                          (19𝑎) 
where 𝜌 ≥ 0, the intertemporal elasticity of substitution satisfies, 𝜎 = 11−𝜌 ≥ 0. In the benchmark 
calibrated model economy, I assume that  𝜌 = 0 (the inter-temporal elasticity of substitution 𝜎 = 1), 
and that 𝜈 is a constant function equal to one, so that                       𝑈 ((𝐶𝑡𝑁𝑡) , (1 − 𝑛𝑡𝑁𝑡)) = 𝜙 𝑙𝑛 (𝐶𝑡𝑁𝑡) + (1 − 𝜙) ln (1 − 𝑛𝑡𝑁𝑡).                                     (19𝑏) 
In extensions of the benchmark economy, I explore two alternative specifications consistent with (18). 
In one, I allow 𝜌 to deviate from 0 to permit a different (higher) intertemporal elasticity of substitution 
while 𝜈 is equal to one. In a second variant, I maintain an intertemporal elasticity of unity but allow 𝜈 
to be a function permitting the elasticity of labor supply to deviate substantially from unity, so that the 
period utility function takes the form, 
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                     𝑈 ((𝐶𝑡𝑁𝑡) , (1 − 𝑛𝑡𝑁𝑡)) = 𝜙 𝑙𝑛 (𝐶𝑡𝑁𝑡) + (1 − 𝜙) (1 − 𝑛𝑡𝑁𝑡)
1−𝜃 − 11 − 𝜃 .                           (19𝑐) 
 Here 1/𝜃 is the Frisch elasticity of labor supply. The utility functions in equations (19a), (19b), and 
(19c) are consistent with a balanced growth path, when the working age population grows at a constant 
rate, 𝜎𝑁,𝑡 = 𝜎𝑁 , sectoral TFP factors all grow at the common constant rate 𝛾, hours worked per 
working age person are constant, and consumption per working age person and the wage grow at the 
same rate as sectoral TFP factors.  
In all specifications of the period utility function, 𝐶𝑡  is a CES composite over household 
consumption of industry j output at date t, 𝑐𝑗,𝑡 , 𝑗 = 𝑎,𝑚, 𝑠,  given by   
                           𝐶𝑡 = ∆𝑐  (∑ 𝜔𝑐,𝑗1𝜀(𝑐𝑗,𝑡 − 𝑐?̅?)1−1𝜀𝑗=𝑎,𝑚,𝑠 ) 𝜀𝜀−1 .                                         (20)                    
In this composite, 𝜔𝑐,𝑗  governs the weight on the jth sector’s value added, 𝑐?̅? > 0 (< 0) is a required 
subsistence level of consumption (non-market endowment) of good j which allows the income 
elasticity of consumption demand to differ (from one) over the value added of different sectors, 𝜀 >0  governs (is) the elasticity of substitution between different consumer goods and services (when 𝑐?̅? =0∀𝑗), and ∆𝑐 is a scaling parameter. The CES price index for final household consumption 𝐶𝑡 is 𝑃𝑐,𝑡.  
        Household maximization of (18) by choice of consumption, hours worked, and tomorrow’s 
capital stock is subject to (15), (19a), (19b), or (19c), (20), non-negativity constraints on consumption, 
hours worked, and capital, and the sequence of budget constraints 
            ∑ 𝑝𝑗,𝑡𝑐𝑗,𝑡𝑗 + 𝑃𝑥,𝑡𝑋𝑡 + 𝑁𝑋𝑡 ≤ (𝑟𝑡 − 𝛿)(1 − 𝜏𝑘)𝑘𝑡 + 𝑤𝑡𝑛𝑡 + 𝑇𝑡 .                                     (21)                              
In (21), 𝜏𝑘  is a constant capital income tax rate, which implies realistic real interest rates in the 
calibrated model, and 𝑇𝑡  is a time-varying a lump sum government transfer which balances the 
government’s budget constraint as I describe next. In addition, 𝑁𝑋𝑡 represents the numeraire value of 
total net exports, the determination of which I do not explicitly model; net exports are exogenously 
determined foreign savings.  
4.2.2 Government consumption 
The government consumes the value added of each sector, spending a total amount equal to an 
exogenously determined fraction of aggregate value added denoted ?̅?𝑡 .   To meet its required 
consumption, the government purchases sector j value added, 𝑔𝑗,𝑡, and aggregates its purchases across 
sectors to produce the government consumption composite,  
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                              𝐺𝑡 = ∆𝑔 (∑ 𝜔𝑔,𝑗1/𝜀(𝑔𝑗,𝑡)1−1/𝜀𝑗=𝑎,𝑚,𝑠 )𝜀/(𝜀−1) .                                          (22) 
Here 𝜔𝑔,𝑗 governs the share of industry j final government consumption in the composite, 𝜀 is the 
elasticity of substitution between types of final consumption good, ∆𝑔 is a scaling parameter, and the 
price of 𝐺𝑡  is a CES index 𝑃𝑔,𝑡 .  The government’s problem is to choose non-negative 𝑔𝑗,𝑡 , 𝑗 =𝑎, 𝑚, 𝑠, to maximize (22), subject to the required expenditure constraint ∑ 𝑝𝑗,𝑡𝑗=𝑎,𝑚,𝑠 𝑔𝑗,𝑡 = ?̅?𝑡𝑌𝑡 , where  
                                𝑌𝑡 = ∑ 𝑝𝑗,𝑡𝑣𝑗,𝑡𝑗=𝑎,𝑚,𝑠 ,                                                                                 (23) 
is aggregate value added, and subject to a budget constraint that its consumption expenditure, 𝑃𝑔,𝑡𝐺𝑡, is no greater than its capital income tax revenue net of lump sum transfers to households.  
The budget constraints of the government and household combined with firms’ profit 
maximization problems yield the national budget constraint,  
 𝑃𝑐,𝑡𝐶𝑡 + 𝑃𝑥,𝑡𝑋𝑡 + 𝑃𝑔,𝑡𝐺𝑡 + 𝑁𝑋𝑡 ≤ ∑ 𝑝𝑗.𝑡𝑣𝑗,𝑡𝑗=𝑎,𝑚,𝑠 .                                           (24𝑎)  
Household expenditure on consumption and investment must satisfy the constraint, 
 𝑃𝑐,𝑡𝐶𝑡 + 𝑃𝑥,𝑡𝑋𝑡 ≤ (1 − ?̅?𝑡)𝑌𝑡 − 𝑁𝑋𝑡.                                                        (24𝑏)  
4.3 Feasibility  
At each date t, the resource constraint for sector j is  
 𝑣𝑗,𝑡 ≥ 𝑐𝑗,𝑡 + 𝑥𝑗,𝑡 + 𝑔𝑗,𝑡 + 𝑛𝑥𝑗,𝑡, ∀𝑗, 𝑡,                                                                      (25𝑎)                                                                       
where 𝑛𝑥𝑗,𝑡 is an exogenous net foreign demand for sector j value added, and ∑ 𝑝𝑗,𝑡𝑛𝑥𝑗,𝑡 = 𝑁𝑋𝑡.𝑗  In 
addition, feasibility for capital services at date t requires  
            ∑ 𝑘𝑗,𝑡 ≤ 𝑘𝑡𝑗=𝑎,𝑚,𝑠 ,                                                                                                           (25𝑏)      
and feasibility for labor services at date t requires that 
            ∑ 𝑛𝑗,𝑡 ≤ 𝑛𝑡.𝑗=𝑎,𝑚,𝑠                                                                                                            (25𝑐)   
4.4 Equilibrium 
An equilibrium is sequences of prices, allocations for households and governments, and production 
plans for firms, given exogenous a) sectoral TFP sequences, b) working population sequence, c) 
constant capital income tax rate, d) government expenditure fraction of aggregate value added, and e) 
net exports by sector and aggregate net exports, such that: (1) household consumption expenditures 
by sector, aggregate investment purchases, and hours worked solve the household’s utility 
maximization problem; (2) the production plan and labor and capital purchases for sector j solves the 
representative sector j firm’s profit maximization problem; (3) investment input purchases solve the 
profit maximization problem of the representative investment firm; (4) government policies satisfy its 
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consumption expenditure requirement and budget constraint; and (5) the sector j value added market, 
the economy-wide market for capital services, and the economy-wide market for labor services clear 
(hence the resource constraints (25a) through (25c) bind). 
4.5 Analysis 
4.5.1 Sectoral allocations and structural change 
The unit cost of value added of sector j confronted by purchasers of its value added is   
        𝑝𝑗,𝑡 = 𝐴𝑗,𝑡−1𝛼𝑗−𝛼𝑗(1 − 𝛼𝑗)−(1−𝛼𝑗)(𝑟𝑡)𝛼𝑗(𝑤𝑡)(1−𝛼𝑗).                                                (26) 
On a balanced growth path, the wage and TFP factor of sector j grow at the same rate, 𝛾,  and the 
rental rate on capital is constant, so that the relative price of the sector’s value added is constant. 
Notice that the relative price of value added across sectors depends on sectoral capital shares, and 
hence rental and wage rates appear in relative prices, in addition to relative sectoral TFPs. However, 
relative prices depend inversely on relative TFPs in a manner identical to that in a model with 
homogenous capital income shares across sectors.    
From the first order conditions for profit maximization by firms, the relative expenditure and 
expenditure shares of capital and labor in sector j are                               𝑟𝑡𝑘𝑗,𝑡𝑤𝑡𝑛𝑗,𝑡 = ( 𝛼𝑗1 − 𝛼𝑗),    𝑟𝑡𝑘𝑗,𝑡𝑝𝑗,𝑡𝑣𝑗,𝑡 = 𝛼𝑗  ,   𝑤𝑡𝑛𝑗,𝑡𝑝𝑗,𝑡𝑣𝑗,𝑡   = (1 − 𝛼𝑗),                                           
implying sector j factor demand functions  
      𝑘𝑗,𝑡 = 𝛼𝑗 𝑝𝑗,𝑣,𝑡𝑟𝑡 𝑣𝑗,𝑡,    𝑛𝑗,𝑡 = (1 − 𝛼𝑗) 𝑝𝑗,𝑡𝑤𝑡 𝑣𝑗,𝑡.                                       (27) 
Similarly, optimal household relative consumption expenditure, and consumption expenditure shares 
for sector j value added are 𝑝𝑗,𝑡(𝑐𝑗,𝑡 − 𝑐?̅?)𝑝𝑗′,𝑡(𝑐𝑗′,𝑡 − 𝑐?̅?′) = (𝜔𝑐,𝑗𝜔𝑐,𝑗′)(𝑝𝑗′,𝑡𝑝𝑗,𝑡 )𝜀−1 ,      𝑝𝑗,𝑡(𝑐𝑗,𝑡 − 𝑐?̅?)𝑃𝑐,𝑡𝐶𝑡 = 𝜔𝑐,𝑗 (𝑃𝑐,𝑡𝑝𝑗,𝑡)𝜀−1,  
implying household demand function for sector j value added  
     𝑐𝑗,𝑡 = 𝜔𝑐,𝑗 (𝑝𝑗,𝑡𝑃𝑐,𝑡)−𝜀 𝐶𝑡 + 𝑐?̅? ,                                                             (28)      
where 𝑃𝑐,𝑡 = ∆𝑐−1 (∑ 𝜔𝑐,𝑗(𝑝𝑗,𝑡)1−𝜀𝑗=𝑎,𝑚,𝑠 ) 11−𝜀 . Analogously, optimal government relative 
consumption expenditure, and expenditure shares for type j value added are,  𝑝𝑗,𝑡𝑔𝑗,𝑡𝑝𝑗′,𝑡𝑔𝑗′,𝑡 = (𝜔𝑔,𝑗𝜔𝑔,𝑗′)(𝑝𝑗′,𝑡𝑝𝑗,𝑡 )𝜀−1 ,           𝑝𝑗,𝑡𝑔𝑗,𝑡𝑃𝑔,𝑡𝐺𝑡 = 𝜔𝑔,𝑗 (𝑃𝑔,𝑡𝑝𝑗,𝑡)𝜀−1     ,   
36 
 
implying government demand function for sector j value added 
          𝑔𝑗,𝑡 = 𝜔𝑔,𝑗 (𝑝𝑗,𝑡𝑃𝑔,𝑡)−𝜀 𝐺𝑡,                                                                  (29) 
with price index 𝑃𝑔,𝑡 = ∆𝑔−1 (∑ 𝜔𝑔,𝑗(𝑝𝑗,𝑡)1−𝜀𝑗=𝑎,𝑚,𝑠 ) 11−𝜀.  Finally, optimal relative investment 
expenditure, and expenditure shares for sector j value added are,  𝑝𝑗,𝑡𝑥𝑗,𝑡𝑝𝑗′,𝑡𝑥𝑗′,𝑡 = (𝜔𝑥,𝑗𝜔𝑥,𝑗′)(𝑝𝑗′,𝑡𝑝𝑗,𝑡 )𝜗−1 , 𝑝𝑗,𝑡𝑥𝑗,𝑡𝑃𝑥,𝑡𝑋𝑡 = 𝜔𝑥,𝑗 (𝑃𝑥,𝑡𝑝𝑗,𝑡)𝜗−1,                            
Implying investment firm demand for sector j value added 
              𝑥𝑗,𝑡 = 𝜔𝑥,𝑗 (𝑝𝑗,𝑡𝑃𝑥,𝑡)−𝜗 𝑋𝑡,                                                              (30) 
with price index 𝑃𝑥,𝑡 = ∆𝑥−1 (∑ 𝜔𝑥,𝑗(𝑝𝑗,𝑡)1−𝜗𝑗=𝑎,𝑚,𝑠 ) 11−𝜗.  
Using the optimal demand functions, (28) through (30), the market clearing condition for 
sector j is    
               𝑣𝑗,𝑡 = (𝜔𝑐,𝑗 (𝑃𝑐,𝑡𝑝𝑗,𝑡)𝜀 𝐶𝑡 + 𝑐?̅? + 𝜔𝑔,𝑗 (𝑃𝑔,𝑡𝑝𝑗,𝑡)𝜀 𝐺𝑡 + 𝜔𝑥,𝑗 (𝑃𝑥,𝑡𝑝𝑗,𝑡)𝜗 𝑋𝑡) + 𝑛𝑥𝑗,𝑡.                (31) 
Then the value-added share of sector j can be expressed, using the right-hand side of (31), as    
𝑝𝑗,𝑡𝑣𝑗,𝑡𝑉𝐴𝑡 = (𝜔𝑐,𝑗 (
𝑃𝑐,𝑡𝑝𝑗,𝑡)𝜀−1 𝑃𝑐,𝑡𝐶𝑡 + 𝑝𝑗,𝑡𝑐?̅? + 𝜔𝑔,𝑗 (𝑃𝑔,𝑡𝑝𝑗,𝑡)𝜀−1 𝑃𝑔,𝑡𝐺𝑡 + 𝜔𝑥,𝑗 (𝑃𝑥,𝑡𝑝𝑗,𝑡)𝜗−1 𝑃𝑥,𝑡𝑋𝑡)∑ 𝑝𝑗′,𝑡𝑣𝑗′,𝑡𝑗′ , (32) 
where aggregate value added is,                                                         𝑉𝐴𝑡 =∑𝑝𝑗,𝑡𝑣𝑗,𝑡.𝑗                                                                            (33) 
Using the demand function for employment in sector j from (27), the relative demand for labor in 
sector j and sector j’, and sector j’s share of employment are   𝑛𝑗,𝑡𝑛𝑗′,𝑡 = (1 − 𝛼𝑗)𝑝𝑗,𝑡𝑣𝑗,𝑡(1 − 𝛼𝑗′)𝑝𝑗′,𝑡𝑣𝑗′,𝑡 , 𝑛𝑗,𝑡∑ 𝑛𝑗′,𝑡𝑗′=𝑎,𝑚,𝑠 = (1 − 𝛼𝑗)𝑝𝑗,𝑡𝑣𝑗,𝑡∑ (1 − 𝛼𝑗′)𝑝𝑗′,𝑡𝑣𝑗′,𝑡𝑗′=𝑎,𝑚,𝑠 . 
Substituting from the solutions for value added prices and demands, we have the equilibrium 
employment share of sector j as  
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𝑛𝑗,𝑡𝑁𝑡 = (1 − 𝛼𝑗) (𝜔𝑐,𝑗 (
𝑃𝑐,𝑡𝑝𝑗,𝑡)𝜀−1𝑃𝑐,𝑡𝐶𝑡 + 𝑝𝑗,𝑡𝑐?̅?   𝜔𝑔,𝑗 (𝑃𝑔,𝑡𝑝𝑗,𝑡 )𝜀−1 𝑃𝑔,𝑡𝐺𝑡 +𝜔𝑥,𝑗 (𝑃𝑥,𝑡𝑝𝑗,𝑡)𝜗−1𝑃𝑥,𝑡𝑋𝑡)∑ (1 − 𝛼𝑗′)𝑝𝑗′,𝑡𝑣𝑗′,𝑡𝑗′=𝑎,𝑚,𝑠 .  (34) 
The value added and employment share of sector j in (32) and (34) deviate due to capital intensity 
differences across sectors. If capital’s share of income were common to sectors, the employment 
and value-added shares of a sector would be equal. Evidently, structural change in employment and 
value-added shares of sectors–secular change–results from a) persistent productivity growth 
differentials which affect relative prices, 𝑝𝑗,𝑡, as seen in (26); b) aggregate income (value added) 
growth which reduces the role of the constant non-homothetic term, 𝑐?̅?; and c) as long as 𝜔𝑐,𝑗 ≠𝜔𝑥,𝑗 , changes in anticipated income growth which alter the household’s optimal intertemporal 
allocation of consumption and labor supply.     
 Note that when 𝜀 = 𝜗 = 0, which is the case in the benchmark calibrated economy, the 
demand functions and associated price indexes take Leontief forms that can be derived directly from 
the foregoing solutions. For example, in the case of household consumption, at an optimum demand 
functions, price index, and optimal consumption index are                                             𝑐𝑗,𝑡 − 𝑐?̅? = 𝜔𝑐,𝑗𝑃𝑐,𝑡𝐶𝑡∑ 𝜔𝑐,𝑗𝑝𝑗,𝑡𝑗 = 𝑤𝑗𝐶𝑡,                                                                (35𝑎)  
                                              𝑃𝑐,𝑡 = ∑ 𝜔𝑐,𝑗𝑝𝑗,𝑡𝑗 ,                                                                              (35𝑏)                                                𝐶𝑡 = 𝑐𝑗,𝑡 − 𝑐?̅?𝜔𝑐,𝑗 , ∀𝑗.                                                                                 (35𝑐) 
Analogous results hold for investment and government consumption. In this case, (changes in) relative 
prices are irrelevant for structural change. However, income growth, and changes in anticipated 
income growth, will nonetheless impact sectoral allocations through income effects attributable to 
non-homothetic preferences and inter-temporal substitution.   
4.5.2 Optimal aggregate household allocations and aggregate metrics  
The intra-temporal optimality condition for per capita household leisure is simply,        𝑙𝑡𝑁𝑡 = 1 − 𝑛𝑡𝑁𝑡 = (1 − 𝜓𝜓 ) (𝑃𝑐,𝑡𝐶𝑡𝑤𝑡𝑁𝑡 ).                                                                   (36)  
In the case of an intertemporal elasticity of substitution equal to 1, the Euler equation is simply                            𝛽𝑃𝑐,𝑡𝐶𝑡/𝑁𝑡𝑃𝑐,𝑡+1𝐶𝑡+1/𝑁𝑡+1 = 𝑃𝑥,𝑡(1 − 𝛿(1 − 𝜏𝑟𝑘))𝑃𝑥,𝑡+1 + 𝑟𝑡+1(1 − 𝜏𝑟𝑘).                          (37𝑎) 
More generally, optimal inter-temporal allocations are dictated by the condition,  
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                   ( 𝛽𝑃𝑐,𝑡𝐶𝑡/𝑁𝑡𝑃𝑐,𝑡+1𝐶𝑡+1/𝑁𝑡+1) ((𝐶𝑡+1/𝑁𝑡+1𝐶𝑡/𝑁𝑡 )𝜓 (𝑙𝑡+1/𝑁𝑡+1𝑙𝑡/𝑁𝑡 )1−𝜓)𝜌 = 𝑃𝑥,𝑡(1−𝛿(1−𝜏𝑟𝑘))𝑃𝑥,𝑡+1+𝑟𝑡+1(1−𝜏𝑟𝑘) . (37𝑏)  
Finally, I define the aggregate capital stock as simply the sum of capital stocks across sectors,   𝑘𝑡 =∑𝑘𝑗,𝑡𝑗 . 
Physical capital is not traded in the model, and so there is no model-based market price estimate. 
However, capital services are exchanged among households and firms in factor markets, and with 
perfect capital mobility across sectors command a common rental price in all j sectors. Clearly, capital 
shares in the model do not, therefore, correspond exactly to nominal capital shares in the data.  In the 
model, labor services are traded at a unique wage rate, and so total hours worked are measured by the 
simple sum across sectors of hours worked within each sector,   𝑛𝑡 =∑𝑛𝑗,𝑡𝑗 . 
Hours’ shares in the model do correspond to hours shares in the data (although labor compensation 
shares would not do so). I define aggregate TFP using model-based estimates of aggregate variables 
as                     𝐴𝑡 = 𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑡𝑘𝑡𝛼𝑛𝑡1−𝛼,                  
using the same economy-wide capital income share (0.362) as I apply in my empirical analysis (and 
which is therefore consistent with the sectoral capital income shares estimated in the data). I compute 
real GDP in this case as a Laspeyres chain of the real value added of the three sectors, using sectoral 
prices in (26). This is more consistent with the measure of real GDP in the data than is aggregate value 
added,  𝑉𝐴𝑡,  in equation (33) in the model. However, it is worth noting that–in either case–the 
numeraire for sectoral value-added prices in the model and the numeraire for sectoral value-added 
prices in the data obviously differ. I discuss the measurement of these objects in more detail in the 
calibration section below, and in the data appendix.   
4.6 Computing equilibrium  
For given initial conditions, if a) policy variables converge to constant values, b) the growth rates of 
the total household time endowment (population) and sectoral TFP converge to constants, with equal 
TFP growth rates across sectors, c) the consumption function parameters 𝑐?̅?, ∀𝑗 converge to zero, and 
d) net exports in each sector converge to constants, the economy converges to a unique balanced 
growth path. The balanced growth path features growth in value added and capital per working age 
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person within each sector equal to the common TFP factor growth rate, constant prices of sectoral 
value added and a constant rental rate of capital, and constant sectoral allocations (no structural 
change). At the aggregate, household level, “nominal consumption”, investment, and government 
consumption all grow at the same constant rate as aggregate value added, and the relative price of the 
aggregate investment good is constant. I compute the model’s transition to this steady state, calibrating 
the model’s parameters to match Japan’s 1980 national accounts and sectoral value-added shares, and 
inputting data on each of the exogenous variables from 1981 through 2018.  I assume that the 
economy converges to its balanced growth path by 2080.  
5. Calibration  
The calibration comprises three parts:  
1. I calibrate the sector level (“static”) parameters of technologies and preferences such that the 
1980 JSNA and OECD STAN sectoral data replicate an equilibrium of the model; 1980 is the 
“base” year. In the base year, all value-added prices are set equal to one. The numeraire–which 
I assume, in the model economy, is the aggregate investment good at date t, 𝑋𝑡–for prices in 
the simulations is therefore 1980 Yen. That is, the price of one unit of the investment good at 
any date equals one 1980 Yen. I also normalize all 1980 equilibrium allocations relative to 1980 
(nominal and real) GDP in Japan, which I set equal to 100.   
2. I input actual measured time-series of sectoral TFP growth rates (derived from the sectoral 
growth accounting in appendix 2 and used in section 3), working population growth rates 
(taken from the United Nations Population dataset used in sections 2 and 3), government 
consumption as a fraction of GDP, and net exports by sector. 
3. I take from the extant literature independent estimates for aggregate parameters where 
possible, and elasticities.    
Parameter values and their sources and/or targets are presented in table 13.  
5.1 Production and technology 
5.1.1 Industry Classification 
I use OECD STAN and JSNA data to calibrate the model and measure TFP by sector. I follow the 
OECD classification of the three major sectors of economic activity, also utilized in the empirical 
analysis, in calibrating the model. I describe this classification in the data appendix.  
5.1.2 Capital income shares, initial capital stocks, and capital depreciation rate 
I compute the capital income share for sector j in Japan as follows. First, as in my empirical analysis, 
I assume Hayashi and Prescott’s estimate of Japan’s aggregate capital income share, 𝛼 = 0.362. I then 
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multiply the implied aggregate labor income share, 1 − 𝛼, by the 1980 JSNA national accounts data 
value of nominal GDP to calculate an adjusted estimate of aggregate compensation of employees in 
the 1980 Japanese economy. I then compute the 1980 share of aggregate compensation of employees 
that each of the three industries in the model accounts for using OECD STAN sectoral compensation 
data. I multiply each sector’s share of total compensation calculated from the STAN data by the 
adjusted aggregate compensation measure to produce GDP and aggregate capital income share 
consistent sectoral labor compensation values for 1980. I compute 1980 capital payments of sector j 
in a similar manner, as sector j’s share of 𝛼𝐺𝐷𝑃1980. Specifically, I compute sector j’s share of 
aggregate capital payments as sector j value added (specifically, the GDP-consistent, adjusted values 
that I calculated for the empirical analysis) less the sector j GDP-consistent measure of the 
compensation of employees computed above. Finally, each sector’s labor income share is just its 
adjusted employee compensation value divided by the sum of its adjusted employee compensation 
value and adjusted capital payments. 
 To estimate the 1980 capital stock, I use the 1980 capital-output ratio from the data employed 
in section 2 and multiply it by 100 (1980 GDP). The depreciation rate is then calibrated as the ratio of 
1980 capital consumption expenditure from the JNSA to the 1980 capital stock. The 1981 capital 
stock–which is an initial condition for the simulations starting in 1981– is estimated as the 
undepreciated portion of the 1980 capital stock, using the calibrated value of the depreciation rate, 
plus the value of 1980 investment expenditure net of inventory accumulation from JNSA.   
5.1.3 Initial TFP levels and value-added scaling parameters by sector 
I take initial TFP levels for each sector j, 𝐴𝑗,1980, directly from the sectoral growth accounting data in 
appendix A2. They are extrapolated to subsequent years using the actual growth rates computed in 
the same growth accounting exercises. I then calculate the value-added production function scaling 
parameters for each sector j, ∆𝑣,𝑗, as the ratio of 1980 value added of sector j, adjusted so that the sum 
over sectors equals 1980 GDP as I describe in section 3), to the product of 1980 TFP and the 1980 
capital-labor bundle for sector j, ∆𝑣,𝑗= 𝑣𝑗,1980(𝐴𝑗,1980𝑘𝑗,1980𝛼𝑗 𝑛𝑗,19801−𝛼𝑗 ). Sector j capital income shares are as 
described in 5.1.2. Sector j capital services are calculated as sector j capital payments, and sector j labor 
services as sector j labor compensation, as all 1980 prices are set equal to one. Similarly, 1980 value 
added by sector is just taken as the (adjusted) nominal value in the data. Capital payments and labor 
compensation by sector are adjusted as described in 5.1.2, so that the sum over sectors of each equals 
the appropriate share of 1980 GDP given by the calibrated aggregate capital income share parameter 
41 
 
0.362. Value added, capital payments, and labor compensation of sector j are all normalized by 1980 
GDP. Note that this implies that calibrated 1980 value added by sector is just the 1980 value added 
percentage of that sector.  
5.1.4 TFP by sector 
TFP by sector, 𝐴𝑗,𝑡, ∀ 𝑗, 𝑡,  for the years 1980 through 2018 is an exogenous input to the calibrated 
model. A sector’s TFP is the Laspeyres chained real value added of the sector, with reference year 
1980 (note that 1980 nominal, constant price, and chained value added are all equal in the calibrated 
model), from the OECD STAN database, divided by that sector’s capital-hours bundle computed 
using the same income shares described in 5.1.2. The TFP of each sector and its annual growth rate 
is calculated in the sectoral growth accounting exercises of appendix A.2 for the period 1980 through 
2018. Beyond 2018, I assume that the growth rate of each sector’s TFP converges gradually such that 
its TFP factor grows at the sample average aggregate TFP growth rate by 2080. The sample average 
aggregate TFP growth rate, drawn from section 2, is 1.20 percent. (It makes little difference 
quantitatively, and none qualitatively, to my 1981-2018 simulation results if I let the model economy 
converge to a balanced growth path with a different (reasonable) long-run growth rate).      
5.2 Household preference parameters 
5.2.1 The discount factor 
The household’s discount factor, 𝛽,  is calibrated so that on a balanced growth path, with TFP factors 
in each sector growing at 1.2 percent, the real interest rate equals its long-run average. The World 
Bank estimates this average real interest rate for Japan, over a time-period which includes all years in 
my sample, as 2.28 percent.  
5.2.2 Consumption and leisure weights, working population, and ?̅?𝒋   
The weights on consumption and leisure in the period utility function are calibrated so that in 1980 
the household spends one-third of its total time endowment working. Specifically, I calibrate these 
parameters so that the static first order conditions represented by (36) hold at 1980 values of the 
aggregate consumption composite, 𝑃𝐶,1980𝐶1980, working population, 𝑁1980,  hours worked, 𝑛1980, and wage rate 𝑤1980 = 1, where 𝑁1980 = 3𝑛1980 = 3∑ 𝑛𝑗,1980𝑗=𝑎,𝑚,𝑠 .  
Recall that from 5.1.3, employment by sector in 1980, 𝑛𝑗,1980,  is calibrated as that sector’s share 
of the aggregate compensation value of labor and normalized by 1980 GDP.  The 1980 working 
population 𝑁1980 = 3𝑛1980 is thus also normalized by 1980 GDP and then extrapolated to all other 
years from 1981 to 2018 using the growth rates of the actual working age population taken from the 
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United Nations population estimates as in section 2. I assume that the growth rate of population and 
the working population is zero on the balanced growth path; from 2019 onwards, I assume the growth 
rate of the working population in the model economy gradually converges to zero by 2080.  
There is one complicating issue for the use of (36) to calibrate 𝜙; namely that the consumption 
composite appears in (36) and this does not equal aggregate consumption expenditure when 𝑐?̅? ≠ 0. 
From the first order conditions for optimal consumption allocations across sectoral value added,  ∑ 𝑝𝑗,𝑡(𝑐𝑗,𝑡 − 𝑐?̅?)𝑗=𝑎,𝑚,𝑠 = 𝑃𝑐,𝑡𝐶𝑡. 
Then to obtain an estimate of 𝑃𝑐,1980𝐶1980 requires subtracting the 1980 value of 𝑐?̅? for all j from 
aggregate consumption expenditure in 1980, ∑ 𝑝𝑗,1980𝑐𝑗,1980𝑗=𝑎,𝑚,𝑠  (a value which is drawn directly 
from the JSNA and normalized by 1980 GDP).  
 I calibrate the values of the non-homothetic terms 𝑐?̅? using estimates in Herrendorf et al. 
(2013). They provide estimates for 𝑐?̅?/𝑐𝑎,𝑡 and 𝑐?̅?/𝑐𝑠,𝑡 for 2010 and 1947. They assume, as do most 
in the literature, that 𝑐𝑚̅̅̅̅ = 0. I take their values for 𝑐?̅?𝑐𝑗,𝑡 , 𝑗 = 𝑎, 𝑠 for 2010 and 1947, interpolate linearly 
between them to find values for 1980, and multiply the 1980 estimated values by 1980 normalized 
(divided by 1980 GDP), value added consumption of agriculture and services calculated from the 
JSNA input-output tables (I describe the computation of value added consumption of each type of 
good below). This calculation yields estimates of  𝑐?̅? and 𝑐?̅?. I then use these estimates in first order 
condition (36) to calculate the weights on consumption and leisure in the period utility function. 
 It is well known that balanced growth is inconsistent with arbitrary values of the non-
homothetic utility parameters 𝑐?̅? and 𝑐?̅?. Following Kehoe et al. (2018), I therefore let the values of 
these parameters gradually converge to zero after 2018, assuming they attain zero values by 2080.  
5.3 Weights in consumption, investment, and government composites 
I calibrate the weights in the household consumption and household/firm investment composites 
from JSNA 1980 “use table” data in the input-output section of the dataset.  Because the entire value 
of a sector’s output is value added in the model, which ignores intermediate inputs for simplicity, I 
follow the method proposed by Herrendorf et al. (2013) for reallocating final expenditure on the 
output of each sector–private and government consumption expenditure, investment, and net 
exports–to reflect agents’ expenditure on the value added produced by that sector. Once this 
reallocation is accomplished, I calibrate the weights in each composite such that the demand functions, 
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equations (28), (29), and (30), are satisfied at the estimated values of 1980 consumption, government 
consumption, and investment on the value added of each sector, and at 1980 prices equal to one.  
Details of the value-added expenditure calculations are provided in the data appendix. To 
summarize, I first transform Japan’s supply and use tables for 1980 by aggregating them into the three 
sectors consistent with the industry classifications described in 5.1.1. I then transform the supply and 
use tables using standard methods into a symmetric, industry-by-industry input-output table. I rake 
and scale the elements of the input-output table to be consistent with Japan’s 1980 JSNA aggregate 
data on value added (GDP), household and NGO consumption expenditure, investment expenditure, 
government consumption expenditure and net exports. I then normalize all elements of the table by 
setting 1980 GDP equal to 100. Finally, I use the algorithm proposed by Herrendorf et al to compute 
the reallocation across sectors of each category of final expenditure– consumption, investment, etc.–
to isolate spending on the value added of each sector in that expenditure category. The resulting 1980 
expenditure on value added by sector and expenditure category are then used as inputs to equations 
(28), (29), and (30) to compute the consumption, government consumption, and investment weights 
on the value added of sectors in the associated CES composites. It is worth noting that the value-
added expenditures algorithm preserves the value of total expenditure in each final expenditure 
category, and the total value added produced by each sector in 1980.    
5.4 Government policies and net exports  
I use total government expenditure as a fraction of GDP–computed using the nominal series in JSNA- 
to measure ?̅?𝑡 at every date from 1980 through 2018. From 2019 onwards, I let the value of this 
fraction of GDP equal its 2018 value at every date, as the economy converges to its balanced growth 
path by 2080. Government spending as a fraction of GDP generally exhibits an upward trend over 
the sample period so the 2018 value is preferred as a balanced growth path value, rather than–for 
example–the much lower sample average. Notice that all government spending is “expensed” in the 
model; there is no government investment by assumption. The capital income tax rate, 𝜏𝑘, is set equal 
to the 1980 value in Imrohoroglu et al. (2006).  
 I have already described the calibration of net exports of value added by sector for 1980, and 
1980 aggregate net exports of value added which is simply equal to its 1980 final expenditure value. 
Both are then normalized by 1980 GDP. I estimate net exports of value added by sector for 1981 
through 2018 as follows. I a) multiply the 1980 proportion that the value added exports of a sector 
represents of total 1980 exports by total nominal exports for each year in the sample 1981-2018; b) 
multiply the 1980 proportion that the value added imports of a sector represents of total 1980 imports 
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by total nominal imports for each year in the sample from 1981-2018; c) divide the estimated nominal 
value added exports of each sector, and the estimated nominal imports of each sector, by a chained 
GDP price deflator for Japan with reference year 1980; d) scale the estimated real value of exports 
and imports for each sector for 1981-2018 by 1980 GDP to be consistent with model units; e) compute 
the value of real, scaled net exports of value added for each sector as the difference between real, 
scaled exports and real scaled imports. This method preserves total net exports from JSNA measured 
in 1980 Yen, and scaled by 1980 GDP, as the sum of estimated 1980 Yen, scaled net exports of value 
added across sectors.     
5.5 Elasticity parameters 
I set the intertemporal elasticity of substitution equal to 1. In this, I follow Herrendorf, Rogerson, and 
Valentinyi (2014), and not that it is consistent with the meta-analysis of Havranek et al. (2015) which 
shows that the mean value of the elasticity of intertemporal substitution for Japan across 109 estimates 
in empirical work is 0.893, with a standard deviation of 0.243. I take the household’s elasticity of 
substitution between the value added of alternative sectors in consumption from Herrendorf, 
Rogerson, and Valentinyi (2013), setting it equal to 0. I assume, since there is no relative price 
substitution in household consumption between the value added of alternative very broad sectors of 
economic activity, that this is also the case for household investment and–in the absence of alternative 
value-added based estimates–for government consumption. That is, my benchmark model’s 
specification of preferences follows equation (19b), with (35c) governing household consumption 𝐶𝑡 = 𝑐𝑗,𝑡−𝑐?̅?𝜔𝑐,𝑗 , ∀𝑗,and 𝑋𝑡 = 𝑥𝑗,𝑡𝜔𝑥,𝑗 , 𝐺𝑡 = 𝑔𝑗,𝑡𝜔𝑔,𝑗.   
6. Results 
6.1 Benchmark model  
In the benchmark calibration of the model, where parameter values follow table 13, the exogenous 
sources of variation and growth are: i) The aggregate working age population, which is total hours 
available to the household for work and leisure; ii) sectoral TFP; iii) government spending as a share 
of GDP; and iv) sectoral and aggregate net exports. Here, I evaluate this model’s performance in 
replicating Japan’s economic performance from 1981 through 2018. Specifically, I evaluate the multi-
sector model’s performance in replicating aggregate and sectoral allocations, aggregate growth 
accounting facts, and sectoral contributions to aggregate TFP factor growth.  
6.1.1 Aggregate and sectoral allocations  
I compute aggregate value added by summing value-added price weighted output across sectors. I  
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compute real GDP by calculating a Laspeyres chain index using the model’s predicted value-added 
prices and outputs by sector. Output per working age person is real GDP divided by the level of the 
working age population calibrated as described in section 5. To compute aggregate capital and hours 
factors, no price-weighting is necessary in aggregating sectoral capital inputs and sectoral hours worked 
in the numerator, however, output in the denominator of the capital factor is calculated as the value-
added price weighted sum of value added across sectors. The aggregate TFP factor is the ratio of 
model-implied GDP per working age person to the model-implied values of the aggregate capital and 
labor factors.  
In the panels of figure 12, I show the benchmark model’s predictions and data for i) the level 
and growth rate of GDP per working age person; ii) the level and growth rate of GDP per hour 
worked; iii) the level and growth rate of the capital factor; iv) the level and growth rate of the hours 
factor; and v) the aggregate TFP factor and TFP factor growth. In each figure featuring the level of a 
variable, I normalize the level in both model and data to equal 100 in 1980. Figure 13 shows how the 
model’s sectoral allocation of hours compares to that in the data.  
Figures 12a and 12b show that the model’s ability to match the level of GDP per working age 
person is very good, however, it predicts somewhat too much growth in the second half of the 1990s, 
and too little growth in the mid-2000s and after the great recession. Figures 12c and 12d show that 
the model’s match to the level and growth rate of GDP per hour is even closer, although it predicts 
excessively rapid growth in the early 1990s and at the end of the sample period. Figure 12e shows that 
the model predicts systematically somewhat too high a level of the capital-factor due to a 
counterfactually high growth rate of the capital factor in the first half of the 1980s and the early 1990s, 
and a capital factor that is counterfactually volatile throughout the sample period. Figures 12g and 12h 
show that the model predicts a level of the hours factor that is on average very close to that in the 
data until just prior to the great recession and the following years; the model implies that hours worked 
per working age person should have fallen by much more prior to and during the great recession, and 
in the aftermath of the 2011 earthquake than was observed in Japan. Overall, the growth rate of the 
hours factor implied by the model is too low in the last decade of the sample. Finally, figures 12i and 
12j show that model’s match to the level and growth rate of the TFP factor is close, although it grows 
a little too quickly in the first couple of years in the sample, and too slowly during the great recession, 
and a little too quickly in the last few years of the sample. Since actual sectoral TFP growth rates are 
inputs to the model, deviations of model implied aggregate TFP from measured aggregate TFP in the 
data are attributable to an inaccuracy of the model’s match to sectoral shares of value added, capital, 
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and hours, and to value added prices of sectors relative to the implicit deflator for aggregate GDP. 
The net impact of these deviations is evidently small on average, as the growth rate of the model’s 
TFP factor is very close to that observed in the data.  
Figure 13 confirms that the model’s match to hours worked shares of sectors is quite close–
very close for all three sectors through the mid-1990s, and very close throughout the sample period 
for agriculture. From the mid-1990s onwards, the model modestly but systematically underpredicts 
the observed share of hours worked in services and overpredicts that in industry. Given the role of 
household intertemporal allocations for sectoral shares of economic activity and resources, this implies 
that the model systematically overpredicts household investment demand (savings) and underpredicts 
household consumption demand from the mid-1990s onwards. This is corroborated by the 
counterfactually high capital factor predicted by the model. The “excess savings” generated in the 
model are likely the result of intertemporal substitution; during the mid-late 1990s the model predicts 
counterfactually high growth of GDP per household member and during the 2000s counterfactually 
low growth in GDP per household member.   
6.1.2 Aggregate growth accounting 
In Table 14, I show the model’s implied decennial aggregate growth accounting for the Japanese 
economy in terms of the capital, labor, and TFP factors and compare its performance to the empirical 
growth accounting data in table 2, which are reproduced in parentheses. Looking first at the final row 
of numbers which present average growth rates for the entire sample period, the benchmark model’s 
predictions for GDP per working age person and the TFP factor are close to the data. On average, 
and as seen in figure 12, the model predicts somewhat too little growth in the hours factor (after the 
mid-1990s) and too much growth in the capital factor throughout the sample period.    
 The decennial accounting shows that the model’s decade-by-decade predictions for the TFP 
factor, in the second column of numbers, are close. It predicts somewhat too little TFP growth on 
average in the 1980s and somewhat too much TFP growth in the 2010s. The third column of numbers 
show that, quantitatively, the model’s predictions for average capital-factor growth in each decade are 
not very far from but systematically higher than the data in all but the final eight years of the sample. 
The final column of numbers shows that the model’s predictions for average hours factor growth in 
the 1980s and 1990s are not too far from the data (and very close in the 1980s), but that in the 2000s 
and 2010s the model substantially underpredicts average hours factor growth. Overall, as a result, the 
first column of numbers in the table shows that the model’s predicted average growth of GDP per 
working age person is very close to the data in the 1980s, too high relative to the data in the 1990s due 
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to counterfactually rapid capital and hours factor growth, and too low in the 2000s and 2010s due to 
insufficiently rapid hours factor growth.  
In terms of decade-by-decade changes in average growth rates, notice that the model produces 
a significant decline in average hours factor growth in the 1990s relative to the 1980s, as seen in the 
data which features a mandated reduction in the length of the working week not incorporated in the 
model. The model’s predicted decline is not quite large enough, however. Similarly, the model 
successfully predicts a large decline in TFP factor growth in the 1990s relative to the 1980s, but this 
decline is not as large as in the data. The model predicts excessively rapid capital-factor growth in the 
1990s relative to the 1980s, but the magnitude of this “miss” is not great. The model’s “miss” of the 
decline in average hours factor growth in the 2000s relative to the 1990s is large, however, the model 
almost perfectly matches the magnitude of increase in average hours factor growth in the 2010s relative 
to the 2000s. This is surprising since multiple labor market policies were in place in Japan during the 
2010s (Abe’s “Womenomics”, for example) designed to stimulate labor supply which are not 
incorporated in the model. Nonetheless, the model cannot replicate the size of growth in the hours 
factor during either the 2000s or 2010s. Finally, the model significantly overpredicts the increase in 
TFP factor growth in the 2010s relative to the 2000s. 
Table 15 shows that the benchmark model matches extraordinarily well the growth accounting 
for GDP per hour worked. This should not be surprising given that the model’s greatest weakness in 
matching data for GDP per working age person is in failing to capture changes in the growth rate of 
hours per working age person. The model’s prediction for average GDP per hour worked by decade, 
and over the entire sample, seen in the first column of numbers of table 15 is quantitatively close to 
the data although, because average TFP growth in the 1990s does not decline as much relative to the 
1980s as in the data, the model overpredicts labor productivity growth in the 1990s. However, overall, 
because the model’s implied TFP factor and capital factor average growth rates by decade reasonably 
approximate those in the data, its accounting for GDP per hour is good.   
6.1.3 Sectoral accounting for GDP per working age person and growth factors 
The model’s performance in replicating the contributions of sectors to GDP per working age person 
growth, growth in the capital and hours factors, and growth in aggregate TFP is represented by figures 
14a through 17b and tables 16 through 19 respectively. I measure these contributions in an exactly 
analogous manner as in the data. I document the model’s performance in matching an empirical 
sectoral decomposition of GDP per hour worked in appendix A.5.    
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 Figures 14a and 14b show that the model’s accounting for the time-series of sectoral 
contributions to GDP per working age person growth is similar to the data although positive co-
movement of different sectors’ contributions in the model is closer than that observed in the data. 
Table 16 presents a sectoral accounting for decennial average growth rates of GDP per working age 
person with the empirical values shown in parentheses. The last row of numbers in the table shows 
that over the entire sample period, the model accurately replicates agriculture’s contribution to average 
GDP per working age person growth, assigns a modestly greater contribution to industry, and a 
somewhat smaller contribution to services. The model’s predictions for the contributions of all three 
sectors in the 1980s are remarkably accurate. The second row of numbers shows that the model over-
predicts growth in GDP per working age person in the 1990s largely because it over-predicts the 
contribution to that growth of the industrial sector; the model fails to capture the magnitude of decline 
in the industrial sector’s growth contribution in the 1990s relative to the 1980s. The model does a 
good job of matching quantitatively the (smaller) decline in services’ contribution. By contrast, the 
model predicts too little growth in the 2000s largely because it substantially under-predicts the service 
sector’s contribution, and the magnitude of decline in services’ contribution in the 2000s relative to 
the 1990s. Although the model only modestly underpredicts the industrial sector’s contribution to 
growth during the 2000s, a bigger problem is that it predicts a large decline in industry’s contribution 
in the 2000s relative to the 1990s whereas in the data there is actually a small increase (a consequence 
of the model underpredicting industry’s growth contribution decline in the 1990s relative to the 
1980s).  The model also underpredicts growth in the 2010s, largely because it understates services’ 
contribution with a much smaller understatement of the contributions of agriculture and industry. In 
this case, however, the direction (positive) and magnitude of change in industry’s sectoral contribution 
in the 2010s relative to the 2000s is proximately correct, while the model somewhat overstates the 
increase in services’ contribution.    
 Figures 15a and 15b show that excess volatility of the aggregate capital factor in the model 
relative to the data largely reflects excess volatility of the service sector’s contribution to growth in the 
factor. The last row of numbers in table 17 shows that the model accurately replicates the contribution 
of agriculture to average capital factor growth over the entire sample period but over-predicts the 
contributions of industry (a little) and, especially, services. In fact, the contribution of services to 
aggregate capital factor growth is significantly over-estimated by the model in every decade except the 
2010s. By contrast, the model’s predicted contribution of agriculture is quite close to the data in every 
decade and that of industry is close to the data in every decade except the 1990s, when the model 
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significantly over-predicts industry’s role in capital deepening. Almost all directional changes in 
sectoral contributions to capital deepening across decades are correct; there is a small increase in 
industry’s contribution in the 2000s relative to the 1990s but, because industry’s contribution increase 
in the 1990s relative to the 1980s is overstated, the model predicts a decline in industry’s contribution 
in the 2000s. Overall, the fact that the model overstates the level of the capital factor relative to the 
data is largely a consequence of its counterfactually large prediction for services’ contribution.  
 Figures 16a and 16b show that the model predicts an excessively large role for both services 
and the industrial sector in producing excessively volatile hours factor growth during the great 
recession. The last row of numbers in table 18 shows that, over the entire sample period, agriculture’s 
contribution to the aggregate positive average hours factor growth is accurately predicted, industry’s 
contribution a little too small, while the service sector’s contribution is much too small thereby 
producing the model’s significant under-prediction of average aggregate hours factor growth. In 
addition, the first row of numbers shows that the model’s predicted sectoral contributions to average 
hours factor growth are quite close to those in the data for the 1980s. The model fails to match 
quantitatively the decline in industry’s contribution to aggregate hours growth in the 1990s relative to 
the 1980s, although it matches quite closely the decline in the contribution of services and the small 
increase in the contribution of agriculture. The model’s largest failure in matching sectoral 
contributions to within-decade aggregate hours factor growth is seen in the 2000s and 2010s when it 
dramatically underpredicts the contribution of services to the (relatively) large positive hours factor 
growth observed in both decades and, in addition, understates the magnitude of the increase in 
services’ contribution in the 2000s relative to the 1990s and in the 2010s relative to the 2000s. Notably, 
the model also fails to predict an increase in industry’s contribution to aggregate hours growth in the 
2000s relative to the 1990s, although successfully predicts that industry’s contributions are negative in 
the 1990s and 2000s but positive in the 2010s. Overall, the model fails to match quantitatively the 
observed low and declining hours growth in the 1990s due to an underprediction of the decline in 
industry’s contribution, and the rapid aggregate hours growth in the 2000s and 2010s due largely to 
underprediction of services’ contribution.  
 Figures 17a and 17b and table 19a show that the model reproduces total sectoral contributions 
to aggregate TFP growth remarkably well. Recall that the model’s successful replication of aggregate 
TFP growth conditional on actual sectoral TFP growth inputs requires that its predictions for sectoral 
allocations and relative prices be accurate. While figures 17a and 17b show that the model’s total 
sectoral contributions to aggregate TFP growth are excessively volatile during the great recession, this 
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is the only period when they are noticeably so. The last row of numbers in table 19a shows that the 
model almost perfectly matches sectoral contributions to average aggregate TFP growth over the 
entire sample period. In the 1980s, the model assigns too little aggregate TFP growth contributions to 
all three sectors, resulting in a moderate underprediction of aggregate TFP factor growth; in the 1990s 
and 2000s, it assigns modestly too large of a TFP growth contribution to industry, and modestly too 
little to services; in the 2010s, the model assigns too little of a TFP growth contribution to industry 
and significantly too great of a contribution to services leading to a significant overprediction of 
aggregate TFP factor growth in the 2010s. Notably, the model fails to quantitatively match the decline 
in industry’s contribution in the 1990s relative to the 1980s, capturing only about half of this.  
 Overall, the model’s biggest “misses” of sectoral contributions to growth factors, relative to 
the data, are: i) overprediction of industry’s contribution to aggregate hours growth in the 1990s and, 
specifically, underprediction of the decline in industry’s contribution in the 1990s relative to the 1980s; 
ii) underprediction of the magnitude of the service sector’s contribution to aggregate hours factor 
growth in the 2000s and 2010s and, specifically, of the increase in services’ contribution in the 2000s 
relative to the 1990s and (to a lesser extent) in the 2010s relative to the 2000s; iii) underprediction of 
the decline in industry’s TFP growth contribution in the 1990s; and  iv) overprediction of the service 
sector’s contribution to aggregate TFP factor growth in the 2010s. The first three factors are largely 
responsible for the model’s overprediction of GDP per working age person growth in the 1990s and 
underprediction of growth in the 2000s and 2010s.  
6.1.4 Decomposition of sectoral contributions to TFP growth 
Figures 17c through 17n compare the model’s predictions for the decomposition of aggregate TFP 
TFP factor growth into weighted sectoral (within) TFP factor and residual contributions, as well as 
the decomposition of residual contributions into those due to relative price, capital income share, and 
value-added reallocation sources.  Tables 19b through 19d present a decennial sectoral accounting for 
i) aggregate TFP factor growth into total weighted TFP factor and residual contributions of sectors, 
ii) aggregate TFP factor growth into sectoral weighted TFP factor and residual contributions, and iii) 
the aggregate residual into sectoral contributions to its three sources, respectively. In each 
decomposition analysis I reproduce the empirical results, sometimes reformatting figures to ensure 
comparability with the benchmark model’s predictions.  
Figures 17c and 17d show that the model matches remarkably well time-series movements in 
the decomposition of aggregate TFP into the total weighted TFP factor and residual contributions of 
sectors; the former is the quantitatively dominant determinant and the latter much smaller although 
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not trivial, especially in the 1990s. Table 19b clarifies that the model matches quite closely the total 
weighted TFP factor contribution of sectors to average aggregate TFP factor growth by decade.  
However, the model underpredicts the residual contribution of sectors in the 1980s and somewhat 
overpredicts this contribution in the 1990s and 2010s. Nonetheless, the last row of numbers in the 
table shows that the model matches well the full-sample average contributions, marginally 
underestimating the weighted TFP factor contribution and marginally overpredicting the residual 
contribution.  
Figures 17e and 17f show that the model also matches the time series of weighted TFP factor 
contributions by sector quite well, while figures 17g and 17h show that there are several periods over 
which the model significantly “misses” the time-series of residual contributions by sector. Table 19c 
clarifies these observations. Looking first at the last row of numbers in the table, on average over the 
entire sample period the model matches remarkably well the decomposition into weighted TFP and 
residual contributions of industry. It is less accurate in matching the decomposition for agriculture 
and services, modestly underestimating the weighted TFP and overestimating the residual contribution 
of agriculture, and conversely for services. For agriculture, the decomposition is most accurate in the 
1990s and 2000s. For industry, the decomposition relatively accurately measures the weighted TFP 
contribution in all decades, and relatively inaccurately measures industry’s residual contribution, 
underestimating it in the 1980s and 2010s and overestimating it in the 1990s and 2000s. For services, 
the decomposition is most accurate in the 1990s and more accurately measures the weighted TFP than 
the residual contribution in all decades except the 1990s. The underprediction of services’ residual 
contribution in the 1980s and 2000s and overprediction in the 2010s are notable. The combination of 
the model’s underprediction of industrial and service sector residual contributions is primarily 
responsible for its underprediction of aggregate TFP factor growth in the 1980s. Services’ residual 
contribution in the 2010s is a more important source of the model’s overprediction of services’ 2010s’ 
total contribution to TFP factor growth than is services weighted TFP contribution, and results in the 
model’s overprediction of 2010s aggregate TFP factor growth. Overall, residual “misses” by the model 
are the source of inaccuracies in the model’s aggregate TFP factor growth performance.  
The tendency of the model to generate relatively inaccurate predictions for the residual 
contributions of sectors, although these contributions are generally small, reflects in figures 17i 
through 17n which show the breakdown by sector of the three sources of the residual; relative price 
effects (which impact aggregate TFP factor growth through sectoral contributions to GDP per 
working age person); capital income share adjustments (which impact TFP factor growth through 
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sectoral contributions to capital deepening); and value added reallocation effects (which also impact 
residual sectoral contributions to aggregate TFP factor growth through sectors’ capital deepening 
contributions). Table 19d quantifies the decennial average growth rate impact for the aggregate 
residual of each residual source by sector.   
Figures 17i and 17j show that time-series relative price contributions in the model are larger 
for industry and services than in the data and not always consistent with the direction of relative price 
contributions of sectors in the data. Figures 17k and 17l show that the model correctly predicts that 
agriculture has the largest capital income share time-series residual contribution although the 
contribution appears modestly overpredicted and not always accurately reflects directional movements 
observed in the data. Figures 17m and 17n suggest that time-series sectoral reallocation contributions 
in the model are too small for industry and services, and too large for agriculture.   
The last four rows of numbers in table 19d summarize the model’s full sample performance 
in predicting behavior of residual contributions to aggregate TFP factor growth. The first column of 
numbers in the last set of rows shows the aggregate effect for TFP factor growth of the residual 
predicted by the model, with the empirical contributions in parentheses. While, as we have seen, the 
model quite accurately predicts the total size of residual contributions to average aggregate TFP factor 
growth, it does not do a great job of allocating residual contributions among the three sources; relative 
price effects are under-predicted, while capital income share and value-added reallocation effects are 
over-predicted. The next three columns of numbers in the last set of rows of the table show the full-
sample sectoral contributions to the residual. In the first of these three columns, it is evident that the 
model’s overprediction of agriculture’s residual contribution is largely due to a counterfactually large 
positive capital income share contribution, although there is also a small overestimate of agriculture’s 
value-added reallocation contribution. Agriculture’s counterfactually large capital income share 
contribution is solely responsible for the model’s overprediction of the total capital-income share 
effect. The model’s overprediction of agriculture’s value-added reallocation contribution is smaller 
than its overprediction of services’ value-added reallocation contribution, but together these account 
for the model’s overprediction of total value-added reallocation effects. The model’s underprediction 
of relative price effects is almost entirely due to a significant underprediction of services’ contribution.  
The remaining rows in the table break down total residual effects by source (first column of 
numbers) and sectoral contributions to the residual y source (second through fourth columns of 
numbers) by decade. The first column of numbers shows that the model significantly underpredicts 
relative price effects in the 1980s and 2000s, and overpredicts them in the 1990s. The underprediction 
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in the 1980s and 2000s are essentially due to substantial underprediction of services’ contributions, 
and the overprediction in the 1990s is due to a substantial overprediction of industry’s contribution. 
While the model gets the total relative price effect roughly right in the 2010s, this is the consequence 
of an overprediction of services’ and underprediction of industry’s contributions. Agriculture plays a 
trivial role. The capital income share effect over-prediction of the model occurs in all but the 1990s, 
when the model is roughly accurate. Overprediction of the capital income share effect in the 1980s, 
2000s, and 2010s is almost exclusively due to a counterfactually large contribution of agriculture. 
Agriculture’s capital income share contribution is also over-predicted in the 1990s but offset by a 
roughly equal underprediction of that of the service sector. The model predicts a counterfactually large 
positive value-added reallocation effect in every decade. In the 1980s, this is primarily due to a 
counterfactually large contribution of agriculture; in the 1990s and 2000s, it is due to a counterfactually 
large (if nonetheless negative) contribution of services; in the 2010s, agriculture’s excessively large 
positive contribution is responsible.  
Overall, the model’s performance in matching aggregate TFP factor growth and its weighted 
TFP factor and total residual sources is very good, as is its performance in matching weighted TFP 
contributions to aggregate TFP growth of individual sectors. However, it fails to quantitatively and 
sometimes qualitatively match annual time-series movements in (and hence average growth rates of) 
sectoral relative prices, sectoral capital-output ratios, and sectoral shares of value added. As a result, it 
does not do a good job of decomposing residual effect growth in aggregate TFP among sources by 
sector.   
6.2 Sensitivity analysis  
6.2.1 Elasticities  
Since the model fails to capture the magnitude of decline in industry’s hours per working age person 
in the 1990s, and the magnitude of industry and service sector hours per working age person growth 
in the 2010s, I evaluate the effects of assuming higher values of the elasticity of intertemporal 
substitution and the (Frisch) elasticity of labor supply. I consider the consequences of doubling each 
elasticity from a value of 1 to 2. A doubling of the Frisch elasticity increases the responsiveness of 
labor supply growth to wage rate growth and the interest rate (inversely). A doubling of the 
intertemporal elasticity of substitution increases the responsiveness of labor supply growth to wage 
rate growth (but by less than does a doubling of the Frisch elasticity), the interest rate (exactly equal 
to the impact of a doubling of the Frisch elasticity), and results in a positive response of labor supply 
growth to growth in the cost of the consumption index. The five panels of figure 18, and tables 20a 
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to 20e show the main results of doubling these elasticities individually. The complete set of results, 
including decomposition of sectoral TFP contributions into residual sources, is available upon request.  
 The figures show that the model’s predictions for levels of the aggregate growth accounting 
variables for GDP per working age person are very similar to those of the benchmark specification. 
The correlations of the aggregate accounting growth factors across alternative calibrations are very 
high because the same exogenous inputs are driving optimal responses in the model. Both a higher 
intertemporal elasticity and a higher labor supply elasticity increase modestly the variability of the 
hours and capital factors over the sample period, with a higher intertemporal elasticity having 
marginally greater impact than a higher Frisch elasticity.  However, note that the aggregate TFP factor 
is almost identical; unless alternative parameter values in a simulation significantly affect sectoral 
allocations, the aggregate TFP factor predicted by the model will be essentially unchanged since 
within-sector TFP factors are the identical across simulations. Indeed, figure 18e shows that the higher 
elasticities only marginally affect the model’s predicted sectoral shares of hours. Services exhibit a 
slightly higher share and agriculture slightly lower share in the 1980s relative to the benchmark 
specification, and services a slightly lower share and industry a slightly higher share in the aftermath 
of the great recession. In both periods, the high elasticity variants perform marginally better than the 
benchmark model.  
Table 22 shows there are some small, quantitative effects of higher elasticities for the model’s 
estimated aggregate growth accounting. The model predicts faster GDP per working age person 
growth under both high elasticity specifications in the 1980s, with both variants more closely matching 
the empirical growth rate than the benchmark specification. The high intertemporal elasticity model 
variant generates significantly higher 1980s growth than observed in the data. Average TFP factor 
growth in the 1980s is essentially unchanged across specifications. The increased 1980s average growth 
rate in both high elasticity variants is mainly attributable to counterfactually high hours factor growth; 
high elasticities move the model farther from observed hours factor growth than does the benchmark 
specification. The high intertemporal elasticity variant also predicts higher capital factor growth than 
in the benchmark model in the 1980s which also moves the model’s capital factor growth farther from 
the data. Thus, although the high elasticity variants improve the model’s ability to match quantitatively 
average growth in the 1980s, they do not accomplish this through the increase in TFP factor growth 
which would improve the model’s aggregate growth accounting but through counterfactually high 
growth in production inputs.  
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The magnitude of decline in growth of GDP per working age person and in the hours factor in 
the 1990s relative to the 2000s is much closer to the data in high elasticity variants, however. In fact, 
the high intertemporal elasticity model marginally overpredicts hours growth decline. Neither TFP 
factor nor capital factor growth is much changed in the model’s predictions for the 1990s in either 
high elasticity variants, so the greater hours factor growth decline generates the greater decline in GDP 
per working age person growth in the 1990s relative to the 1980s, improving the performance of the 
model.  
However, the high elasticity variants also predict a greater decline in the hours factor during the 
great recession. This aggravates the benchmark model’s underprediction of GDP per working age 
person growth in the 2000s and of the decline in GDP per working age person growth in the 2000s 
relative to the 1990s. Again, TFP and capital factor growth are not much altered relative to the 
benchmark specification. There is a significantly larger increase in hours per working age person 
growth in the 2010s predicted by the high elasticity variants, bringing hours factor growth within the 
last decade closer to that in the data relative to the benchmark. However, the model now overpredicts 
the increase in hours growth in the 2010s relative to the 2000s. Faster predicted hours factor growth 
in the 2010s is somewhat offset in its impact for predicted GDP per working age person growth by 
more negative growth in the capital factor in the high elasticity variants.  
Finally, the last four rows of the table show that there is little to choose between the 
predictions of the three specifications over the entire sample period.     
Overall, the higher elasticity variants somewhat improve the model’s fit to the aggregate 
growth accounting data in the 1990s (high intertemporal elasticity is best) and 2010s (high Frisch 
elasticity is best) but worsen its performance in the 1980s (high intertemporal elasticity is worst) and 
2000s (high Frisch elasticity is worst). Higher elasticity variants improve the model’s performance in 
matching the magnitude of decrease in hours factor growth in the 1990s relative to the 1980s. They 
make little difference to the model’s failure to match the increase in hours factor growth in the 2000s 
relative to the 1990s; both high elasticity variants, like the benchmark, predict decreases and of roughly 
the same size. The high elasticity variants also deteriorate the models’ performance in matching the 
magnitude of increase in hours factor growth in the 2010s relative to the 2000s, overpredicting the 
increase relative to the benchmark. It is difficult to unambiguously state that either high elasticity 
variant is a significantly better match to the data than the benchmark. 
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 Tables 23a through 23e provide an assessment of the model’s performance vs. the benchmark 
specification in matching sectoral contributions to growth in GDP per working age person, the capital, 
hours, and TFP factors, and to weighted/within-sector TFP effects.  
The second column of numbers in table 23a shows that the high elasticity variants do not 
significantly alter agriculture’s predicted contribution to GDP per working age person growth relative 
to the benchmark in any decade. In the 1980s, the two high elasticity variants predict an identical 
increase in services’ contribution relative to the benchmark which does not improve the fit of the 
model. In the 1980s, the high intertemporal elasticity variant predicts a larger increase in industry’s 
contribution to GDP per working age person growth relative to the benchmark than does the high 
Frisch elasticity variant, and both are closer to the data than the benchmark. In the 1990s, the high 
Frisch elasticity variant leaves industry and service sector contributions to GDP per working age 
person growth essentially unchanged relative to the benchmark, however, the high intertemporal 
elasticity variant reduces the contributions of both industry (closer to the data) and services (farther 
from the data). In the 2000s, the high elasticity variants predict smaller contributions to GDP per 
working age person growth of both industry and services relative to the benchmark, with the high 
intertemporal elasticity generating a larger decline; both variants are farther from the data than the 
benchmark. In the 2010s, the high Frisch elasticity variant performs best, significantly raising the 
contributions of both industry (more than the high intertemporal elasticity variant does) and services 
(a high intertemporal elasticity reduces this contribution).  
 Table 23b shows that the high elasticity variants leave agriculture’s contributions to capital 
deepening unchanged in all decades. Quantitatively, the high Frisch elasticity variant marginally alters 
the capital factor growth contributions of industry and services within each decade relative to the 
benchmark, and always changes the contributions of these two sectors in the same direction. It also 
slightly increases the decennial changes across decades of both industry and service sector capital 
deepening contributions relative to the benchmark. The high intertemporal elasticity variant has a 
bigger impact on the capital factor growth contribution of industry within each decade than does the 
high Frisch elasticity variant. It has a smaller impact on service-sector contributions, except in the 
2010s, which is the only decade in which the high intertemporal elasticity does not shift the 
contributions of industry and services in opposite directions relative to the benchmark. Overall, 
however, all effects of higher elasticities for capital deepening contributions are small. The effects of 
high elasticities for sectoral contributions to TFP factor growth seen in table 23d are trivial. Only the 
numbers in table 23c, which show the hours factor growth contributions of sectors under alternative 
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elasticities, account for the quantitatively significant changes seen in the sectoral contributions to GDP 
per working age person growth in table 23a and the aggregate growth accounting in table 22.  
 The second column of numbers in table 23c show that the high elasticity variants have trivial 
consequences for the model’s contributions of agriculture to hours factor growth. All the action is in 
industry, in the third column of numbers. There are relatively small effects of high elasticities for 
service sector contributions in the fourth column. In the 1980s, the rapid increase in the aggregate 
hours factor growth relative to the benchmark and data seen in table 22 and generated by both high 
elasticity variants is disproportionately reflected in a higher contribution of industry relative to services, 
and more so for the high intertemporal elasticity variant. In the 1990s, the negative industrial sector 
hours contribution predicted by the high intertemporal elasticity variant is much closer to the data 
than either the high Frisch elasticity or benchmark model and brings the reduction in industry’s 
contribution to hours factor growth in the 1990s relative to the 1980s very close to the data. By 
contrast, in the 2000s industry’s negative contribution to hours growth is larger in the high elasticity 
variants than in the benchmark, moving the model farther from the data. In the 2010s industry’s 
positive contributions are larger in both high elasticity variants than in the benchmark moving the 
model farther from industry’s contribution in the data. However, the service sector’s positive 
contributions to hours factor growth are also larger in the high elasticity variants, moving the model 
closer to services’ contribution in the data. The combination of excessively large negative industry 
contributions in the 2000s and excessively large positive industry contributions in the 2010s means 
that the high elasticity variants predict a counterfactually large increase in industry’s hours factor 
growth contributions in the 2010s relative to the 2000s than observed in the data or the benchmark 
model. By contrast, the smaller service sector contributions in the 2000s and larger contributions in 
the 2010s predicted by the high elasticity variants imply a closer match to the observed increase in 
services’ hours factor growth contributions in the 2010s relative to the 2000s–especially for the high 
Frisch elasticity model.  
 Within-decades, the high elasticity variants deteriorate the model’s performance in matching 
industry’s contributions in the 1980s (high intertemporal elasticity is worst) but improve its 
performance in matching services contributions in the 1980s (high Frisch elasticity is best). The high 
elasticity variants deteriorate the model’s performance in matching services’ contributions in the 1990s 
(high intertemporal elasticity is worst) but improve its performance in matching industry’s 
contributions in the 1990s (high intertemporal elasticity is best). The high elasticity variants deteriorate 
the model’s performance in matching both industry’s contributions in the 2000s (high intertemporal 
58 
 
elasticity is worst) and services’ contributions in the 2000s (high Frisch elasticity is worst). Finally, the 
high elasticity variants deteriorate the model’s performance in matching industry’s contributions in the 
2010s (high intertemporal elasticity is worst) but improve the model’s performance in matching 
services’ contribution (high Frisch elasticity is best). High elasticity variants improve the model’s ability 
to match industry’s decline in hours factor growth contributions in the 1990s relative to the 1980s, 
and the increase in services’ hours factor growth contributions in the 2010s relative to the 2000s.  
High elasticity variants, by increasing the sensitivity of endogenous variables to sectoral TFP 
changes, tend to worsen the model’s ability to match within-decade average growth and sectoral 
contributions but improve its performance in matching large cross-decade changes in aggregate 
growth and sectoral contributions to aggregate growth. Neither high elasticity variant unambiguously 
improves the fit of the model to both aggregate growth accounting and sectoral contribution data. 
6.2.3 Aggregate labor supply wedge 
I now explore the performance of a model featuring an aggregate labor wedge in the intra-temporal 
labor-leisure optimality condition. The wedge effectively represents a time-varying tax on the wage 
rate. It is derived by measuring the value in the data of the right-hand side of the intra-temporal 
optimality condition given by,        (1 − 𝜏𝑤,𝑡) ≡ (1 − 𝜓𝜓 ) (𝑃𝑐,𝑡𝐶𝑡/𝑁𝑡𝑤𝑡 ) /(1 − 𝑛𝑡𝑁𝑡).                                                                    
I divide aggregate labor income by aggregate employment to measure the economy-wide (nominal) 
wage at each date, the difference between the working population and employment to measure leisure 
and employ OECD aggregate (nominal) household consumption expenditure data. The five panels of 
figure 19 and tables 22 through 23d display the results.  
 Figure 19a shows the measured labor wedge which measures the distortion to optimal labor 
supply due to labor market policies, practices, and institutions. This is the portion of the wage that is 
effectively received by households, net of the proportional tax rate implied by such policies. A value 
of one implies no tax or friction. A value less than one implies labor supply taxation, and greater than 
one labor supply subsidy. The figure shows that the reduction in the length of the workweek instituted 
in the late 1980s and early 1990s effectively taxed labor supply, reducing the opportunity cost of 
leisure. The effect of this policy for labor supply gradually diminished over the following decade, the 
effective labor supply tax rate declined, and the wedge converged back to a value of one.  Policies 
designed to raise labor force participation after the great recession resulted in an effective subsidy to 
labor supply, increasing the opportunity cost of leisure. However, the largest subsidy was quite short-
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lived. By the end of the sample period, there is essentially no net subsidy. Figure 19b shows that the 
labor wedge slows growth in GDP per working age person too early relative to the data, starting in 
the late 1980s, and by too large a magnitude in the late 1980s and early 1990s. From the mid-1990s 
onwards, however, the labor wedge facilitates faster growth in the model relative to the benchmark, 
and it tracks the data more closely than the benchmark variant from about 1996 until the great 
recession. It also does a slightly better job of tracking relatively rapid GDP per working age person in 
the 2010s. Figure 19c shows that the labor wedge has little impact relative to the benchmark 
specification for predicted capital factor movements, and figure 19e shows it has essentially zero 
impact relative to the benchmark specification for tracking the TFP factor. Figure 19d shows that, not 
surprisingly, almost all the difference in the GDP per working age person performance of the labor 
wedge variant relative to the benchmark model derives from a different prediction for the evolution 
of hours per working age person. The hours factor declines too much in the late 1980s and early 1990s 
but moves more closely with the data than the benchmark after the mid-1990s except during the great 
recession. Figure 19a shows that the great recession of 2008-2009 is associated with a decline in the 
wedge or a higher effective tax rate on labor supply.  
 Table 22 shows the growth accounting for the labor wedge model and compares it to that of 
the benchmark and the data. As the figures suggest, the labor wedge model produces too little growth 
on average in the 1980s because it predicts slightly negative, rather than positive, growth in hours per 
working age person. It performs somewhat better than the benchmark in matching the slow growth 
of output per working age person in the 1990s but, again, not because it better matches hours per 
working age person but because it is closer to the data in its prediction for capital deepening. However, 
in the 2000s, unlike the benchmark, the labor wedge variant produces the observed positive, rather 
than negative, growth in hours per working age person and generates significantly faster growth in the 
hours factor in the 2010s. Its growth rate predictions for the last twenty years are thus closer to the 
data than those of the benchmark model. Its capital factor predictions are also closer to the data in 
the 2000s and 2010s.  
 Table 23a shows that its ability to match the GDP per working age person growth rate in the 
2000s and 2010s better than the benchmark model is due to more accurate, larger growth 
contributions of all three major sectors.  Roughly the opposite is true of its predicted contributions in 
the 1980s and 1990s; they are less accurate and too small relative to the data except for the implied 
contribution of industry in the 1990s which is marginally closer to the data than the benchmark model. 
Table 23b shows there is a mixed bag of results for the labor wedge relative to the benchmark variant 
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in matching sectoral contributions to the average growth of the capital factor in each decade. Although 
most differences are small, the labor wedge variant’s predictions for industry and service sector 
contributions in the 1980s are significantly worse and its predictions for the two sectors’ contributions 
in the 1990s significantly better than those of the benchmark. Table 23d shows its predictions for 
sectoral contributions to TFP factor growth are almost identical to those of the benchmark. This is 
because predicted sectoral hours shares (not shown here for brevity but available upon request) are 
essentially identical in simulations of the two models. Finally, table 23c shows that the labor wedge 
variant’s growth rate and growth accounting “misses” relative to the benchmark in the 1980s and 
1990s are largely due to its failure to replicate the industrial sector’s positive contribution to hours 
factor growth in the 1980s, and the decline in industry’s contribution in the 1990s. The service sector’s 
contribution to hours factor growth also counterfactually rises in the 1990s, although its 1990s value 
is significantly closer to the data than in the benchmark model. By contrast, the labor wedge model 
produces a more significant increase in the hours growth contribution of services in the 2000s, relative 
to the benchmark, and a much smaller decline in the hours growth contribution of industry relative 
to the benchmark. In the 2010s, the labor wedge more significantly overpredicts industry’s 
contribution to hours growth relative to the benchmark but comes closer to the data in its prediction 
for services’ contribution. Nonetheless, the predicted increase in industry’s contribution to hours 
factor growth in the 2010s relative to the 2000s is smaller than that of the benchmark model and closer 
to the data, while that of services is smaller and farther from the data.  
 The intra-temporal labor wedge model overall does a better job of capturing hours factor 
contributions to GDP per working age person growth, and sectoral contributions to hours factor 
growth in, especially, the 2010s. However, the match to hours factor growth in the 2010s is far from 
quantitatively close. There is a larger failure of the model to match hours factor growth and growth 
rate changes in the 1980s and first half of the 1990s. The labor tax that exactly replicates the intra-
temporal labor-leisure optimality condition is “too high” early in the sample, and insufficiently low 
late in the sample, relative to the hours per working age person supplied in the data. This could suggest 
that Japan’s labor market or other interventions and institutions distorted the household’s inter-
temporal margin, as well as the intra-temporal margin.  
Combining the intra-temporal and inter-temporal optimality conditions of the household 
yields the inter-temporal condition for optimal labor supply.  I define the intertemporal wedge, 𝜏𝑐,𝑡, by 
the value of the inter-temporal optimality condition,  
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 1 − 𝜏𝑐,𝑡 = (𝑤𝑡+1(𝑙𝑡+1/𝑁𝑡+1)𝑤𝑡(𝑙𝑡/𝑁𝑡) )(1 − 𝜏𝑤,𝑡+11 − 𝜏𝑤,𝑡 )( 𝑃𝑥,𝑡𝛽 ((1 − 𝛿(1 − 𝜏𝑟𝑘))𝑃𝑥,𝑡+1 + 𝑟𝑡+1(1 − 𝜏𝑘))). 
Here, the first two terms in brackets are simply equal to consumption expenditure per working age 
person growth. An intertemporal wedge–which could represent a time-varying consumption 
expenditure tax or tax on the gross return to capital–reduces consumption expenditure growth relative 
to its optimal rate, conditional on the return to capital. Exogenous TFP growth largely drives growth 
in wages in the first term, and the level of TFP also is a key exogenous determinant of the return to 
capital in the third term.  In the 1980s, wages would have been rising quite rapidly with TFP growth. 
In the benchmark model, absent either a labor wedge or intertemporal wedge, rapidly growing wages 
were associated with declining leisure per working age to satisfy the intertemporal optimality condition 
during the 1980s, and hence rising hours worked per working age person. The model is close to the 
data in its hours factor growth prediction. In the labor wedge model, the labor tax was increasing over 
the 1980s, (1−𝜏𝑤,𝑡+11−𝜏𝑤,𝑡 ) < 1, thereby reducing the impact of TFP growth for wage growth.  In the 
absence of an intertemporal wedge, 𝜏𝑐,𝑡 = 0, leisure per working age person could fall or rise to satisfy 
the intertemporal optimality condition depending on the relative size of wage growth and growth in 
the labor wedge. In the labor wedge model, leisure per working age person counterfactually rose over 
time on average in the 1980s and hours worked per working age person counterfactually declined. A 
positive intertemporal tax rate, 𝜏𝑐,𝑡 > 0, by suppressing growth in leisure and promoting growth in 
hours, could reconcile the labor wedge model with 1980s hours factor data. Similarly, in the 2000s and 
2010s, wage growth is much slower due to slower TFP growth. In the benchmark model absent wedges, 
this–conditional on the return to capital–is associated with slowly rising leisure and falling hours in 
the 2000s, and slowly declining leisure and rising hours per working age person in the 2010s. Hours 
in the 2010s do not rise sufficiently rapidly relative to the data. In the labor wedge model, the wedge 
is rising in the 2000s (the tax is falling), (1−𝜏𝑤,𝑡+11−𝜏𝑤,𝑡 ) > 1, and this allows for slowly falling leisure and 
rising hours per working age person, but the latter do not rise fast enough. In both variants of the 
model, to replicate observed growth in hours in the 2000s would require a large tax on consumption 
growth, 𝜏𝑐,𝑡 > 0. In the 2010s, the labor tax is temporarily negative, 𝜏𝑤,𝑡+1 < 0,  (there is a subsidy) 
and initially increasing in size, so that (1−𝜏𝑤,𝑡+11−𝜏𝑤,𝑡 ) > 1, although this ratio stabilizes at roughly one and 
becomes smaller than one before the end of the sample. Then, given (slow) wage growth and the 
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return to capital, leisure should be falling, and hours worked rising, relative to the benchmark model 
on average – at least in the first few years of the 2010s. The model successfully predicts a larger rise 
in hours per working age person than in the benchmark during the 2010s, but the rise in labor supply 
is nonetheless insufficiently large relative to the data. Again, a positive tax 𝜏𝑐,𝑡 > 0  which suppresses 
consumption and leisure growth conditional on wage growth and the return to capital could reconcile 
model and data.  
If measuring the return to capital in the data accurately were straightforward, incorporating an 
intertemporal wedge in the model and directly quantifying its importance would make sense. I do not 
attempt that here. It is worth mentioning, however, that the model’s prediction for capital deepening 
is typically off by a small factor so that its predicted return to capital is inaccurate.    
7. Conclusion 
My results imply that the most important modification to a competitive equilibrium multi-sector 
growth model that could improve its fit to Japan’s growth experience is careful specification of several 
labor market policies and practices implemented between the late 1980s and the present date. The 
model’s greatest weakness lies in its inability to match growth rates of hours per working age person 
and changes in growth rates of hours per working age person across decades based solely on efficient 
intertemporal and intra-temporal allocations of labor supply. Specifically, a benchmark model cannot 
account for the large decline in hours per working age person growth in the 1990s or its 1990s growth 
rate, nor can it produce the positive growth rate of hours per working age person in the 2000s, nor 
can in match quantitatively the rapid growth rate of hours per working age person in the 2010s. A 
variant allowing for either a much higher elasticity of labor supply or of intertemporal substitution 
improves the model’s ability to match the large decline in hours growth in the 1990s and the growth 
rate in the 2010s, but deteriorates the model’s ability to match the increase in hours in the 2000s,  
within-decade hours growth in the 1980s and 2000s, and the increase in hours growth in the 2010s. A 
variant incorporating a labor supply wedge does better in matching hours per working age person 
growth within the 2000s (marginally) and 2010s (substantively), although is not capable of replicating 
quantitatively the within-decade growth rates. However, it performs much worse in matching hours 
growth in the 1980s. I show that only the addition of an intertemporal distortion could reconcile a 
model with a labor supply friction with hours growth data over the entire sample period.  
Overall, the results call for an exploration of how labor market policies in the 1980s, 1990s, 
and 2010s affected household intra-temporal and intertemporal labor-leisure allocations. Given the 
joint observation of persistent TFP slowing and evidently important role of labor market policies, 
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practices, and institutions in dictating observed GDP and hours per working age person growth, a 
potential avenue for future inquiry would also investigate any role of Japan’s labor market policies for 
incentives to innovate and improve efficiency–contributing to sectoral and aggregate TFP growth 
slowing.   
Other natural extensions of the work described here include 1) incorporating sectoral input-
output linkages, 2) refining and increasing the set of sub-sectors of economic activity to account for 
sectoral differences in R&D and other measures of innovation intensity, and 3) opening the economy. 
It is possible that input-output linkages among sectors significantly tightens the model’s predictions 
for structural change. Conditioning on measured TFP growth for sectoral value added, this could 
increase the model’s accuracy in predicting weighted TFP and, especially, residual contributions of 
sectors and may improve model-based estimates of value-added reallocation and relative price effects. 
Including sub-sectors differentiated by the intensity of measured innovation or “tech” could shed light 
on underlying reasons for slowing industrial sector TFP growth in the 1990s and slowing service sector 
TFP growth in the 2000s and beyond. Opening the economy would allow analysis of how the 
evolution of Japan’s international competitiveness implicated her structural change, and hence 
measured aggregate productivity. The emergence of China as a manufacturing giant during the sample 
period is of particular interest, as discussed by Coleman (2005).  
These extensions are beyond the scope of the present paper and left for future work.     
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Figure 1a. Real GDP per working age 






Figure 1b. Real GDP per hour worked, 


























Figure 3a. Accounting for output per 




















       






Figure 4a. Sectoral real value added per 
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Figure 6. Sectoral contributions to 















































Figure 8. Total sectoral contributions to aggregate TFP 












Figure 9a. Total weighted TFP factor 
and residual contributions to TFP 











Figure 9b. Weighted TFP factor 
contributions by sector 



















Figure 9c. Residual contributions by 












Figure 10a. Agriculture's weighted TFP 
and residual contributions to aggregate 











Figure 10b. Industry's weighted TFP 
and residual contributions to aggregate 










Figure 10c. Services' weighted TFP and 
residual contributions to aggregate 









Figure 11a. Contributions to RESID 










Figure 11b. Relative price contributions 















Figure 11c. Capital income share 











Figure 11d. Value added reallocation 











Figure 12a. GDP per working age 









Figure 12b. GDP per working age









Figure 12c. GDP per hour worked, 





Figure 12d. GDP per hour worked 














Figure 12e. Capital factor, benchmark 













Figure 12f. Capital factor growth rate, 








Figure 12g. Hours factor, benchmark 











Figure 12h. Hours factor growth rate, 








Figure 12i. TFP factor, benchmark 













Figure 12j. TFP factor growth, 





                      
 












Figure 13. Hours shares of  major sectors, benchmark 












Figure 14a. Benchmark model sectoral 
contributions to GDP per working age 









Figure 14b. Empirical sectoral 
contributions to GDP per working age 













Figure 15a. Benchmark model sectoral 










Figure 15b. Empirical sectoral 



















Figure 16a. Benchmark model sectoral 










Figure 16b. Empirical sectoral 















Figure 17a. Benchmark model sectoral 











Figure 17b. Empirical sectoral 















Figure 17c. Benchmark model TFP 











Figure 17d. Empirical TFP factor 
growth contributions by source 


















Figure 17e. Benchmark model 











Figure 17f. Empirical weighted TFP 
factor contributions by sector 










Figure 17g. Benchmark model residual 







Figure 17h. Empirical residual 
contributions by sector 










Figure 17i. Benchmark model relative 







Figure 17j. Empirical relative price 
















Figure 17k. Benchmark model capital 
income share contributions to RESID 






Figure 17l. Empirical capital income 
share contributions to RESID by 










Figure 17m. Benchmark model value 
added reallocations contrbutions to 






Figure 17n. Empirical value added 
reallocation contributions to RESID by 










Figure 18a. GDP per working age 











Figure 18b. Capital factors, benchmark 















Figure 18c. Hours factors, benchmark 










Figure 18d. TFP factors, benchmark vs. 
















Figure 18e. Hours shares of  major sectors, benchmark vs. 













Figure 19a. Labor wedge (wage portion received by 






Figure 19b. GDP per working age 










Figrue 19c. Capital factors, benchmark 









Figure 19d. Hours factors, benchmark 
















Table 1. Growth in output per working age person and output per hour worked, 1981-2018                         
 
    
     Period   
 
        Y/N 
   
 
       Y/H 
 
    1981–1990 
         
         3.64 
 
 
        3.05 
 
    1991–2000 
         
         1.27  
      
 
        1.64 
    
    2001–2010 
    
       (2001-2007) 
       
         1.21 
 
              (1.72)  
      
 
        0.60 
      
             (0.83) 
    
    2011–2018 
       
         2.04  
          
      
        0.49 
 
 
    1981–2018 
 
         2.04 
 
 
        1.49 
 
 
Table 2. Accounting for growth in output per working age person 1981–2018                         
 
    
  
      Period   
 
 
   
     Y/N 
 
 𝑨 𝟏𝟏−𝛂 
 
 (𝐊/𝐘) 𝛂𝟏−𝛂 
 
 
   H/N 
 
    1981–1990 
         
     3.64 
 
  
     3.05 
  
     0.01  
 
     0.58 
 
    1991–2000 
         
     1.27  
         
 
     0.98 
         
     0.65  
         
 
    -0.36 
 
   2001–2010 
   (2001-2007) 
 
 
     1.21 
    (1.72) 
 
 
     0.09   
    (0.37) 
 
     0.52  
    (0.46) 
 
 
     0.60 
    (0.89) 
 
 
    2011–2018 
          
     2.04  
          
 
     0.55  
         
    -0.06  
           
 
     1.54 
 
    1981-2018 
 
     2.04 
 
 
     1.20 
 
     0.30 
 
 
     0.54 
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      Table 3. Accounting for growth in output per hour worked 1981-2018                         
 
    
  
      Period   
 
 
   
     Y/H 
 
 𝑨 𝟏𝟏−𝛂  (𝐊/𝐘) 𝛂𝟏−𝛂 
 
 
    1981–1990 
         
     3.05 
 
  
     3.05 
  
     0.01  
 
    1991–2000 
         
     1.64  
         
 
     0.98 
         
     0.65  
         
 
   2001–2010 
   (2001-2007) 
 
     0.60    
    (0.83) 
 
     0.09      
    (0.37) 
 
     0.52      
    (0.46) 
 
 
    2011–2018 
          
     0.49  
          
 
     0.55  
         
    -0.06  
           
 
    1981-2018 
 
     1.49 
 
 
     1.20 
 
     0.30 
 
 
                
                Table 4. Sectoral value-added growth per working aged person 1981–2018 
 
     
 Period   
 
Aggregate 
    
 
Agriculture  









         
         3.64 
 
  
         -0.04  
 
          3.44   
 
          3.01  
 
1991–2000 
         
         1.27  
         
         -1.24  
         
          0.32  
 
          2.27 
         
 
2001–2010  
        
         1.21 
         
         -1.86  
 
          0.94 
 
 




          
         2.04  
        
         -0.29  
           
          2.40  
 
 





         2.04 
 
         -0.89 
 
          1.74 
 
 
          2.12  
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               Table 5. Sectoral contributions to GDP per working age person growth 
(percentage points) 
 
     
 Period   
 












         
         3.64 
 
  
        -0.00  
 
         1.36  
 
          2.28  
 
1991–2000 
         
         1.27  
         
        -0.06  
         
        -0.21 
 
          1.54 
         
 
2001–2010  
        
         1.21 
       
        -0.03  
      
        -0.05 
       
 
          1.29  
        
 
2011–2018 
          
         2.04  
        
         0.04 
           
         0.66  
 
 





         2.04 
 
        -0.01 
 
         0.43 
 
 
          1.62  
 
 
              
 
Table 6. Sectoral contributions to aggregate capital factor growth  
  (percentage points) 
 
     
 Period   
 
Aggregate 












         
         0.01 
 
  
         -0.07  
 
         -0.02   
 
         0.10  
 
1991–2000 
         
         0.65  
         
         -0.01  
         
          0.11  
 
         0.55 
         
 
2001–2010 
        
         0.52 
         
         -0.02  
         
          0.12 
          
 
         0.43  
         
 
2011–2018 
          
        -0.06  
        
         -0.02  
           
         -0.04  
 
 





         0.30 
 
         -0.03 
 
          0.05 
 
 









Table 7. Sectoral contributions to hours per working age person growth   
                                           (percentage points) 
 
     
 Period   
 
Aggregate 












         
         0.58 
 
  
         -0.10  
 
          0.03   
 
         0.65  
 
1991–2000 
         
        -0.36  
         
         -0.05  
         
         -0.60 
 
         0.29 
         
 
2001–2010  
        
         0.60 
         
          0.02  
         
         -0.27 
         
 
         0.85  
         
 
2011–2018 
          
         1.54  
        
         -0.01  
           
          0.21  
 
 
         1.34 
 
 
1981-2018          0.54 
 
         -0.27 
 
         -0.23 
 
 




      Table 8. Sectoral and aggregate TFP factor growth 1981–2018 (percent) 
 
     
 Period   
 
Aggregate 












         
         3.05 
 
  
         6.02  
 
          3.33   
 
         1.93  
 
1991–2000 
         
         0.98  
         
        -5.47  
         
          0.47 
 
         1.72 
         
 
2001–2010  
        
         0.09 
 
        -5.26  
         
          0.44 
         
 
        -0.20  
         
 
2011–2018 
          
         0.55  
        
        10.12  
           
          1.92  
 
 





         
         1.20 
 
          
          0.89 
 
          
          1.52 
 
 








Table 9. Sectoral contributions to aggregate TFP growth 1981–2018 (percentage points) 
 
     













         
         3.05 
 
  
          0.16  
 
          1.36   
 
         1.53  
 
1991–2000 
         
         0.98  
         
        
          0.00  
         
    
          0.28  
 
         
         0.70 
         
 
2001–2010  
        
         0.09 
         
         -0.03  
 
          0.10 
          
 




          
         0.55 
  
         
          0.07 
 
           
          0.49 
 




          
         1.20 
 
          0.05 
 
          0.56 
 
         0.59 
           
                               
 
Table 10. Weighted TFPF and RESID contributions to aggregate TFPF growth   
(percentage points) 
 
     













         
         3.05 
 
  
          2.55  
 
         0.50  
 
1991–2000 
         
         0.98  
         
        
          1.18  
         
         
        -0.20 
         
 
2001–2010  
        
         0.09 
         
         -0.05  
 
 




          
         0.55 
  
         
          0.66 
 




          
         1.20 
 
          1.11 
 
         0.09 








Table 11. Sectoral WTFPF and RESID contributions to aggregate TFP factor growth  
                        (percentage points)        
          
   
 Period 
         
 
Aggregate 












   WTFPF       
   RESID   
   
         
     3.05 
 
       2.55  
       0.50 
        
  
     0.16 
 
      0.14            
      0.03   
 
     1.36 
 
     1.30          
      0.05  
 
     1.53     
 
      1.11          




   WTFPF    
   RESID 
      
     0.98  
 
       1.18         
      -0.20 
 
 
     0.00 
 
      -0.14 
       0.14  
       
     0.28    
 
       0.27  
       0.01 
 
     0.70 
 
      1.05        





    WTFPF  
    RESID 
 
   
     0.09 
 
      -0.05 
       0.14 
 
    -0.03 
 
     -0.08 
      0.05 
 
     0.10 
 
      0.16           
     -0.06 
  
     0.01 
 
      -0.14 





    WTFPF  
    RESID  
    
     0.55 
 
      0.66 
     -0.10 
 
     0.07 
 
      0.11            
     -0.04        
      
     0.49 
 
     0.54            
     -0.05         
  
     0.00 
 
      0.01         




     
    WTFPF  
    RESID 
    1.20 
 
       1.11 
       0.09 
 
    
     0.05 
 
       0.00          
       0.05 
 
  
     0.56 
 
      0.57 
     -0.01 
 
    
    0.59 
 
      0.53 
      0.06 
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     Table 12. Sectoral contributions to aggregate RESID  
(percentage points)   
        
    
   Period        
 
Aggregate 





   
   Industry  
  
   




    RELYP  
    CAPINC  
    VREALL   
     
         
     0.50 
 
       0.55 
      -0.03   
      -0.02 
        
  
     0.03 
 
       -0.00    
       -0.03 
        0.06 
         
 
     0.05 
 
       0.03      
       0.00 
       0.03 
        
 
    0.42     
 
      0.53  
      0.00 
     -0.10 




    RELYP  
    CAPINC  
    VREALL   
     
    -0.20 
 
      -0.20        
       0.13 
      -0.12  
        
      0.14 
 
       -0.02 
        0.12 
        0.05 
         
     0.01 
 
      -0.31 
       0.02 
       0.30 
        
   -0.35 
 
      0.13 
     -0.01 
     -0.47 




    RELYP  
    CAPINC  
    VREALL   
       
   
     0.07 
 
       0.15  
       0.02 
      -0.02         
        
      0.05 
 
       -0.00 
        0.02       
        0.03 
       
    -0.06 
 
      -0.30 
      -0.02    
       0.23 
       
     0.15 
 
       0.46  
       0.02 
      -0.28   




    RELYP  
    CAPINC  
    VREALL   
           
    
    -0.10 
 
      -0.02 
      -0.09          
       0.02 
         
     -0.04 
 
        0.04  
       -0.08            
       -0.01        
        
    -0.05 
 
      -0.01  
   -0.00            
      -0.03         
 
    -0.01 
 
      -0.05  
    -0.01         
       0.06 
       
 
1981–2018 
     
    RELYP  
    CAPINC  
    VREALL   
           
     0.10 
 
        0.13  
        0.01 
       -0.04 
        
    
      0.05 
 
        0.00 
        0.01          
        0.03 
        
  
    -0.01 
 
      -0.16  
      0.01 
       0.14 
       
    
    0.06 
 
       0.28 
      -0.01 
      -0.21 









                            Table 13. Calibrated parameters of benchmark model  
 
 
   
Parameter   
 
     Value   
 
 
  Source/target 
Technology 𝛼                                             𝛼𝑎 , 𝛼𝑚, 𝛼𝑠                 𝐴𝑎,1980, 𝐴𝑚,1980, 𝐴𝑠,1980 Δ𝑎,𝑣 , Δ𝑚,𝑣 , Δ𝑠,𝑣                
      𝜔𝑥,𝑎, 𝜔𝑥,𝑚, 𝜔𝑥,𝑠 
      Δ𝑥 
      𝛿 
      𝑘0 
      𝛾  
      𝜎𝐴,𝑎 , 𝜎𝐴,𝑚, 𝜎𝐴,𝑠 
         
     0.362 
     0.708, 0.372, 0.335 
     5.376, 112.958, 132.063 
     0.082, 0.008, 0.007  
     0.036, 0.666, 0.297 
     1.000 
     0.062 
     271.940   
     1.012 
     0.012  
 
 Hayashi and Prescott (2002) 
 OECD (STAN), JSNA (1980)  
 OECD (STAN), JSNA (1980) 
 JSNA sectoral value added (1980) 
 JSNA input-output (1980) 
 JSNA fixed investment (1980) 
 JSNA capital consumption (1980) 
 JSNA capital-GDP ratio (1980) 
 Sample average TFP growth rate 
 Sample average TFP growth rate 
Preferences 
      𝛽 
      𝜙 
      𝜔𝑐,𝑎 , 𝜔𝑐,𝑚, 𝜔𝑐,𝑠 
      𝑐?̅?, 𝑐?̅? 
    
      Δ𝑐 
      
      𝑛 
         
     0.989 
     0.327 
     0.015, 0.250, 0.735  
     1.231, 10.934  
     
     0.423 
 
     1.000 
 
 WDI, long-run real interest rate 
 JSNA, labor 1/3 total time, 1980  
 JSNA input-output (1980) 
 Herrendorf et al. (2013), JSNA        
 input-output (1980) 
 JSNA consumption spending 
(1980) 
 Sample average working    
 population growth rate 
Government  
      𝜏𝑘 
      𝜔𝑔,𝑎, 𝜔𝑔,𝑚, 𝜔𝑔,𝑠 
      Δ𝑔 
     
      ?̅? 
 
     0.3598 
     0.018, 0.129, 0.853 
     1.000 
    
     0.198  
 
  Chen et al. (2006) 
  JSNA input-output (1980) 
  JSNA government spending     
  (1980) 
  JSNA government share of GDP 
  (2018) 
Elasticities  
      1/(1 − 𝜌) 
      𝜀    
      𝜗 
      1/𝜃 
           
     1.000 
     0.000 
     0.000 
     1.000          
 
  Herrendorf et al. (2014) 
  Herrendorf et al. (2013) 
  Herrendorf et al. (2013) 









Table 14. Benchmark model’s aggregate growth accounting for GDP per working age 
person, data in parentheses (percentage points) 
 
    
      Period   
 





  H/N 
 
 
    1981–1990 
         
     3.49 
    (3.64) 
 
  
     2.65 
    (3.05) 
  
     0.21  
    (0.01)  
 
 
     0.62 
    (0.58) 
 
    1991–2000 
         
     2.11 
    (1.27)  
         
     1.04 
    (0.98) 
         
     1.13    
    (0.65)  
         
 
    -0.06 
   (-0.36) 
 
    2001–2010 
    
     0.39 
    (1.21) 
       
   
    -0.07      
    (0.09) 
 
 
     0.79   
    (0.52) 
  
 
    -0.33  
    (0.60) 
  
   2011–2018 
           
     1.50 
    (2.04)  
          
     0.95 
    (0.55)  
         
    -0.16 
   (-0.06)  
           
 
     0.72 
    (1.54) 
 
    1981-2018 
 
      
     1.89 
    (2.04) 
 
     1.15 
    (1.20) 
 
     0.53 
    (0.30) 
 
 
     0.21 


























     Table 15. Benchmark model’s aggregate growth accounting for GDP per hour worked, 
data in parentheses (percentage points) 
 
    
      Period   
 
 
    Y/H 
 
𝑨 𝟏𝟏−𝛂 (𝐊/𝐘) 𝛂𝟏−𝛂 
 
    1981–1990 
         
     2.86 
    (3.05) 
 
  
     2.65 
    (3.05) 
  
     0.21  
    (0.01)  
 
 
    1991–2000 
         
     2.17 
    (1.64)  
         
     1.04 
    (0.98) 
         
     1.13    
    (0.65)  
         
 
   2001–2010 
   
 
 
     0.72 
    (0.60) 
 
    -0.07      
    (0.09) 
   
 
     0.79   
    (0.52) 
 
   
   2011–2018 
           
     0.79 
    (0.49)  
          
     0.95 
    (0.55)  
         
    -0.16 
   (-0.06)  
           
 
    1981-2018 
 
      
     1.68 
    (1.49) 
 
  
    1.15 
    (1.20) 
 
   
   0.53 



























Table 16. Benchmark model’s sectoral contributions to GDP per working aged  
person growth, data in parentheses (percentage points) 
 
     
 Period   
 
Aggregate/ 











  1981–1990 
         
         3.49 
        (3.64) 
 
  
        -0.03 
       (-0.00)  
 
         1.26 
        (1.36)   
 
          2.25 
         (2.28)  
 
  1991–2000 
         
         2.11 
        (1.27)  
         
         0.06 
       (-0.06)  
         
         0.64 
       (-0.21) 
 
          1.41 
         (1.54) 
         
 
   2001–2010  
        
         0.39      
        (1.21) 
       
        -0.01 
       (-0.03)  
      
        -0.24 
       (-0.05) 
       
 
          0.64 
         (1.29)  
        
 
   2011–2018 
 
         1.50 
       (2.04)  
        
        -0.06 
        (0.04)  
           
         0.57 
        (0.66)  
 
         
          0.99 
         (1.34)     
 
 
  1981-2018 
 
 
         1.89 
       (2.04) 
 
       -0.01 
      (-0.01) 
 
         0.56 
        (0.43) 
 
         1.34 

























Table 17. Benchmark model’s sectoral contributions to capital deepening, data in parentheses  
(percentage points) 
 
     














  1981–1990 
         
         0.22 
        (0.01) 
 
  
        -0.11 
       (-0.07)  
 
         0.05 
       (-0.02)   
 
          0.27 
         (0.10)  
 
  1991–2000 
         
          1.13 
        (0.65)  
         
         0.06 
       (-0.01)  
         
         0.36 
        (0.11) 
 
          0.71 
         (0.55) 
         
 
  2001–2010  
        
         0.79      
        (0.52) 
       
         0.01 
       (-0.02)  
      
         0.08 
        (0.12) 
       
 
          0.70 
         (0.43)  
        
   
 2011–2018         -0.16 
      (-0.06)  
 
        -0.07 
       (-0.02) 
            
        -0.02 
       (-0.06)  
 
         
         -0.07 
        (-0.00) 





         0.53 
       (0.30) 
 
 
       -0.03 
      (-0.03) 
 
     
         0.13 
        (0.05) 
 
 
         0.43 


















Table 18. Benchmark model’s sectoral contributions to hours factor growth, data in 
parentheses (percentage points) 
 
     















  1981–1990 
         
         0.62 
        (0.58) 
 
  
        -0.04 
       (-0.10)  
 
         0.11 
        (0.03)   
 
         0.56 
        (0.65)  
 
  1991–2000 
         
        -0.06 
       (-0.36)  
         
          0.00 
       (-0.05)  
         
        -0.19 
       (-0.60) 
 
         0.13 
        (0.29) 
         
 
  2001–2010  
        
        -0.34      
        (0.60) 
       
        -0.01 
        (0.02)  
      
        -0.50 
       (-0.27) 
       
 
         0.18 
        (0.85)  
        
   
  2011–2018 
 
        0.72 
       (1.54)  
        
        -0.02 
       (-0.01)  
           
         0.28 
        (0.21)  
 
          
         0.46  






         0.21 
       (0.54) 
 
        -0.02 
       (-0.03) 
 
        -0.09 
       (-0.18) 
 
 
        0.32 
















Table 19a. Benchmark model’s sectoral contributions to TFP factor growth, data in  
parentheses (percentage points) 
 
     















    1981–1990 
         
         2.65 
        (3.05) 
 
  
         0.12 
        (0.16)  
 
         1.10 
        (1.36)   
 
         1.43 
        (1.53)  
 
    1991–2000 
         
         1.04 
        (0.98)  
         
        -0.00 
        (0.00)  
         
         0.46 
        (0.28) 
 
         0.58 
        (0.70) 
         
 
    2001–2010  
        
        -0.07      
        (0.09) 
       
        -0.01 
       (-0.03)  
      
         0.18 
        (0.10) 
       
 
        -0.24 
        (0.01)  
        
 
    2011–2018 
 
         0.95 
       (0.55)  
        
         0.04 
        (0.07)  
           
         0.31 
        (0.49)  
 
          
         0.60 
        (0.00) 
 
 
    1981-2018 
 
 
         1.15 
       (1.20) 
 
         0.04 
        (0.05) 
 
         0.52 
       (0.56) 
 
 
        0.59 
















Table 19b. Benchmark model’s WTFPF and RESID contributions to aggregate TFP factor 
growth, data in parentheses (percentage points) 
 
     















         
         2.65  
        (3.05) 
 
  
        2.54  
       (2.55)  
 
         0.11      
        (0.50)  
 
1991–2000 
         
         1.02 
        (0.98)  
         
        0.92 
       (1.18)  
         
         0.12 
       (-0.20) 
         
 
2001–2010  
        
       -0.07   
       (0.09) 
         
       -0.18 
      (-0.05)  
 
 
        0.11 




          
        0.95   
       (0.55) 
  
        0.77   
       (0.66) 
 
       0.18 




          
        1.15  
       (1.20) 
 
       1.03 
      (1.11) 
 
        0.13 
      (0.09) 

























Table 19c. Benchmark model’s sectoral WTFPF and RESID contributions to aggregate 
TFPF growth, data in parentheses (percentage points) 
 
   
 Period 
         
 
Aggregate 












    
      WTFPF      
    
     
       RESID   
         
     2.65 
    (3.05) 
      
          2.54  
          (2.55) 
 
           0.11 
          (0.50)       
  
     0.12 
    (0.16) 
 
         -0.05                
         (0.14) 
 
          0.16 
       (0.03)   
 
     1.10 
   (1.36) 
 
 1.25 
         (1.30)          
       
         -0.15 
         (0.05)  
 
    1.43 
   (1.53)     
 
          1.33 
     (1.11)         
      
         0.10 




    
      WTFPF   
    
    
       RESID 
      
      1.02 
     (0.98)  
 
           0.92 
          (1.18)        
     
           0.12 
         (-0.20) 
 
   -0.00 
    0.00 
       
          -0.18 
      (-0.14) 
 
           0.18 
          (0.14)    
     0.46 
    (0.28)    
 
           0.20 
          (0.27)  
        
           0.27 
          (0.01) 
     0.58 
    (0.70) 
 
         0.90   
        (1.05) 
            
        -0.33 




     
      WTFPF  
     
 
       RESID 
 
   
     -0.07 
     (0.09) 
 
          -0.18 
         (-0.05) 
 
           0.11 
          (0.14) 
    -0.01 
   (-0.03) 
 
         -0.16  
        (-0.08) 
 
          0.16 
         (0.05) 
    0.18 
   (0.10) 
 
         0.06 
        (0.16) 
            
         0.12 
       (-0.06)  
   -0.24 
   (0.01) 
 
         -0.08  
        (-0.14) 
       
         -0.16 




     
      WTFPF  
     
      
       RESID  
    
      0.95 
    (0.55) 
 
           0.77 
          (0.66) 
     
           0.18 
         (-0.10) 
    0.04 
   (0.07) 
 
         -0.09 
         (0.11) 
                  
          0.13 
        (-0.04) 
     0.31 
    (0.49) 
 
          0.60 
         (0.54) 
              
         -0.29     
        (-0.05) 
    0.60 
   (0.00) 
 
         0.26  
        (0.01) 
                
         0.34 
    (-0.01) 
 
1981–2018 
     
     
      WTFPF 
  
     
      RESID 
     
     1.15 
    (1.20) 
 
           1.03 
          (1.11) 
 
           0.13 
          (0.09) 
      0.04  
     (0.05) 
 
         -0.12   
         (0.00) 
             
          0.16        
         (0.05) 
      0.52 
     (0.56) 
 
          0.52 
         (0.57) 
 
        -0.00  
        (-0.01) 
     0.59 
    (0.59) 
 
         0.62   
          (0.53) 
 
         -0.03   
         (0.06) 
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Table 19d. Benchmark model’s sectoral contributions to aggregate RESID, data in  
parentheses (percentage points) 
        
    
   Period        
 
Aggregate 





   
   Industry  
  
   




     RELYP  
     CAPINC  
     VREALL    
   
         
 0.11 (0.50) 
 
      0.02 (0.55) 
      0.06 (-0.03)   
      0.07 (-0.02) 
        
  
 -0.16 (0.03) 
 
      -0.03 (-0.00)   
       0.07 (-0.03) 
       0.13 (0.06) 
         
 
 0.15 (0.05) 
 
       -0.21 (0.03)     
        0.00 (0.00) 
        0.06 (0.03) 
        
 
 0.10 (0.42)     
 
      0.26 (0.53)  
      -0.02 (0.00) 
      -0.12 (-0.10) 




     RELYP  
    CAPINC  
    VREALL   
     
     
 0.12 (-0.20) 
 
      -0.00 (-0.20)       
       0.12 (0.13) 
       0.01 (-0.12)  
        
 0.18 (0.14) 
 
    0.02 (-0.02) 
       0.17 (0.12) 
      -0.01 (0.05) 
         
   
 0.27 (0.01) 
 
       0.15 (-0.31) 
       0.02 (0.02) 
       0.10 (0.30) 
        
 
 -0.33 (-0.35) 
 
     -0.17 (0.13) 
     -0.07 (-0.01) 
     -0.08 (-0.47) 




     RELYP  
    CAPINC  
    VREALL   
       
 0.11 (0.14) 
 
      -0.02 (0.15)  
       0.07 (0.02) 
       0.04 (-0.02)        
        
 0.16 (0.05) 
 
       0.02 (-0.00) 
       0.11 (0.02)      
   0.02 (0.03) 
       
 0.12 (-0.06) 
 
      -0.13 (-0.30) 
       0.01 (-0.02)   
       0.23 (0.23) 
       
 -0.16 (0.15) 
 
       0.09 (0.46)  
      -0.05 (0.02) 
      -0.22 (-0.28)   




    RELYP  
    CAPINC  
    VREALL   
           
    
 0.18 (-0.10) 
 
       0.01 (-0.02) 
       0.09 (-0.09)          
       0.05 (0.02) 
         
 0.13 (-0.04) 
 
      -0.05 (0.04)  
 0.08 (-0.08)          
       0.10 (-0.01)        
        
 -0.29 (-0.05) 
 
       0.27 (-0.01)  
-0.00 (-0.00)       
  -0.03 (-0.03)       
 
 0.34 (-0.01) 
 
      0.33 (-0.05)  
   0.01 (-0.01)        
  -0.01 (0.06) 
       
 
1981–2018 
     
    RELYP  
    CAPINC  
    VREALL   
           
      
 0.13 (0.10) 
 
       0.00 (0.13)  
       0.08 (0.01) 
       0.04 (-0.04) 
        
 0.16 (0.05) 
 
       -0.01 (0.00) 
        0.11 (0.01)          
        0.06 (0.03) 
        
 -0.00 (-0.01) 
 
      -0.11 (-0.16)  
       0.01 (0.01) 
       0.10 (0.14) 
       
 -0.03 (0.06) 
 
       0.12 (0.28) 
      -0.04 (-0.01) 
      -0.11 (-0.21) 












Table 20. Benchmark model vs. high elasticity variants aggregate growth accounting for    
                   GDP per working age person, data in parentheses (percentage points) 
 
    
  
      Period   
 
 
   
     Y/N 
 
 𝑨 𝟏𝟏−𝛂 
 




  H/N 
 
 
    1981–1990 
     High 1/(1-ρ) 
     High 1/ϴ 
      Benchmark 
      Data 
         
    
     3.72 
     3.60 
     3.49 
    (3.64) 
 
  
     
     2.65 
     2.65 
     2.65 
    (3.05) 
  
     
     0.26 
     0.16 
     0.21  
    (0.01)  
 
 
   
     0.81 
     0.80 
     0.62 
    (0.58) 
 
    1991–2000 
     High 1/(1-ρ) 
     High 1/ϴ 
      Benchmark 
      Data    
 
         
     1.93 
     2.12 
     2.11 
    (1.27)  
         
     1.03 
     1.03 
     1.04 
    (0.98) 
         
     1.16 
     1.17 
     1.13    
    (0.65)  
         
 
   
    -0.25 
    -0.08 
    -0.06 
   (-0.36) 
 
   2001–2010 
    High 1/(1-ρ)    
    High 1/ϴ 
     Benchmark 
     Data 
 
 
     0.17 
     0.31  
     0.39 
    (1.21) 
 
    
    -0.10 
    -0.10 
    -0.07      
    (0.09) 
    
     0.73 
     0.85 
     0.79   
    (0.52) 
   
 
     
    -0.46 
    -0.45  
    -0.33  
    (0.60) 
 
   2011–2018 
    High 1/(1-ρ)       
    High 1/ϴ 
     Benchmark 
     Data 
 
     1.46  
     1.64 
     1.50 
    (2.04)  
         
     0.93 
     0.94 
     0.95 
    (0.55)  
         
    -0.32 
    -0.25 
    -0.16 
   (-0.06)  
           
 
     0.85 
     0.95 
     0.72 
    (1.54) 
 
   1981-2018 
    High 1/(1-ρ)       
    High 1/ϴ 
     Benchmark 
     Data 
 
      
     1.84 
     1.93 
     1.89 
    (2.04) 
 
   
     1.14 
     1.14 
     1.15 
    (1.20) 
 
     0.50 
     0.52 
     0.53 
    (0.30) 
 
 
      
     0.21 
     0.27 
     0.21 










Table 21a. Benchmark model vs. high elasticity variants sectoral contributions to GDP per 
working aged person growth, data in parentheses (percentage points) 
 
     















  1981–1990 
     High 1/(1-ρ)      
     High 1/ϴ 
      Benchmark 
      Data 
         
          
       3.72 
         3.60 
         3.49 
        (3.64) 
 
  
    
        -0.02  
        -0.03 
        -0.03 
       (-0.00)  
 
      
         1.42  
         1.31 
         1.26 
        (1.36)   
 
     
          2.32 
          2.32  
          2.25 
         (2.28)  
 
  1991–2000 
     High 1/(1-ρ)      
     High 1/ϴ 
      Benchmark 
      Data 
         
     
       1.93 
         2.12 
         2.11 
        (1.27)  
         
         0.05 
         0.06 
         0.06 
       (-0.06)  
         
         0.51 
         0.64 
         0.64 
       (-0.21) 
 
          1.38 
          1.42 
          1.41 
         (1.54) 
         
 
   2001–2010 
     High 1/(1-ρ)      
     High 1/ϴ 
      Benchmark 
      Data  
        
       
       0.17 
         0.31 
         0.39      
        (1.21) 
       
        -0.02 
        -0.01 
        -0.01 
       (-0.03)  
      
        -0.36 
        -0.28 
        -0.24 
       (-0.05) 
       
 
          0.55 
          0.60 
          0.64 
         (1.29)  
        
 
   2011–2018 
     High 1/(1-ρ)      
     High 1/ϴ 
      Benchmark 
      Data 
 
        1.46  
        1.64 
        1.50 
       (2.04)  
        
        -0.05 
        -0.05 
        -0.06 
        (0.04)  
           
         0.60 
         0.63 
         0.57 
        (0.66)  
 
          0.91  
          1.05 
          0.99 
         (1.34)     
 
 
  1981-2018 
     High 1/(1-ρ)      
     High 1/ϴ 
      Benchmark 
      Data 
 
         1.84 
         1.93 
         1.89 
       (2.04) 
 
       -0.01 
       -0.01 
       -0.01 
      (-0.01) 
 
         0.54 
         0.57 
         0.56 
        (0.43) 
 
1.31    
         1.37 
         1.34 












Table 21b. Benchmark model vs. high elasticity variants sectoral contributions to capital 
deepening, data in parentheses (percentage points) 
 
     















  1981–1990 
     High 1/(1-ρ)      
     High 1/ϴ 
      Benchmark 
      Data 
 
         
      
       0.26 
         0.16 
         0.22 




        -0.10 
        -0.12 
        -0.11 
       (-0.07)  
 
   
         0.10 
         0.03  
         0.05 
       (-0.02)   
 
      
          0.26 
          0.23  
          0.27 
         (0.10)  
 
  1991–2000 
    High 1/(1-ρ)       
    High 1/ϴ 
     Benchmark 
     Data 
 
          1.16 
          1.17 
          1.13 
        (0.65)  
         
         0.06 
         0.06 
         0.06 
       (-0.01)  
         
         0.34 
         0.38 
         0.36 
        (0.11) 
 
          0.76 
          0.73 
          0.71 
         (0.55) 
         
 
  2001–2010  
    High 1/(1-ρ)       
    High 1/ϴ 
     Benchmark 
     Data 
 
         0.63 
         0.85 
         0.79      
        (0.52) 
       
         0.01 
         0.01 
         0.01 
       (-0.02)  
      
         0.02 
         0.09 
         0.08 
        (0.12) 
       
          0.70 
          0.75 
          0.70 
         (0.43)  
        
   
 2011–2018 
    High 1/(1-ρ)       
    High 1/ϴ 
     Benchmark 
     Data 
 
        -0.32 
        -0.25 
        -0.16 
      (-0.06)  
 
        -0.07 
        -0.07 
        -0.07 
       (-0.02) 
            
        -0.04 
        -0.04 
        -0.02 
       (-0.06)  
 
         -0.21 
         -0.14 
         -0.07 
        (-0.00) 
       
 
1981-2018 
    High 1/(1-ρ)       
    High 1/ϴ 
     Benchmark 
     Data 
 
        0.50 
        0.52 
        0.53 
       (0.30) 
 
       -0.03 
       -0.03 
       -0.03 
      (-0.03) 
 
         0.11 
         0.12 
         0.13 
        (0.05) 
 
 
         0.41 
         0.42 
         0.43 








Table 21c. Benchmark model vs. high elasticity variants sectoral contributions to hours 
factor growth, data in parentheses (percentage points) 
 
     















  1981–1990 
     High 1/(1-ρ)      
     High 1/ϴ 
      Benchmark 
      Data 
 
         
         
       0.81 
         0.80 
         0.62 
        (0.58) 
 
  
     
        -0.04 
        -0.04 
        -0.04 
       (-0.10)  
 
      
         0.24 
         0.18 
         0.11 
        (0.03)   
 
    
         0.61 
         0.65 
         0.56 
        (0.65)  
 
  1991–2000 
     High 1/(1-ρ)      
     High 1/ϴ 
      Benchmark 
      Data 
 
        -0.25 
        -0.08 
        -0.06 
       (-0.36)  
         
        -0.00 
         0.00 
         0.00 
       (-0.05)  
         
        -0.32 
        -0.20 
        -0.19 
       (-0.60) 
 
         0.08 
         0.12 
         0.13 
        (0.29) 
         
 
  2001–2010  
     High 1/(1-ρ)      
     High 1/ϴ 
      Benchmark 
      Data 
 
        -0.46 
        -0.45  
        -0.34      
        (0.60) 
       
        -0.02 
        -0.02 
        -0.01 
        (0.02)  
      
        -0.59 
        -0.56 
        -0.50 
       (-0.27) 
       
         0.14 
         0.12 
         0.18 
        (0.85)  
        
   
  2011–2018 
     High 1/(1-ρ)      
     High 1/ϴ 
      Benchmark 
      Data 
 
        0.85 
        0.95 
        0.72 
       (1.54)  
        
        -0.02 
        -0.02 
        -0.02 
       (-0.01)  
           
         0.37 
         0.37 
         0.28 
        (0.21)  
 
         0.50 
         0.60 
         0.46  




     High 1/(1-ρ)      
     High 1/ϴ 
      Benchmark 
      Data 
 
         0.21 
         0.27 
         0.21 
       (0.54) 
 
        -0.02 
        -0.02 
        -0.02 
       (-0.03) 
 
        -0.10 
        -0.07 
        -0.09 
       (-0.18) 
 
        0.32 
        0.36 
        0.32 










Table 21d. Benchmark model vs. high elasticity variants sectoral contributions to TFP factor 
growth, data in parentheses (percentage points) 
 
     















    1981–1990 
     High 1/(1-ρ)      
     High 1/ϴ 
      Benchmark 
      Data 
 
         
          
       2.65 
         2.65 
         2.65 
        (3.05) 
 
  
      
         0.12 
         0.12  
         0.12 
        (0.16)  
 
      
         1.08 
         1.10 
         1.10 
        (1.36)   
 
      
         1.45 
         1.43 
         1.43 
        (1.53)  
 
    1991–2000 
     High 1/(1-ρ)      
     High 1/ϴ 
      Benchmark 
      Data 
 
         1.03 
         1.03 
         1.04 
        (0.98)  
         
        -0.00 
        -0.00 
        -0.00 
        (0.00)  
         
         0.49 
         0.46 
         0.46 
        (0.28) 
 
         0.54 
         0.57 
         0.58 
        (0.70) 
         
 
    2001–2010  
     High 1/(1-ρ)      
     High 1/ϴ 
      Benchmark 
      Data 
 
        -0.10 
        -0.10 
        -0.07      
        (0.09) 
       
        -0.01 
        -0.01 
        -0.01 
       (-0.03)  
      
         0.21 
         0.18 
         0.18 
        (0.10) 
       
        -0.30 
        -0.27 
        -0.24 
        (0.01)  
        
 
    2011–2018 
     High 1/(1-ρ)      
     High 1/ϴ 
      Benchmark 
      Data 
 
         0.93 
         0.94 
         0.95 
       (0.55)  
        
         0.04 
         0.04 
         0.04 
        (0.07)  
           
         0.27 
         0.29 
         0.31 
        (0.49)  
 
          
         0.62 
         0.60 
         0.60 
        (0.00) 
 
 
  1981–2018 
     High 1/(1-ρ)      
     High 1/ϴ 
      Benchmark 
      Data 
 
        1.14 
        1.14 
        1.15  
       (1.20) 
 
        0.04 
        0.04 
        0.04 
       (0.05)  
 
 
         0.53 
         0.52 
         0.52 
        (0.56) 
 
 
        0.57 
        0.58 
        0.59  










Table 22. Benchmark model vs. wedge variants aggregate growth accounting for    
                      GDP per working age person, data in parentheses (percentage points) 
 
    
  
      Period   
 
 
   
     Y/N 
 
 𝑨 𝟏𝟏−𝛂 
 




  H/N 
 
 
    1981–1990 
     Labor wedge 
      Benchmark 
      Data 
         
   
      2.99  
      3.49 
     (3.64) 
 
  
     
     2.63 
     2.65 
    (3.05) 
  
     
     0.48  
     0.21  
    (0.01)  
 
 
   
    -0.12  
     0.62 
    (0.58) 
 
    1991–2000 
     Labor wedge 
      Benchmark 
      Data    
 
         
      
      1.99 
      2.11 
     (1.27)  
         
      
     1.01 
     1.04 
    (0.98) 
         
      
     0.87  
     1.13    
    (0.65)  
         
 
   
     0.10 
    -0.06 
   (-0.36) 
 
   2001–2010 
    Labor wedge 
     Benchmark 
     Data 
 
  
      0.69 
      0.39 
     (1.21) 
 
    -0.07   
    -0.07      
    (0.09) 
    
     0.70 
     0.79   
    (0.52) 
   
 
     
     0.06 
    -0.33  
    (0.60) 
 
    
    2011–2018   
     Labor wedge 
      Benchmark 
      Data 
 
      1.82 
      1.50 
     (2.04)  
         
     0.94 
     0.95 
    (0.55)  
         
    -0.07  
    -0.16 
   (-0.06)  
           
 
      
     0.95 
     0.72 
    (1.54) 
 
   1981-2018 
    Labor wedge 
     Benchmark 
     Data 
 
      
      
      1.87 
      1.89 
     (2.04) 
 
   
     1.14 
     1.15 
    (1.20) 
 
     0.53 
     0.53 
    (0.30) 
 
 
      
     0.21 
     0.21 












Table 23a. Benchmark model vs. wedge variants sectoral contributions to GDP per working 
aged person growth, data in parentheses (percentage points) 
 
     















  1981–1990 
     Labor wedge 
      Benchmark 
      Data 
         
          
         2.99 
         3.49 
        (3.64) 
 
  
    
        -0.05 
        -0.03 
       (-0.00)  
 
      
         1.04 
         1.26 
        (1.36)   
 
     
          2.00 
          2.25 
         (2.28)  
 
  1991–2000 
     Labor wedge 
      Benchmark 
      Data 
         
     
         1.99 
         2.11 
        (1.27)  
         
         0.06 
         0.06 
       (-0.06)  
         
         0.58 
         0.64 
       (-0.21) 
 
          1.34 
          1.41 
         (1.54) 
         
 
   2001–2010 
     Labor wedge 
      Benchmark 
      Data  
        
       
         0.69 
         0.39      
        (1.21) 
       
        -0.00 
        -0.01 
       (-0.03)  
      
        -0.11 
        -0.24 
       (-0.05) 
       
 
          0.80 
          0.64 
         (1.29)  
        
 
   2011–2018 
     Labor wedge 
      Benchmark 
      Data 
 
        1.82   
        1.50 
       (2.04)  
        
        -0.05  
        -0.06 
        (0.04)  
           
         0.70 
         0.57 
        (0.66)  
 
          1.17 
          0.99 
         (1.34)     
 
 
  1981-2018 
     Labor wedge 
      Benchmark 
      Data 
 
         1.87 
         1.89 
       (2.04) 
 
       -0.01 
       -0.01 
      (-0.01) 
 
         0.55 
         0.56 
        (0.43) 
 
         1.33 
         1.34 

















Table 23b. Benchmark model vs. wedge variants sectoral contributions to capital 
deepening, data in parentheses (percentage points) 
 
     















  1981–1990 
     Labor wedge 
      Benchmark 
      Data 
 
         
      
         0.48 
         0.22 




        -0.10   
        -0.11 
       (-0.07)  
 
   
         0.14 
         0.05 
       (-0.02)   
 
      
          0.44 
          0.27 
         (0.10)  
 
  1991–2000 
    Labor wedge 
     Benchmark 
     Data 
 
          0.87 
          1.13 
        (0.65)  
         
         0.05 
         0.06 
       (-0.01)  
         
         0.25 
         0.36 
        (0.11) 
 
          0.57 
          0.71 
         (0.55) 
         
 
  2001–2010  
    Labor wedge 
     Benchmark 
     Data 
 
          
 
         0.70 
         0.79      
        (0.52) 
       
         0.01 
         0.01 
       (-0.02)  
      
         0.06 
         0.08 
        (0.12) 
       
          0.64 
          0.70 
         (0.43)  
        
   
 2011–2018 
    Labor wedge 
     Benchmark 
     Data 
 
        -0.07 
        -0.16 
      (-0.06)  
 
         
        -0.07 
        -0.07 
       (-0.02) 
            
         
         0.03 
        -0.02 
       (-0.06)  
 
         -0.03 
         -0.07 
        (-0.00) 
       
 
1981-2018 
    Labor wedge 
     Benchmark 
     Data 
 
        0.53 
        0.53 
       (0.30) 
 
        
       -0.03  
       -0.03 
      (-0.03) 
 
          
         0.12 
         0.13 
        (0.05) 
 
         0.43 
         0.43 











Table 23c. Benchmark model vs. high elasticity variants sectoral contributions to hours 
factor growth, data in parentheses (percentage points) 
 
     















  1981–1990 
     Labor wedge 
      Benchmark 
      Data 
 
         
         
        -0.12  
         0.62 
        (0.58) 
 
  
     
        -0.05 
        -0.04 
       (-0.10)  
 
      
        -0.21  
         0.11 
        (0.03)   
 
    
         0.14  
         0.56 
        (0.65)  
 
  1991–2000 
     Labor wedge 
      Benchmark 
      Data 
 
         0.10 
        -0.06 
       (-0.36)  
         
         
         0.01 
         0.00 
       (-0.05)  
         
        -0.12 
        -0.19 
       (-0.60) 
 
         0.22 
         0.13 
        (0.29) 
         
 
  2001–2010  
     Labor wedge 
      Benchmark 
      Data 
 
         0.06 
        -0.34      
        (0.60) 
       
        -0.01 
        -0.01 
        (0.02)  
      
         
        -0.33 
        -0.50 
       (-0.27) 
       
         0.40 
         0.18 
        (0.85)  
        
   
  2011–2018 
     Labor wedge 
      Benchmark 
      Data 
 
         
        0.95 
        0.72 
       (1.54)  
        
         
        -0.02 
        -0.02 
       (-0.01)  
           
         0.37 
         0.28 
        (0.21)  
 
         0.60 
         0.46  




     Labor wedge 
      Benchmark 
      Data 
 
          
         0.21 
         0.21 
       (0.54) 
 
        -0.02 
        -0.02 
       (-0.03) 
 
        -0.10 
        -0.09 
       (-0.18) 
 
        0.33 
        0.32 















Table 23d. Benchmark model vs. labor wedge variants sectoral contributions to TFP factor 
growth, data in parentheses (percentage points) 
 
     















    1981–1990 
     Labor wedge 
      Benchmark 
      Data 
 
         
          
         2.63 
         2.65 
        (3.05) 
 
  
      
         0.10 
         0.12 
        (0.16)  
 
      
         1.10 
         1.10 
        (1.36)   
 
      
         1.42 
         1.43 
        (1.53)  
 
    1991–2000 
     Labor wedge 
      Benchmark 
      Data 
 
         1.01 
         1.04 
        (0.98)  
         
         0.01 
        -0.00 
        (0.00)  
         
          
         0.46 
         0.46 
        (0.28) 
 
         0.55 
         0.58 
        (0.70) 
         
 
    2001–2010  
     Labor wedge 
      Benchmark 
      Data 
 
         -0.07 
         -0.07      
        (0.09) 
       
         0.00 
        -0.01 
       (-0.03)  
      
          
         0.17 
         0.18 
        (0.10) 
       
         
        -0.24 
        -0.24 
        (0.01)  
        
 
    2011–2018 
     Labor wedge 
      Benchmark 
      Data 
 
         0.94 
         0.95 
       (0.55)  
        
         0.04 
         0.04 
        (0.07)  
           
         0.30 
         0.31 
        (0.49)  
 
          
         0.60 
         0.60 
        (0.00) 
 
 
  1981–2018 
     Labor wedge 
      Benchmark 
      Data 
 
        1.14 
        1.15  
       (1.20) 
 
        0.04 
        0.04 
       (0.05)  
 
 
         0.52 
         0.52 
        (0.56) 
 
 
        0.58 
        0.59  













Appendixes   
Data Appendix 
Section 2.1 Real output is measured by real GDP at producer prices in chained 1980 yen. I calculate 
this setting nominal GDP equal to real GDP in 1980, and extrapolating using the growth rate of real 
GDP measured in chained 2015 yen published by the OECD.   
In figure 1a, I divide real GDP by the number of working age people, computed as the 
population sum of those aged 16 years to 65 years drawn from the United Nations Population 
Estimates database. In figure 1b, I divide real GDP by the number of hours worked by employees, 
which I calculate using JSNA data. I estimate hours worked by employees as the product of average 
hours worked by all employees and the total number of employees, both drawn from JSNA. While 
this is a relatively narrow estimate of total hours, as the number of employees is much smaller than 
the total number of employed persons, the descriptive statistics and accounting results presented here 
are similar quantitatively to those in Betts (2021), where a measure of hours worked by employed 
persons is used, published by the GDCC and Penn World Tables (PWT). Unfortunately, the 
GDCC/PWT estimates of employed persons and average hours of employed persons for Japan do 
not include sectoral breakdowns, and so I use the narrower measure which is broken down by sector 
in JSNA and the OECD.   
Section 2.2 To compute the capital-output ratio, I divide the nominal value of the economy’s total 
stock of fixed capital, published in the OECD STAN accounts and in the JSNA, by nominal GDP 
drawn directly from the OECD national accounts.  This raises two measurement issues. First, the use 
of the fixed capital stock rather than gross capital inclusive of inventories is non-standard. The reason 
for this choice is the lack of available gross capital data at the industry level over the sample period. 
My sectoral decompositions of output and TFP growth into industry sources relies on having 
consistent measures of capital at the aggregate and industry level. Second, the use of the nominal ratio 
is not ideal. At the aggregate level, this could be resolved, as net (and gross) capital and GDP measured 
in fixed 1980 yen are available. However, at the industry level, the only available measures of real 
capital and output over the sample period are in chained yen, and capital-output ratios computed using 
chained data are not meaningful. Note that the aggregate and industry level nominal capital-output 
ratios that I use in this analysis reflect not only changes in the volume of capital relative to output but 
also in the relative price of capital in terms of output.  
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I measure the TFP factor by taking the ratio of real output per working age person to the 
product of the capital and hours factors, using Hayashi and Prescott’s (2002) estimate of the capital 
income share in Japan in the 1980s, 0.362.  
Section 3 In the sectoral analysis, “agriculture” comprises industries, D01T03; D01, agriculture and 
hunting; D02, forestry and logging; and D03, fishing and aquaculture. “Industry” consists of D05T09, 
mining and quarrying; D10T33, manufacturing; D35T39, “utilities”, including gas, electricity, and 
water supply, sewerage, waste management, and remediation activities; and D41T43, construction.  
“Services” comprises all service industries in the set of industries D45T99. The compilation of the 
data – collected from individual countries’ national accounts – uses recommendations of the 2008 
System of National Accounts (SNA08). In addition, the classification of industries in the OECD 
STAN data follows the International Standard Industrial Classification of all economic activities, 
Revision 4 (ISIC Rev. 4). All the original OECD STAN data series are in current Yen, except where I 
otherwise note. 
Section 3.1   
I measure real value added by sector in chained 1980 yen at producer prices, as is aggregate GDP. To 
do so requires some calculations. Aggregate GDP from the OECD national accounts, which I use to 
measure aggregate output in section 2, is valued at producer prices. The OECD’s sectoral value-added 
series are measured at factor cost. For consistency of measures and facilitate the sectoral 
decompositions, I adjust the nominal value added of each sector measured at factor cost in proportion 
to its relative value in the sum of factor-cost value added over sectors, such that the sum over the 
three sectors equals nominal GDP measured at producer prices at every date. I then extrapolate each 
sector’s real value-added series forward from its adjusted nominal 1980 value using the growth rate of 
the OECD’s factor cost chained 2015 Yen series to produce a chained 1980 Yen sectoral value-added 
series.  
The nominal sectoral value-added adjustment assigns net production taxes and measurement 
error included in producer price GDP to the three major sectors of economic activity in proportion 
to the relative size of each sector’s nominal value added at factor cost at every date. I (implicitly) 
assume that net production taxes and measurement error assigned to each sector have a negligible 
effect on the growth rate of real output in the sector. Obviously, the nominal value-added data at 
producer prices for the three sectors sum to the total nominal GDP series in section 2; however, 
because the real sectoral value-added series are derived from chained Laspeyres indexes, they do not 
sum to aggregate chained real GDP. 
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Sectoral hours data are drawn from JSNA. The sectoral employment numbers are adjusted 
proportionately to account for small rounding errors in the sum over sectors relative to aggregate 
employment numbers published by JSNA and the OECD STAN. Total hours of employees are also 
subject to a small proportionate adjustment to account for rounding errors.    
Section 3.2 Nominal fixed capital stocks by sector are based on OECD STAN data. The nominal 
capital stock of each sector is subject to a small proportional adjustment to account for measurement 
/rounding error, such that the sum over sectors of nominal fixed capital is exactly equal to the 
aggregate nominal fixed capital stock.   
 The aggregate GDP price deflator is the ratio of nominal GDP from the OECD to real GDP 
measured in 1980 chained yen calculated as I describe above. Sectoral value added price deflators are 
the ratios of adjusted nominal sectoral value added at each data to the (adjusted) real value added of 
the sector measured in 1980 chained yen and calculated as I describe above.   
A.1 Comparison of aggregate growth accounting to Hayashi and Prescott (2002) 
Table A.1 presents a growth accounting using my data for two sub-periods also studied by Hayashi 
and Prescott (2002), which do not exactly overlap with my decades. Hayashi and Prescott’s results are 
in parentheses. Note that here I decompose hours per working age person into the analogue of the 
two sources that they study, hours per employee, and the employment rate from the working 
population. Also note that we use different metrics of all the variables: Real output (I use real GDP 
vs. the GNP that Hayashi and Prescott analyze); working age populations (I use population members 
ages 15 to 65 vs. Hayashi and Prescott’s ages 19 to 69); employment vs. the employed persons used 
by Hayashi and Prescott, and hence average hours worked (I use per employee vs. per employed 
person); and capital-output ratios (nominal vs. constant price, including government and excluding 
foreign vs. excluding government and including foreign). 
  Difference in metrics do not substantially alter most of the average growth rates for the first 
sub-period, 1983-1991. Even the different capital-output ratio measures (nominal vs. constant price, 
including government and excluding foreign vs. excluding government and including foreign) do not 
produce quantitatively large differences in results. The first sub-period produces very similar results 
overall, except that the employment rate measured by employees that I use here grows more quickly 
than that measured by all employed persons in Hayashi and Prescott. The employment rate factor 
accounts for much more output per working age person growth in my accounting than in theirs, and 
the TFP factor a little less. In the second sub-period, the deviations in results are quantitatively larger 
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for output, and the capital-output ratio, but smaller for TFP, average hours, and the employment rate. 
Qualitatively, the results for 1991-2000 relative to 1983-1991 are the same; TFP and output per 
working age person growth drop precipitously, capital-deepening increases, while employment rate 
growth and average hours decrease.   
In figure A.1 I plot the time-series of my aggregate TFP series against that of Hayashi-Prescott. The 
latter series I draw directly from Hayashi’s website. I normalize both metrics to equal 100 in 1980. 
Over the common sub-period 1981–2000, the two measures share very similar annual fluctuations; 
their sample correlation is 0.98. However, while this correlation is 0.99 over the period 1981-1990 it 
is only 0.70 over the period 1991-2000. My measure of the TFP factor is slightly less volatile (its 
relative standard deviation is 0.97) and it tends to be slightly higher. 
 
Table A.1 Comparison to Hayashi-Prescott (2002) 
     







        E/N 
 
 





         
       3.75 
      (3.60) 
  
        0.03 
       (0.20)  
 
        1.10 
       (0.10)   
 
      -0.55 
     (-0.50)  
  
       3.18 
      (3.70) 
 
1991–2000 
         
       1.27  
      (0.50) 
        0.67  
       (1.40) 
        0.48 
      (-0.40) 
      -0.89 
     (-0.90) 
 
       0.83 
      (0.30) 
 
   Figure A.1  
               













Data presented in section 3 showed that agriculture’s level and share of economic activity shrank 
considerably from 1980 until the mid-2010s. Here I account for this contraction and develop estimates 
of the TFP factor in the sector (from which follows TFP, and the TFP growth rate used in the 
programs) employing growth accounting methods.   
Figure A.2 shows a growth accounting of the level of output per working age person for 
agriculture, which assumes that the Cobb-Douglas function in section 3 of the text holds, shown in 
equations (4) and (5), with the capital share calibrated to match the benchmark 1980, Japanese 
agricultural capital income share. Namely, the growth accounting uses equation (A.1),  
 (𝑌𝑎,𝑡𝑁𝑡 ) = 𝐴𝑎,𝑡 (𝐾𝑎,𝑡𝑌𝑎,𝑡) 𝛼𝑎1−𝛼𝑎 (𝐻𝑎,𝑡𝑁𝑡 ).                                                                                (𝐴. 1) 
In measuring the variables in equation (A.1), all variables (except the aggregate working age 
population, of course) are the sectoral analogues of those in the aggregate production function (1). I 
describe the sectoral data series and sources in detail in the text.  
The figure illustrates that this sector’s value added per working age person deviates                     
              
extraordinarily widely from the sectoral TFP factor over the sample period; this is not balanced growth 
path behavior (see the discussion of conditions for balanced growth at the aggregate level in terms of 
sectoral behavior in sections 3 and, especially, 4). Agriculture’s value added and hours per working age 
person both gradually decline over the sample period although both exhibit a surprising increase in 
the mid-2000s, subsequently stabilizing. The capital factor is highly variable over the sample period, 















Because these movements are so large relative to those in value added and hours per working age 
person, the “residual” TFP factor is highly negatively correlated with the capital factor.  
One reason for the exaggerated behavior of agriculture’s capital factor is that the calibrated 
(1980) share of capital income in the sector is extraordinarily high (see table 14), magnifying 
movements in the capital-output ratio of the sector. The direction of the movements in the capital 
factor are perfectly consistent with the implications of the multi-sector growth model, however. In a 
multi-sector growth model, the (net of tax) return to capital–and hence next period’s marginal product 
of capital–in every sector must be equal. Because agriculture’s capital income share is so large, the 
output-capital ratio can be lower in agriculture and the capital-output ratio higher than in other sectors 
for a given return. Through the Euler equation, each sector’s return to capital is also positively 
associated with aggregate consumption per working age person growth, evaluated in numeraire units, 
which is driven by GDP per working age person growth. Thus, higher (perfectly anticipated) income 
and consumption tomorrow relative to today reduces the household’s incentive to save and invest, 
raising the marginal product of capital. Hence each sector’s t+1 capital-output ratio is negatively 
associated with income growth between t and t+1. This is true for agriculture, as figure A.2 illustrates; 
entering the 1990s with much slower GDP per working age person growth, the capital factor rises 
sharply and persistently. It declines significantly only after the great recession when GDP per working 
age person growth in Japan increased somewhat. The figure suggests that negative TFP growth from 
1990 through the mid-2000s contributed to more negative value added per working age person growth 
during the early 1990s, as well as negative growth in the hours factor of the sector, while stabilization 
of both value added and hours per working age person in the sector after the great recession is 
associated with strong positive TFP growth and negative capital deepening.  
Table A.2 presents a decennial growth rate accounting for the sector. The average growth rate 
of value added per working age person in agriculture was negative in every decade of the sample 
period, and over the full sample period. During the 1980s, slightly negative value-added growth 
coincided with rapid TFP factor growth, however, negative hours and capital factor growth offset the 
TFP increases. Negative value added per working age person growth in the 1990s and 2000s coincided 
with a large decline in, and negative, TFP factor growth, which was not offset by much higher, and 
positive, capital-factor growth. In the 1990s, negative TFP factor growth was exacerbated by negative 
hours factor growth; in the 2000s negative TFP factor growth was somewhat offset in its impact for 
value added growth by (surprisingly) positive hours growth. The relative stabilization of value added 
per working age person observed in the 2010s is associated with a large increase in TFP factor growth, 
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a substantial decline in, and negative, capital factor growth, and negative hours factor growth. Thus, 
the largest decennial changes in the growth rate of value added per working age person in the 1990s 
(much more negative) and 2010s (much less negative) are primarily associated with big swings in the 
same direction of TFP factor growth. Over the entire sample period, modestly negative average value 
added per working age person growth was the result of significant, negative average hours factor 
growth offsetting modestly positive TFP factor growth, with very little average (negative) capital factor 
growth. Given the negative average growth in hours per working age person over the years 1980 
through 2018, however, the agricultural sector does not exhibit balance growth behavior over the 
sample period.  
        
Table A.2 Accounting for agricultural value added per working aged person 1980–2018 
  
  Period 
 





     





         
       -0.04 
 
  
       -1.27  
 
         -4.79   
  
        6.02 
 
1991–2000 
         
       -1.24  
 
        7.68  
         
         -3.45  
         
 
       -5.47 
         
 
2001–2010 
        
       -1.86 
 
        1.23  
          
          2.17 
         
 
       -5.26 
        
 
2011–2018 
          
       -0.29  
        
       -9.80  
           
         -0.61  
          
 
       10.12  




       -0.89 
 
       -0.05 
 
         -1.73 
 
 




Industry’s level but not its share of economic activity grew over the entire sample period as figures in 
section 3 illustrate.    
Figure A.3 shows a growth accounting of the level of output per working age person for 
industry, assuming that output per working age person in the sector is described by 
(𝑌𝑚,𝑡𝑁𝑡 ) = 𝐴𝑚,𝑡11−𝛼𝑚 (𝐾𝑚,𝑡𝑌𝑚,𝑡) 𝛼𝑚1−𝛼𝑚 (𝐸𝑚,𝑡𝑁𝑡 ) ℎ𝑚,𝑡,                                                         (𝐴. 2) 
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where the subscript “m” denotes manufacturing (although my classification of the sector includes 
energy and construction) and recall that the capital share is calibrated to match the 1980 industrial 
capital income share for Japan. The figure shows the long-run trend rise in value added per working 
age person in industry is closely associated with a trend increase in the TFP factor, and–to a lesser 
extent–capital factor, while the hours factor exhibits trend decline over the sample period. There is 
decline and stagnation in value added per working age person in the 1990s which correlates almost 
perfectly with a decline and stagnation in the TFP factor but is also coincident with a decline in the 
hours factor and occurs despite a rise in the capital factor. Similar statements can be made about the 
great recession. There is an increase in value added per working age person after the great recession 
which correlates closely with a rise in the TFP factor and, except in the last couple of years, and with 
steady growth in the hours factor of the sector. Table A.3 presents a formal decennial growth rate 
accounting for the sector.   
                          
The table shows that the growth rate of value added per working age person falls precipitously 
in the 1990s relative to the 1980s, recovers marginally in the 2000s, and improves to roughly long-run 
trend growth (2 percent) in the 2010s. During the 1980s, rapid output growth coincided almost exactly 
with rapid TFP factor growth, and the industrial sector exhibits behavior consistent with near-
balanced growth. The decline in and negative average growth in output per working age person in the 
1990s coincides with a large decline in average TFP factor growth, and smaller but significant decline 
in (and negative) hours factor growth. The growth slowdown would have been greater, had these 
sources of decline not been offset somewhat by positive capital-factor growth, consistent with the 
predictions of a neoclassical growth model. TFP factor growth is similar in the 2000s to the 1990s, 
while somewhat faster (although still negative) hours factor growth accounts for the small 















reduction in capital factor growth. The faster growth observable in the 2010s is attributable to much 
faster TFP factor and positive hours factor growth and occurs despite negative capital-factor growth. 
On average over the entire sample, especially positive TFP factor, and capital factor, growth contribute 
to positive output per worker growth and are offset by negative growth in the sector’s hours factor. 
Decennial changes in the growth rate of output per working age person in the sector are led by changes 
in TFP growth (in the 1990s and 2010s) and hours factor growth (in every decade).  
3. Services 
Services’ level and share of economic activity experienced secular growth over the sample period, as 
agriculture’s experienced secular decline. Figure A.4 shows a growth accounting of the level of value  
 
  Table A.3 Accounting for industrial value-added growth per working aged person 1980–2018 
 
     
 Period   
 
Y/N 
    
 











         
          3.44 
 
  
        0.02  
 
         0.08   
  
         3.33 
 
1991–2000 
         
          0.32  
         
        1.52  
 
        -1.67  
          
 
         0.47 
         
 
2001–2010 
        
          0.94 
         
        1.32  
          
        -0.83 
 
 
         0.44 
        
 
2011–2018 
          
          2.39  
        
       -0.28  
          
         0.75  
          
 
         1.92  




          1.74 
 
        0.70 
 
        -0.48 
 
 
         1.52 
 
 
added per working age person for services, assuming that production of value added in the sector is 
described by 




                         
The figure shows that the tremendous growth in value added per working age person over the 
sample period is driven by a combination of TFP factor and hours factor growth until roughly 1985, 
by TFP factor growth from the mid-1980s until roughly 2002, and by hours factor growth thereafter. 
The capital factor appears almost completely stable, with a notable decrease in the early 1980s and 
small increase in the late 1980s.  The sector’s growth after 2002 is associated with a declining TFP 
factor and increasing hours factor. 
             Table A.4 quantifies these observations in a decennial growth accounting. What is fascinating 
about this accounting is that decline in service sector value added per working age person growth in 
the 1990s predominantly comes not from TFP factor growth decline as it does in the industrial sector, 
although there is a modest fall, but from a decline in the growth of the hours factor. However, TFP 
factor growth collapses in the service sector in the 2000s through the 2010s, never recovering. This 
TFP growth collapse produces a second sharp decline in growth of value added per working age 
person in the 2000s, despite very healthy hours factor growth, while hours factor growth is the primary 
source of the partial recovery in service sector value added per person growth in the 2010s. Over the 
full sample, hours factor growth is the largest source of output growth in the sector! 
Table A.4 Accounting for services value-added per working aged person growth 1980–2018                                                       
 






    
 










         
          3.01 
 
  
      -0.01  
 
        1.10   
  
        1.93 
 
1991–2000 
         
          2.27  
       0.10  
 
        0.45  
          
 















                  
 
2001–2010 
        
          1.22 
         
       0.18  
          
        1.24 
 
 
       -0.20 
        
 
2011–2018 
          
          1.96  
        
       0.07  
          
        1.88  
          
 
        0.02  




          2.12 
 
       0.08 
 
        1.13 
 
 
        0.91 
 
 
A.3 Sectoral decomposition of labor productivity growth 
The growth rate of aggregate output per hour worked, labor productivity, measured in chained 1980 
yen, has the following interpretation in terms of sectoral contributions, where I define a sector’s share 
of hours worked at t as 𝑠ℎ,𝑖,𝑡 ≡ (𝐻𝑖,𝑡𝐻𝑡 ): 
          (𝑌𝑡+1𝐻𝑡+1) − (𝑌𝑡𝐻𝑡)(𝑌𝑡𝐻𝑡) = ∑ ( 
 ( 𝑌𝑖,𝑡+1𝐻𝑖,𝑡+1𝑌𝑖,𝑡𝐻𝑖,𝑡 )(
𝑃𝑖,𝑡+1𝑃𝑡+1𝑃𝑖,𝑡𝑃𝑡 )(𝑠ℎ,𝑖,𝑡+1𝑠ℎ,𝑖,𝑡 ) − 1) 
 𝑠𝑦,𝑖,𝑡𝑖=𝑎,𝑚,𝑠 .                  (𝐴. 5) 
The expression on the right-hand side of (A.5) shows that a sector’s contribution of aggregate labor 
productivity growth depends on within-sector labor productivity growth, growth in the sector’s 
relative output price, and growth in the sector’s share of hours over time, in addition to its current 
share of value added. It is straightforward to show that the contributions of sectors to aggregate labor 
productivity growth can be approximated by the weighted sum of net growth rates in these 
components, 
(𝑌𝑡+1𝐻𝑡+1) − (𝑌𝑡𝐻𝑡)(𝑌𝑡𝐻𝑡) ≅ ∑ ( 
 ( 𝑌𝑖,𝑡+1𝐻𝑖,𝑡+1 − 𝑌𝑖,𝑡𝐻𝑖,𝑡𝑌𝑖,𝑡𝐻𝑖,𝑡 ) + (
𝑃𝑖,𝑡+1𝑃𝑡+1 − 𝑃𝑖,𝑡𝑃𝑡𝑃𝑖,𝑡𝑃𝑡 ) + (𝑠ℎ,𝑖,𝑡+1 − 𝑠ℎ,𝑖,𝑡𝑠ℎ,𝑖,𝑡 )) 
 𝑠𝑦,𝑖,𝑡.𝑖=𝑎,𝑚,𝑠 (𝐴. 6) 
   
I illustrate the total contributions of each of the three major sectors of economic activity to 
the growth rate of aggregate output per hour worked in figure (A.5). The figure shows for each sector 
the total contribution represented by its element in the sum on the right-hand side of equation (A.5). 
The figure shows that agriculture plays a very small role, and almost all time-series variation in the 
aggregate growth rate is accounted for by industry and services. However, in contrast to GDP per 
working age person, a decline in industry’s contribution heavily dominates the fall in aggregate 
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productivity in the 1990s, while a decline in services’ contribution drives continued aggregate 
productivity growth decline in the 2000s. The data in table A.5, which presents a decennial sectoral 
accounting of aggregate labor productivity growth in terms of total sectoral contributions to the 
average growth rate by decade, corroborate this. The service sector was the largest contributor to rapid 
aggregate labor productivity growth in the 1980s, although the industrial sector also contributed 
substantively. The industrial sector, however, was the dominant source of decline in aggregate labor 
productivity growth in the 1990s relative to the 1980s, and its contribution further declined in the 
2000s. However, the service sector was largely responsible for the additional substantive decline in the 
aggregate productivity growth rate in the 2000s relative to the 1990s, and solely responsible for the 









Figure A.5. Sectoral contributions to 












Figure A.6. Weighted labor 
productivity growth contributions to 












Figure A.7. Relative price contributions 
to output per hour worked growth 










Figure A.8. Hours reallocation 
contributions to output per hour 







I now decompose labor productivity growth further, using equation (A.5) (see equation (A.6) 
for an intuitive approximation) to decompose the labor productivity growth contribution of a sector 
into two sources: 1) Weighted (by its value-added share), within-sector, labor productivity growth, 
(denoted WLPG) and 2) a well-defined residual term, also weighted by a sector’s value-added share. 
The residual term comprises two effects: 1) A relative output price effect of the sector, (denoted 
REPLYL), and 2) a sector’s hours’ worked reallocation effect (denoted HRSL). The derivation follows 
Diewert (2015) closely. Figures A.6, A,7, and A.8 and table A.6 display the results of the labor 
productivity decomposition. The figures and the table show that the large decline in industry’s 
contribution to aggregate productivity growth in the 1990s relative to the 1980s was due not only to a 
substantial fall in its weighted labor productivity contribution, but also to a decline in its relative value-
added price, and to a decline in its share of hours worked – in short, to a decline in its importance as 
a sector contributor to aggregate labor productivity growth.  
    
 Table A.5. Sectoral contributions to GDP per hour worked growth (percentage points) 
 
     
 Period   
 












         
         3.05 
 
  
        -0.02  
 
         1.13   
 
          1.93  
 
1991–2000 
         
         1.64  
         
        -0.05  
         
        -0.08 
 
          1.77 
         
 
2001–2010  
        
         0.60 
       
        -0.04  
      
        -0.24 
       
 
          0.87  
        
 
2011–2018 
          
         0.49  
        
         0.02  
           
         0.22  
 
 





         1.49 
 
        -0.02 
 
         0.26 
 
 
          1.26  
 
 
By contrast, the service sector driven decline in aggregate labor productivity growth in the 
2000s was almost entirely attributable to a decline in its within sector, weighted labor productivity 
contribution which was negative (service sector labor productivity fell). The relative value-added price 
of services rose more rapidly than in the 1990s, and the increase in its share of hours worked was only 
marginally smaller than in the previous decade. In the 2010s, however, the service-sector driven decline 
in labor productivity growth reflected not a decline in its within-sector labor productivity growth, but 
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a decline in its relative output price and in growth of its share of hours worked. Nonetheless, hours 
worked continued to rise in services and decline in industry. In the 2010s although industry exhibited 
a much larger within-sector, weighted labor productivity growth contribution than services, the benefit 
of this for aggregate productivity growth was offset by persistent reallocation of hours worked from 
industry into services. Despite these observations, this evidence shows that labor productivity growth 
in all three sectors has fallen substantially and persistently since the 1980s contributing to the aggregate 
slowdown. 
A.5 Benchmark model’s sectoral accounting of GDP per hour worked 
Figures A.9 and A.10 and table A.7 show benchmark model-predicted sectoral contributions to GDP 
per hour worked growth and compares them to the data analyzed in appendix A.4. Figure A.9 shows  
Table A.6. Weighted labor productivity and residual contributions to aggregate labor  
                                    productivity growth (percentage points)        
          
   
 Period 
         
 
 Aggregate 
     Y/H 
 
Agriculture  
      
   
   Industry  
  




   WLPG       
   RELPYL   
   HRSR 
         
      3.05 
 
         2.54  
         0.55 
        -0.05  
  
    -0.02             
 
         0.14         
        -0.00 
        -0.16  
 
     1.13 
 
       1.31          
        0.02  
       -0.20  
 
    1.93        
 
       1.09         
        0.52 




   WLPG    
   RELPYL 
   HRSR 
      
      1.64  
 
         1.83        
        -0.20 
        -0.01  
 
    -0.05        
 
        0.04 
       -0.02  
       -0.06 
     -0.08  
 
        0.70  
       -0.31 
       -0.47 
     1.77 
 
        1.10        
        0.13 




    WLPG  
    RELPYL 
    HRSR 
   
      0.60 
 
         0.41 
         0.15 
         0.03 
    -0.04 
 
       -0.05 
       -0.00 
        0.01 
     -0.24    
 
        0.49          
       -0.29 
       -0.43  
     0.87 
 
      -0.03 
        0.45 




    WLPG  
    RELPYL 
    HRSR 
  
    
      0.49 
 
         0.51 
        -0.02 
        -0.00  
 
     0.02 
 
        0.01          
        0.04 
       -0.03  
      
      0.22    
 
       0.45          
       -0.01    
       -0.22 
  
     0.25  
 
        0.05        
        -0.05 






     
    WLPG  
    RELPYL 
    HRSR 
 
     1.49 
 
        1.37 
        0.13 
       -0.01  
 
    
    -0.02   
 
        0.04          
        0.00 
       -0.06 
 
  
      0.26   
 
        0.75 
        -0.15 
        -0.34 
 
    
     1.26 
 
        0.58 
        0.28 
        0.39 
 
 
the model produces insufficiently volatile output per hour contributions throughout the sample 
relative to the empirical contributions shown in figure A.10. It does successfully capture negative 
trends over the sample period in the contributions of both industry and services to labor productivity 
growth, however. The last row of numbers in table A.7 reveal that the model accurately predicts the 
full sample contributions of agriculture and services to average labor productivity growth, but 
somewhat over-predicts that of industry. The model implies quite accurate sectoral contributions to 
average productivity growth in the 1980s but fails to match quantitatively the decline in industry’s 
contribution in the 1990s relative to the 1980s. It generates fairly accurate sectoral contributions in 
the 2000s, both before and after the great recession, and modestly over-estimates the contributions of 
both industry and services in the 2010s. The model’s biggest miss relative to the data by far, however, 
is in failing to match the decline in industry’s contribution to labor productivity growth in the 1990s. 
The sectoral accounting results in section 6.1.3 show that this is attributable to a counterfactual 
increase in industry’s contribution to capital deepening and a counterfactually small decline in 
industry’s contribution to aggregate TFP factor growth in the 1990s relative to the 1980s.   
Figures A.11 through A.16 decompose model-predicted sectoral contributions to labor 
productivity growth into their weighted labor productivity, relative price, and hours reallocation 
effects, and compare them to those in the data. Table A.8 presents a decennial accounting of labor 
productivity growth by source and sector.   
Figures A.11 and A.12 show the model produces reasonable weighted labor productivity 
contributions of sectors in terms of trends, although possibly assigns a relatively small role to industry 
and agriculture and relatively large role to services. It also produces some counterfactual inverse 
correlations of the contributions of industry and services from the great recession onwards. Relative 
price contributions predicted by the model roughly match the volatility of those we see in the data 
except during the great recession, seen in figures A.13 and A.14, but the direction of some 
movements–especially in the last decade or so of the sample–are counterfactual. Figures A.15 and 
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A.16 show the model’s hours reallocation contributions of sectors are insufficiently volatile relative to 
the data.  Again, there are some counterfactual directional movements in the last decade of the sample.  
 The last four rows and first column of numbers in table A.8 show that over the entire sample 
period, the model overpredicts weighted labor productivity growth and underpredicts the relative price 
and hours reallocation effects of sectors. The second through fourth columns in the last four rows 
show that these “misses” are almost solely attributable to a full sample overprediction of service sector 
contributions to weighted labor productivity growth and underprediction of service sector 












Figure A.9 Benchmark model total 








Figure A.10 Empirical total sectoral 
contributions to output per hour 











Figure A.11 Benchmark model 
weighted labor productivity growth 








Figure A.12 Empirical weighted labor 
productivity growth contributions by 










Figure A.13 Benchmark model relative 
price effects for labor productivity 






Figure A.14 Empirical relative price 
effects for labor productivity growth by 









Table A.7 Benchmark model’s sectoral contributions to GDP per hour worked growth, data 
in parentheses (percentage points) 
 
     















    1981–1990 
         
         2.86 
        (3.05) 
  
        -0.05 
       (-0.02)  
 
         1.03 
        (1.13)   
 
         1.91 
        (1.93) 
 
    1991–2000 
 
 
         
         2.17 
        (1.64)  
         
         0.05 
       (-0.05)  
         
         0.67 
       (-0.08) 
 
         1.44 
        (1.77) 
         
          
    2001–2010  
 
         
        
         0.72      
        (0.60) 
  
        -0.01 
       (-0.03)  
      
        -0.10 
       (-0.23) 
       
 
         0.82 
        (0.87) 
        
     
    2011–2018 
 
      
        0.79 
       (0.49) 
       
        -0.07 
        (0.02)  
   
         0.33 
        (0.22)  
 
         0.51 
        (0.25) 
 
 




        1.68 
       (1.50)  
 
        -0.02 
       (-0.02) 
 
        0.49 
       (0.26) 
 
        1.21 










Figure A.15 Benchmark model hours 
reallocation effects for labor 







Figure A.16 Empirical hours 
reallocation contributions for labor 
productivity growth by sector 







Table A.8. Benchmark model’s sectoral contributions to weighted labor productivity growth  
and residual effects, data in parentheses (percentage points) 
 
   
 Period 
         
 
 Aggregate 
     Y/H 
 
Agriculture  
      
   
   Industry  
  




   WLPG       
   RELPYL   
   HRSR 
         
  2.86 (3.05) 
 
        2.95 (2.54)  
        0.01 (0.55) 
       -0.07(-0.05)  
 
  
 -0.05 (-0.02)           
 
       0.10 (0.14)               
      -0.03 (-0.00) 




       1.37 (1.31)          
      -0.21 (0.02)  
      -0.14 (-0.20)  
 
  1.91 (1.93)        
 
       1.48 (1.09)         
       0.25 (0.52) 




   WLPG    
   RELPYL 
   HRSR 
      
  2.17 (1.64)  
 
       2.18 (1.83)        
      -0.00 (-0.20) 
      -0.02 (-0.01)  
 
 
  0.05 (-0.05)       
 
       0.04 (0.04) 
       0.02 (-0.02)  
      -0.00 (-0.06) 
 
  0.67 (-0.08)  
 
       0.68 (0.70)  
       0.15 (-0.31) 
      -0.17 (-0.47) 
 
  1.44 (1.77) 
 
       1.46 (1.10)       
      -0.18 (0.13) 





    WLPG  
    RELPYL 
    HRSR 
 
   
  0.72 (0.60) 
 
       0.76 (0.41) 
      -0.00 (0.15) 
      -0.02 (0.03) 
 
  -0.01 (-0.04) 
 
       0.00 (-0.05) 
       0.02 (-0.00) 
      -0.03 (0.01) 
 
 -0.10 (-0.24)    
 
       0.40 (0.49)           
      -0.11 (-0.29) 
      -0.39 (-0.43)  
 
  0.82 (0.87) 
 
       0.35 (-0.03) 
       0.09 (0.45) 





    WLPG  
    RELPYL 
    HRSR 
  
    
  0.79 (0.49) 
 
       0.78 (0.51) 
       0.02 (-0.02) 
      -0.03 (-0.00)  
 
 -0.07 (0.02) 
 
       0.04 (0.01)            
      -0.05 (0.04) 
      -0.06 (-0.03)  
      
  0.33 (0.22)    
 
       0.54 (0.45)            
      -0.26 (-0.01)   
       0.04 (-0.22) 
  
 0.51 (0.25)  
 
      0.19 (0.05)        
      0.33 (-0.05) 




     
    WLPG  
    RELPYL 
    HRSR 
 
  1.68 (1.49) 
 
        1.72 (1.37) 
        0.01 (0.13) 
       -0.04(-0.01)  
 
    
  -0.02 (-0.02)  
 
       0.05 (0.04)          
      -0.01 (0.00) 
      -0.05 (-0.06) 
 
  
  0.49 (0.26)   
 
       0.76 (0.75) 
      -0.10 (-0.15) 
      -0.17 (-0.34) 
 
    
   1.21 (1.26) 
 
     0.91 (0.58) 
     0.11 (0.28) 




price increases for services and the mediation of their impact for labor productivity growth through 
services’ value-added share. The rest of the table shows that in every decade, while the model does a 
good job of matching weighted labor productivity growth contributions of agriculture and industry it 
significantly overpredicts that of services. It also significantly underpredicts the hours reallocation 
price contribution of services in every decade, and the relative price contribution in every decade 
123 
 
except the 2010s. The model’s predictions for agriculture’s relative price and hours reallocation 
contributions in each decade are quantitatively close to those in the data but sometimes of the wrong 
sign; the predictions for industry’s relative price and hours reallocation contributions are less accurate. 
The decomposition is, in this sense, much like that for TFP growth; the model does a decent job of 
matching weighted within-sector labor productivity growth contributions but is much less accurate in 
decomposing the residual contributions of sectors in sources.  
 
 
